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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the wage differentials and wage discrimination 
among employees in the chemical and petrochemical industries in Saudi Arabia. 
The context of segmentation is discussed through a detailed examination of the 
distinct features of the Saudi labour market, with a special emphasis on the 
Saudisation labour policy that reflects government intervention in the labour 
market. Under the Saudisation labour policy, the government compelled private 
firms to attract Saudi nationals to join their services and to secure them permanent 
jobs. The present study discusses how this policy has distorted the structure and 
function of the Saudi labour market from both the demand and supply side 
perspectives. 
Due to the lack of official data on the Saudi labour market and the 
restrictions by the Statistics Law in Saudi Arabia on access to any cross-sectional 
data, a purpose designed cross-sectional survey was conducted among a sample of 
six hundred Saudi and non-Saudi workers in these industries. Simple statistical 
analyses of the survey returns have revealed substantial differences in the pay and 
working conditions between Saudi and non-Saudi workers across a number of 
personal characteristics, such as levels of education, occupation, years of working 
experience and marital status. Regression analyses have further confirmed the 
significant differences in the effects of supply side factors on the monthly 
earnings on Saudi and non-Saudi workers. 
Using the Oaxaca-Blinder technique to measure and to decompose 
differences in average monthly earnings between Saudis and non-Saudis in the 
chemical and petrochemical industries, the study reveals that the aggregate 
earnings differentials between the two groups of workers is 62.6% in favour of 
Saudi workers, while the explained portion of the earnings differential between 
the two groups of workers is estimated at 3%, and the unexplained portion is 
calculated at 97%, which indicates a significant level of discrimination in the 
chemical and petrochemical industries. 
This study provides an original and systematic attempt at examining wage 
differentials and wage discrimination with emphasis on the sources of 
segmentation in the Saudi Arabian labour market between indigenous and migrant 
X 
workers. It contributes to bridging the gap in the studies on wage differentials and 
the labour market's segmentation in Saudi Arabia with a hope that the economic 
reforms that have started in the country will consider such issues to reform its 
labour market policy. 
xi 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Saudi economy was transformed from a subsistence economy by the 
discovery of oil in 1938. In the next few decades, labour shortages forced oil 
companies to import both skilled and unskilled foreign workers. This situation was 
exacerbated in the 1970s when the expansion of the economy increased the 
demand for labour from 1.1 million to 1.5 million workers between 1970 and 1975. 
The demand subsequently doubled between 1975 and 2000, as the result of the 
rapid economic development that followed the oil boom revenues of the 1970s. 
The supply of indigenous Saudi workers simply could not keep up with the pace of 
growth in labour demand and the country has experienced a substantial rise in the 
number of foreign or non-Saudi workers. In fact, foreign or non-Saudi workers 
now dominate the labour force in Saudi Arabia, accounting for 51% of the labour 
force in 2000. It is worth noting that the proportion of foreign or non-Saudi 
workers has reduced noticeably from 61% in 1980 over the past two decades as a 
result of the Saudi government's Saudisation policy, which is to be discussed in 
detail later. 
Despite the significant shortage of domestic labour supply and the 
dominance of the labour force by foreign or non-Saudi workers, there are apparent 
disparities in the pay and working conditions between the Saudi and non-Saudi 
workers. In 2002, the overall average monthly wage ratio between the two groups 
is found in this study as 3.7 in favour of Saudi workers. Moreover, Saudi workers, 
particularly in the public sector, have various privileges than their non-Saudi co- 
workers. Through labour laws and regulations, Saudi workers enjoy far superior 
access to various benefits over their non-Saudi workers, such as health services, 
pensions, training, and education. These aspects form the main dimensions of the 
labour market segmentation in the country. 
While much work has been done on wage inequality and labour market 
segmentation in the developed economies, there has been much less focus on such 
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phenomena in the developing countries. The original contribution of this study is 
that it examines wage differentials and wage discrimination with reference to the 
sources of segmentation in the Saudi Arabian labour market between indigenous 
and migrant workers. This is done through a case study of the Saudi Chemical and 
Petrochemical industries. Previously, issues of wage differentials and wage 
discrimination, and labour market segmentation in Saudi Arabia have neither been 
a focus for research nor a goal of labour policy in the country. Therefore, it is 
hoped that this will contribute to the increasingly widespread discussion about 
labour market policy in the country. 
1.2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Firms hire labour in the market in consideration of a rate of compensation for 
using the labour service of the worker for a certain time period. Wages represent 
the main form of payment to compensate labour. The rate of compensation, or the 
wage rate, is determined by many factors. The mechanism by which the wage rate 
is determined reflects the constantly changing work relations between employers 
and employees in different labour markets. Even in a competitive labour market, 
firms pay different wage rates to their employees. This leads to wage differentials 
between workers in these labour markets in developed and developing countries, 
and across occupations. 
There are many influences on wage differentials, such as gender, race, 
religion, size of firm, job-rank, age, industry, labour market experience, region, 
family background, training and education, immigration status, marital status, and 
number of family members (Tachibanaki, 1998). These influences are associated 
with the demand for and supply of labour factors that have a significant role in 
wage determination. The demand for labour is usually described as a derived 
demand, because labour is not demanded in itself but it is associated with the 
demand for goods and services products. Therefore, firms hire labour as a factor of 
production to combine with other factors, particularly physical capital, to produce 
these goods and services. 
According to the neoclassical theory of the firm in a perfectly competitive 
market, the demand for factors of production is derived from the firm's optimal 
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production decision; that is, to employ each factor until its marginal revenue 
product is equal to the rental price of the factor. Therefore, in a perfectly 
competitive labour market, any factor that affects the marginal product of labour 
and the wage rate determines the demand for labour. Moreover, once imperfect 
competition is considered, other factors also emerge as additional determinants. As 
a result, a broad range of factors that include wage rates, employee benefits, the 
way products are produced, and the state of technology affect the demand for 
labour. In addition, government regulations on the labour market, international 
trade between countries, consumer preferences for products, and the skills of 
labour that are augmented through education, on-the-job training, and work 
experience are also important determinants. 
Considering the supply of labour, the quantity of labour supplied depends on 
the number of individuals participating in the labour market and the number of 
hours they are willing to provide (Sapsford, 1981). Labour supply, like labour 
demand, is influenced by many factors, such as public policy, labour regulations, 
working day, employment, child labour, and information about the market price 
and demand conditions (Pencavel, 1986; Card, 1987). It is also influenced by some 
non-wage characteristics such as working conditions, job advancement, household 
size, payroll tax, social benefits, unionism, and job hazards (Altonji and Paxson, 
1985), and the presence of immigrants in the labour markets of different countries. 
However, various factors exist to distort the competitive nature of the 
labour market. It is found that in an imperfectly competitive environment, labour 
markets may be segmented into primary and secondary sectors (Doeringer and 
Piore, 1979). The former captures clean jobs, high and rising pay, and fringe 
benefits. In contrast, the secondary segment is characterised by low and stagnant 
pay, hazardous and insecure jobs, and an absence of fringe benefits. 
Wage differentials and labour market segmentation are traditionally 
examined in the context of developed countries through theoretical and empirical 
studies, which provide the theoretical and methodological basis for the current 
study. Moreover, it must also be noted that the labour market in Saudi Arabia has 
distinct characteristics, because this labour market is not deeply rooted in the 
market system and, as a formal market for labour services, it has a relatively short 
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history. It emerged during the 1930s as a formal labour market that accompanied 
the economic development of the country when oil started to be exploited. 
Currently, it is still going through significant changes in both its functions and 
structure. The next few sections provide a brief review of the process of the 
emergence of the Saudi labour market and its salient features. 
1.3 THE EMERGENCE OF THE LABOUR MARKET IN SAUDI ARABIA 
Before the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia in the 1930s, subsistence 
agriculture with its main components of raising livestock, cultivation, and fishing 
was the main economic activity apart from pearl diving. Cultivation and herding 
were carried out through the family or mutual collaboration among tribe members. 
However, some waged labour did exist in certain activities. For example, fishing 
and pearl diving were the main sources of income for native migrant workers from 
different parts of the country to the coastal areas. Some hired labour also emerged 
in agriculture to carry out irrigation through the manual elevation of water from 
wells. Nevertheless, there are no adequate wage records or statistics for that period. 
It is thought that the monthly wage rate during the 1920s and 1930s was about 
(Saudi Riyals) SR 80 per month or US $21 in current prices (Ministry of Finance, 
1999). Some small industries and handicrafts were found scattered in the big cities, 
such as cottage industries, building works, quarrying, and leather tanning. These 
firms were largely operated by hired labour. They were mostly paid for their work 
in kind, as monetary wages in their modern form only came into existence in 1910 
(Ministry of Finance, 1999). This is due to the prevalence of the subsistence 
economy that was characterised by the limited market circulation of commodities 
and mutual collaboration among people. 
Statehood started to be built when some public departments were 
established in the 1920s, which comprised the Royal Department, municipalities, 
courts, and finance and education departments, for example. Most other 
government departments were set up after the unification of the country in 1932. 
The number of employees in government agencies has increased gradually over the 
1920s and 1930s, and non-Saudi nationals started to be recruited (IPA, 1999). 
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After the first oil discovery was made in Iran in 1908, the Gulf started to 
attract petroleum companies whose efforts resulted in more oil discoveries in Iraq, 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries (Luciani, 1984). In Saudi 
Arabia, oil was discovered in 1938 by Standard Oil of California (SOCAL), which 
was changed in 1948 into the Arab American Company (ARAMCO), and later 
nationalised by the Saudi government in 1975. As was the case in many Gulf 
countries, the growing oil industry in Saudi Arabia faced a shortage of both skilled 
and unskilled labour. This shortage forced ARAMCO to import foreign workers 
whose numbers increased significantly with the onset of commercial production of 
oil in 1946, from about 2,200 workers to more than 8,600 workers in 1951. This is 
in addition to Saudi migrants who moved from different parts of the country to join 
the oil and gold mining companies (Seccombe and Lawless, 1986). 
There are no adequate records about the participation of women in the 
formal labour market in Saudi Arabia before the 1960s, when they started to be 
recruited for certain jobs in the public departments, particularly education and 
health care. Women were not recruited to jobs in manufacturing, construction, or 
similar activities in the country. 
Increased oil production during the 1970s generated large public revenues, 
which increased from 4.3 billion US dollars in 1972 fivefold to 22.6 billion US 
dollars in 1973. Part of the oil revenues was allocated to finance large numbers of 
public and private sector projects. The public departments initiated many social 
and economic schemes, such as public utility services, industrial cities, hospitals, 
educational institutions, and municipal services. Meanwhile, many other industrial, 
agricultural, and services projects were launched by the growing private sector 
with government support, subsidies, and other financial incentives. For example, 
easy financing for private projects was available from development financial 
institutions that were set up with huge amounts of capital to provide real estate, 
industrial, agricultural, and even small business financing free of interest and with 
long periods of repayment extending to more than ten years. This policy increased 
the demand for labour from 1.103 million workers to 1.522 million workers over 
the period 1970-1975, and then the demand doubled with subsequent development 
plans, particularly during 1980-2000 (Development Plans, 1970-2000). 
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1.4 SPECIAL FEATURES OF SAUDI LABOUR MARKET 
This section provides a brief introduction to the salient features of the Saudi 
labour market, which will be discussed and explained in detail in subsequent 
chapters. 
1.4.1 A high unemployment rate among Saudi workers 
Easy recruitment in the public sector with its numerous privileges 
encouraged Saudi workers to exhibit a strong preference for working in this sector 
rather than the private sector. Since the 1990s, the government has restricted 
recruitment of Saudi workers in the public sector, for certain jobs. At the same 
time, the unemployment problem started to emerge clearly for the first time since 
the oil discovery, reaching a rate of 13% in 1992 and then declining to 8.1% in 
2000. To combat the unemployment problem, the government launched a 
Saudisation policy that aimed to replace non-Saudi workers with Saudi nationals. 
1.4.2 Limited labour market participation by Saudi workers 
Although the participation of Saudi workers in the labour force has slowly 
increased from a low rate since 1980, the current participation rate, which is the 
proportion of the employed and unemployed workers to the working population, 
remains low in comparison to international standards. In 1980, the rate was about 
31% and only increased to about 35% in 2000. The low participation rate is 
fundamentally due to the very limited participation by women in the Saudi labour 
market. The majority, about 90%, of Saudi females were classified as non- 
participants in the labour market in 2000. Moreover, even among the Saudi males, 
the proportion of non-participants fluctuated around 40% of the working-age Saudi 
males. 
1.4.3 Low skill base of the indigenous labour force 
Since the beginning of oil production, Saudi Arabia has faced a shortage of 
skilled and unskilled labour. To tackle this problem, particularly over the 1970s 
and 1980s, the labour policy was directed to the importing of workers to satisfy 
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labour demand by new projects and businesses in both the private and public 
sectors. In addition, many training and educational programmes were launched to 
supply the needed skilled labour, primarily among the Saudi nationals. These 
programmes covered academic, technical education, and vocational training. 
1.4.4 A significant proportion of foreign workers in the labour force 
This is because of the labour supply shortage among native workers since 
the 1970s. Foreign workers, who were participating in different economic sectors 
but particularly in the construction and services activities, accounted for 51% of 
the total labour force participants. The majority, about 71% of the foreign workers, 
were employed in the private sectors in the year 2000 (Central Department of 
Statistics "CDS", 2000). 
1.4.5 A highly regulated labour market 
There are numerous regulations governing different aspects of the Saudi 
labour market, such as migration control, labour regulations related to Saudi and 
non-Saudi workers in both the private and government departments, and pension 
regulations. These regulations reflect a significant degree of government 
intervention in the Saudi labour market. 
1.4.6 A segmented labour market between Saudi and non-Saudi workers 
The segmentation phenomenon in the Saudi labour market stems mainly 
from the government regulations and social values that make Saudi workers seek 
work mainly in managerial and administrative jobs. The prevailing labour 
regulations in Saudi Arabia provide these workers, particularly those in 
government departments, with various privileges over non-Saudi workers who 
represent most of the workers in the private sector, which has few privileges. Apart 
from other labour market factors and personal characteristics of Saudi and non- 
Saudi workers, government regulations have contributed significantly to the wage 
differentials and wage discrimination between the two groups of workers. 
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1.5 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
The overall aim of this study is to examine the extent of wage differentials 
and wage discrimination between Saudi and non-Saudi workers and to analyse 
their sources by examining the structure and operation of the labour market in 
Saudi Arabia. More specifically, the objectives of this study are: 
" To evaluate how the regulatory system in Saudi Arabia might have 
contributed to the segmentation of the labour market and to the wage differentials; 
" To explain the main sources of the wage differentials, including workers' 
personal and productivity characteristics, such as education and training, family 
structure, nationality or ethnicity, occupation, and non-wage privileges of the 
workplace. 
" To investigate the extent of wage discrimination arising between the two 
groups of workers. 
The main approach adopted by this study to achieve these aims and 
objectives includes: 
1- An examination of the literature on wage determinationand the 
available data on the Saudi labour market; 
2-A field survey of the workers in the chemical and petrochemical 
industries; and 
3- Regression analyses and decomposition of the collected cross-sectional 
data from the survey. 
These objectives reveal the importance of the study, as the issue of wage 
differentials and wage discrimination has not yet been openly brought up in the 
Saudi labour market. It has neither become a subject of research nor a goal of 
economic policies, but the issue is there and is supported by some labour laws. 
Therefore, the importance of examining this issue is to contribute to bridging the 
gap in the studies on wage differentials and wage discrimination in Saudi Arabia 
with a hope that the economic reforms that have started in the country will 
consider such issues to remedy its labour market, and to increase awareness about 
distortions that create labour market segmentation in the country, on both the 
macro level and on the industry level. 
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1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The analysis and explanation of different variables in this study are based 
on cross-sectional data on wages collected among workers in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries through a specific questionnaire that was designed for this 
purpose. This survey was carried out due to lack of such data from existing 
sources, as a result of restrictions by legislation in Saudi Arabia, which prevents 
access to any cross-sectional data from respondents to surveys conducted by the 
Statistical Department, which is the single authorised body for household surveys. 
The survey on which this thesis is based was carried out among workers of the 
chemical and petrochemical industries in the main three cities of the country: 
Riyadh, Jeddah, and Dammam. The analysis and investigation of this data are 
based on three techniques. First, simple percentile measures of workers' earnings 
are made in the 10th, median, and 90th upper percentiles. Second, regression 
analysis is used to explain the impacts of the controlled variables on the earnings 
structure of the employees in the selected industries. Third, wage differentials are 
decomposed using the Oaxaca-Blinder technique to measure both the explained 
and the unexplained portions of the raw earnings differentials between Saudi and 
non-Saudi workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries. 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF STUDY 
The study is organised into six chapters. The first is an introductory 
chapter that provides a review of the research, characteristics of the labour market 
in Saudi Arabia, and the aims and objectives of the study. Chapter Two presents a 
literature review on wage differentials. It discusses the theoretical aspects of the 
labour supply and labour demand determinants that influence wage differentials. 
Chapter Three discusses more details about the characteristics of the Saudi labour 
market and examines the segmentation phenomenon associated with labour market 
regulations in the country. Chapter Four is devoted to a discussion of the pay and 
working conditions in Saudi Arabia, particularly in the chemical and petrochemical 
industries. It discusses the research methodology and the data related to the study. 
A descriptive analysis of the earnings differentials between Saudi and non-Saudi 
workers in these industries is also presented. Chapter Five presents the empirical 
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analysis of the structure of employees' compensation in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries in Saudi Arabia using the cross-sectional data collected in 
the three main cities of the county. It discusses and employs the Oaxaca-Blinder 
technique to decompose wage differentials between Saudi and non-Saudi workers. 
Chapter Six provides a summary and the conclusions of the study. 
10 
CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION: 
In a market economy, the employment level and the wage rate are jointly 
determined by the interactions of the demand for and supply of labour in the labour 
market. The supply of labour reflects the decision by individual workers or their 
representative bodies (e. g., trade unions) to participate in the labour market under 
desired conditions, which typically include pay and working hours. This decision 
varies substantially across different labour markets due to differences in the 
organisation of the labour market (e. g., whether or not there is union 
representation), the macro and microeconomic environment, population structure, 
skill levels of workers, social values and culture, and individual preferences. The 
demand for labour primarily reflects the macro and microeconomic environment 
within which the firms operate. Under conditions of perfect competition, the 
demand for labour is derived from the optimal factor input condition that labour 
should be hired up to the point where the nominal wage equals the marginal 
revenue product of labour (MRPL). 
In the competitive labour market, all workers would have the opportunity to 
be paid the same unit wage rate (e. g., hour, month, or some other period) under the 
following conditions: 1) All workers have identical productivity and are perfectly 
substitutable for one another. 2) There is perfect mobility of the labour force in the 
labour market. 3) All workers and employers have perfect knowledge about the 
labour market. 4) Wages are determined by demand and supply. Under conditions 
of perfect competition, any inequality in the unit wage rate must arise from 
differences in workers' productivity levels. However, it has been argued that wage 
inequality or wage difference can also be attributed to the occupational distribution 
and the nature of occupations in which workers are engaged, referred to as the 
occupational wage differential (Adam Smith, 1776). On the other hand, wage 
differentials and wage discrimination might arise due to personal characteristics 
that are unrelated to any of the above competitive labour market conditions. Such 
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personal characteristics include gender, race, and ethnicity, and form the primary 
factors for generating wage discrimination in the labour market (Arrow, 1995). 
The previous two chapters have revealed significant wage differentials 
between Saudi and non-Saudi workers in the labour market of the selected 
industries. Such differentials exist among workers from the two groups who have 
similar qualifications, or occupational status, or personal or family characteristics. 
Moreover, these chapters provide prima facie evidence of wage discrimination 
between the two groups of workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries. 
This chapter reviews the literature on wage differentials and wage 
discrimination as well as previous empirical studies on these issues. In addition, it 
discusses supply and demand factors that influence wage differentials in the labour 
market in general, and discusses literature on labour market segmentation. 
It should be noted that the wage measure in this study is based on gross 
monthly earnings computed from the basic wages, bonuses and other pecuniary 
benefits of workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries converted to a 
monthly basis. Because monthly earnings are a function of both the wage rate and 
the number of hours worked, the study concentrates here on full-time, monthly 
working hours (based on the standard 48 hours per week), which is the common 
form of labour participation in the country as well as in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries. 
Many economists have discussed wage differentials between different 
groups of workers classified by special characteristics such as sex or ethnicity in 
different countries. They examined such a phenomenon by controlling various 
factors that may influence wage determination of these workers. Such factors 
include workers' occupational status, demographic variables, human capital 
components, and other workplace characteristics. These factors usually arise from 
both the supply side and the demand side. Although the empirical analysis of this 
study focuses on the supply side factors that determine employee compensation in 
the selected industries, it is useful to start with a review of the general literature on 
both the demand and supply side factors. 
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2.2- SUPPLY DETERMINANTS OF WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
Analysis of the labour supply can be based on the representative worker's 
utility model that involves indifference curves and budget curves for the choices of 
the consumers regarding the optimal utility level. The indifference curves are 
framed to show the various combinations of the individuals' choices between two 
alternatives: work and leisure. The labour supply analysis is concerned, at the 
microeconomic level, with the individuals and the household decision on their time 
allocation. Usually, individuals' labour supply involves a choice between working 
for pay and leisure that represents what is left over from the allocated work time. 
Leisure and paid work can be used to produce specific utility or satisfaction, so 
both of them can substitute for each other and individuals can choose the optimal 
combination between the two alternatives (Smith, 1994; Sapsford, 1981). Should 
an individual sacrifice some of his/her income, there would be an increase in 
his/her leisure time that could be substituted for this sacrificed income to keep him 
as satisfied as before. 
The competitive labour supply model postulates that individuals are free to choose 
and determine the time or work hours they prefer to provide in the labour market, 
sacrificing their leisure time. This indicates that cutting off leisure time for 
working pay involves disutility that could be compensated by wages (Smith, 
1994). Figure (1) illustrates an individual or worker's combination of the two 
alternatives across indifference curves that connect the various combinations of 
income on the vertical axis and leisure time on the horizontal axis. The traditional 
utility theory assumes that as the two alternatives produce equal utility or have the 
same satisfaction level, then the worker or the individual will be indifferent to 
choosing between them. The figure expresses various combinations of the 
individual's preferences between work-for-pay and leisure time that gives him the 
same satisfaction or utility subject to income based on monthly work hour 
constraints. As individuals decide on the number of hours they supply in the 
market, they simultaneously determine their leisure time (Hi). From this figure, 
curves II, I2 and 13 are the indifference curves. Each curve shows all combinations 
of income and leisure time that gains the individual a level of utility. From this 
figure, the budget lines B, , 
B2 and B3have slopes, which represent different 
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earnings level Y, , Y2 and Y3 , while H is the allocated work time, and 
H, H2 and H3 are the leisure time left over after the worked hours. 
B3 
B2 
B, 
Y2 
Y, 
Figure (1) 
Combination of Leisure and Work Time 
The representative worker's trade-off between work and leisure depends on the 
wage rate. A change in the wage rate has two opposite effects on the trade-off: the 
so-called income and substitution effects. For example, a rise in the wage rate 
means that a worker can work for a smaller number of hours to achieve the same 
level of earnings as before. If the worker's preference for work and leisure remains 
unchanged after the rise in the wage rate, and provided that leisure is a normal 
product, the worker's demand for leisure tends to increase and thus the supply of 
labour tends to fall. This is called the income effect. However, a rise in the wage 
rate also has a substitution effect on the supply of labour as it tends towards more 
work. This is because with the rise in the wage rate, the opportunity cost of leisure 
also rises and the demand for leisure tends to fall, or the supply of labour tends to 
increase. At normal levels of the wage rate, it is usually assumed that the 
substitution effect dominates the income effect and there is a positive relationship 
between labour supply and the wage rate. However, if the wage rate is increased to 
a sufficiently high level, the income effect could dominate the substitution effect 
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and the relationship between the labour supply and the wage rate could become 
negative. 
The individual labour supply decision has been extended to study family 
labour supply. The family labour supply theory considers the family as one 
productive unit that pools together its consumption (c) and the leisure times of its 
members (L, L2 ,......, L. ). The 
family also pools its earnings and expenses; 
therefore, total family utility is maximised subject to its expenses and income. 
Becker (1968) and Killingsworth (1983) argued that the family utility model 
produces double substitution effects on its members' labour supply. The first is the 
substitution effect on one family member's labour supply of an increase in his or 
her own wage. The second effect on a family member's labour supply is the rise in 
compensation of some other family member; this is called the cross-substitution 
effect. This type of substitution effects is either positive or negative depending on 
whether the leisure time of the family members (i), and (j) is a complement or a 
substitute. Therefore, a change in the husband's income has the same effect on the 
wife's labour supply as a change in the wife's income on the husband's labour 
supply. Killingsworth (1983) argues that the gross or total effect of a rise in i's 
income on j's labour supply need not equal the total effect of a rise in j's income 
on i's labour supply, because the income effects on the two family members need 
not be equal. In addition, if the cross-substitution effects are zero for all family 
members, then the only effect of a rise in one member's income on another 
member's labour supply is a pure income effect. Campbell and Green (2002) 
assumed that rising wage inequality could be associated with incentives to devote 
long work hours in the labour market. To examine this assumption, they estimated 
the effect of the worked hours over 1991-1995 on the earnings of 1996 for men 
and women in the UK. They found that the average number of the aggregate 
weekly worked hours between 1991 and 1995 has a positive decreased impact on 
1996 gross weekly pay, with the return becoming negative beyond 47 hours for 
women and 59 hours for men. Moreover, they found that an extra unpaid hour 
between 1991 and 1995 raised earnings by 4% in 1996, and the long-term cost of 
working a short time, for women, has its implications on continuing gender gap 
earnings in favour of male versus female. They argued that these findings confirm 
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that the increased wage inequality in the UK is associated with the propensity to 
work long hours, and with the cessation of the historical downward trend in 
average worked hours. 
Granado (2003) discussed labour supply and hour constraints in the USA 
among individuals who stayed in the same job during two successive years 
(stayers) and individuals who changed their employer in this period (movers). He 
based his analysis of this issue on the assumption that workers could freely choose 
the number of hours they work, in contrast to an alternative assumption that the 
employer decides the number of hours and the workers can move at zero cost to 
the firm that offers the exact number of hours they want to work. He found that 
movers who are not laid off have positive and significant labour supply elasticity. 
He argued that this is because the higher their wages in a given year relative to the 
previous year, the higher their hours worked in that year relative to the previous 
year. In contrast, both the movers who were laid off and the stayers were found to 
have insignificant labour supply elasticity. 
However, changes in the labour supply are generated by inflow of some 
factors related to the supply side. These factors comprise human capital 
components, demographic factors, and tax and welfare transfer benefits. The next 
sections provide some details for the impact of these factors. 
2.2.1 Human Capital and Wage Determination 
The quality of efforts that individuals offer to the labour market is related 
to the human capital investments that comprise their education, training, 
experience and even health care. It represents an important part of the labour 
supply and wage determination. Often, the term "human capital" is used to indicate 
skills or labour quality (Mincer, 1993). The human capital model involves analyses 
of investments related to some categories, which mainly include education, 
training, and health factors that contribute to produce a supply of skills and to 
augment an individual's earning capacity. Such investments take the form of 
expenditures on education, job training, health and knowledge. But these forms of 
investments may be constrained by the individual's physical and mental abilities, 
family wealth, and educational and market opportunities that match his or her 
education and training (Mincer, 1974). However, the human capital investment 
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aims to increase individuals' productivity and improve their employment 
opportunities in the labour market for better earnings. 
The human capital literature confirms the impact of education and training 
on wage determination; this may give rise to wage differentials. Mincer (1993) 
contended that positive differences in wage levels that are associated with 
differences in schooling or in occupational distribution in the labour market are the 
returns to investments in education and job training. These returns change with 
changes in costs and demands for education. 
However, this points to the impact of human capital on earnings 
distribution; as Becker (1975) argues, the age-earnings profile tends to be steeper 
among more skilled and educated people, due to the impact of on-the-job training 
and education. The human capital theory confirms the life-cycle nature of the 
individual's earnings, as these earnings change over the lifetime that is associated 
with the decline in human capital investments and depreciation of the human 
capital stock. The theory postulates that the human capital investments typically 
increase during the early working life at the younger ages, and then continue at a 
diminishing rate. This is reflected in the wage profile, which grows over the 
lifetime. It is assumed that the earnings rapidly grow during the first decade of 
working life and then decline and level off in the third and fourth decades (Mincer, 
1974 and 1993). However, the earnings life-cycle pattern reflects the inherent 
biological and psychological features of the human capital stock that depreciates 
by age. Mincer (1993) argued that the age-depreciation factor has its impact on 
earnings, but only to a certain degree, because it reflects productivity changes over 
the working life. The human capital theory has considered experience and its 
effects on the worker's earnings. Theoretically, experience is viewed as being 
associated with the individual's working life. Killingsworth (1975) defined 
experience as the habit of punctuality, the habit of following rules and instructions, 
and the habit of planning and deciding. It is argued that experience increases with 
augmentation of the human capital stock. Moreover, analysis of the influence of 
experience on earnings is usually associated with the worker's educational and 
training status. 
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Concerning the impact of training on workers' earnings, Becker (1975) 
infers that trained people would receive lower earnings during the training period 
because of training costs during that period, but receive higher earnings later 
because they start to collect the returns on their training. He argues that the 
combined effect of training payment and revenues have to form the age-earnings 
curve of trained people. 
Moreover, the theory considers the impact of health care as a form of 
human capital on the worker's earnings and productivity in the labour market. 
Health improvement at working ages can help to extend the worker's earnings 
period in the labour market through keeping his/her productivity over the working 
lifetime. A better nutritional and health care programme, higher wages, coffee 
breaks, and good characteristics of the workplace may affect work ethics and 
productivity (Becker, 1975). Employees can invest in health outside the firm, but a 
firm may pay such investment if it could benefit from the resulting increase in 
productivity. It can pay by offering higher wages during the investment period than 
would normally be offered and it can convert outside health investment into on- 
the job investment. 
The human capital theory postulates procedures to measure returns to the incurred 
investments. The same investment appraisal techniques of the internal rate of 
return (IRR) and the net present value (NPV) that are used for physical capital 
investment can be applied to human capital investment. The discount factor of 
these components is based on the compound principle that aims to evaluate the 
forecast returns of the proposed invested capital. These techniques usually consider 
the time preference of the investments and their opportunity cost. The human 
capital theory applies the same techniques to predict the returns on human capital 
investments. An example is the regression earnings equation developed by Mincer 
in 1974 to estimate the rate of return to human investments; this equation 
(Equation 1) is expressed as: 
InY =Bo +B, S+B2 X +B3X2 +u (1) 
where ln(Y) is the natural logarithmic earnings rate, S is years of schooling, X is 
experience, B, is the rate of return to schooling, B2 is a coefficient reflecting a 
positive return to experience, B3 is negative coefficient of the quadratic 
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experience (X2) , and u is the residual error term. In this equation, the experience 
variable is measured in years of working life to represent accumulated investments 
on-the-job training and on-the-job mobility. The quadratic experience term (X2) in 
Equation (2) is based on the assumption that investment in human capital declines 
linearly with time, which indicates that the experience square coefficient(B3) is 
expected to be negative. Mincer (1974) estimated the rate of return for schooling in 
the USA as 10.7% His estimates suggested that the return on years of experience 
produced a positive value of 8.1%, but to a certain extent, as each additional year 
produces a negative reward estimated at (-0.012%). Willis (1986) presents changed 
rates for the average rate of return of education in the USA between 1939 and 1982 
for secondary and higher educations. He contended that the educational rate of 
return declined to rates between 5.3% and 0.187% for both types of education over 
1939-1982, while it appeared stable around 10% over the period 1939-1969. 
Heckman et al. (2003) estimated earnings equations for white and black males in 
the USA using census data for the period 1940-1990. They concluded that the rate 
of return on schooling is estimated at around 10-13% for white men and 9-15% 
for 
black men over the period 1940-1990. They estimated the coefficient on 
experience as 9-13% for white men with a negative coefficient on experience 
square of 0.13-0.23% for this group, and estimated the experience coefficient as 
6.5-11% for black, while the coefficient of the experience square for this group 
produced zero values over 1940-1990. 
On the basis of the earnings function (Equation 1), the model of the human 
capital discount factor can be obtained to measure the present value of the lifetime 
earnings for both uneducated and educated workers (Sapsford and Tzannatos, 
1993), which are shown in Equations (2) and (3) as : 
PV" =(W"/r) (1-e-rT) (2) 
PVe=(W`/r) (1-e-rT) e-rs (3) 
where : 
PV is the present value, W is the lifetime earnings, (e) is the basis of the natural 
logarithm, (W/r) is the present value of annuity paid forever, (1-e-'T) is the finite 
life correction factor (that is, it corrects the previous ratio for the fact that people 
eventually stop working for one reason or another), and (e-'S) is another 
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adjustment for the fact that those who become educated will have no wage until 
their education stops and work starts, and the subscripts (e) stands for the educated 
workers, (u) stands for the uneducated workers, (r) for interest rate, (T) is the 
working time years, and (s) is the number of schooling years. Equating the right- 
hand side of the two equations and eliminating the finite life correction factor for 
both sides expressed as (Equation4): 
We =Wu e rS (4) 
and taking the logarithms on both sides in Equation (5) as: 
ln(W")=1n(W")+rS (5) 
They conclude that the theory is compatible with the common sense result that 
educated workers should have greater wages than uneducated workers (W. >W"). 
This simple model provides a convenient relationship between annual earnings and 
length of schooling (in years). 
2.2.2 Demographic Factors and Wage Determination 
In labour economics, demographic factors comprise a worker's personal 
characteristics that include age, marital status, gender or sex, and family structure, 
especially number of children and their age distribution. These factors have their 
influences on the worker's earnings and their distribution. Age is a demographic 
factor that indicates physical conditions and the lifetime of the worker in the labour 
market. Workers usually enter the labour market at a young age (for example, at 15 
years old), continue up to old age and then retire at the age of 55 or older. Age has 
an influence on earnings, which usually increase with age but at a decreasing rate 
because the worker's productivity tends to decrease with the increase in age. On the 
other hand, the human capital theory postulates that individuals' lifetime earnings 
curves reflect their productivity changes. Initially, productivity starts at the 
younger ages then levels off in the middle years and declines later due to decrease 
of physical and cognitive abilities (Mincer, 1993; Killingsworth, 1975). These 
biological characteristics of age increase work as a depreciation factor that 
influences the worker's earnings across his/her working lifetime. Mincer (1974, and 
1993) provided some evidence to show that the inherent age depreciation factor 
affects earnings only to a limited degree, except at teenage and in the near- or post- 
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retirement years. It is argued that age has positive effects on these earnings in early 
working life and negative effects in later years. On the other hand, this theory of 
productivity associates human capital investments with age-earnings profile. One 
point to note is that it is useful to distinguish the effects on earnings from age and 
from experience. Whilst the age effects may reflect the worker's physical 
productivity over the lifetime, the experience effects reflect the impact on earnings 
of the worker's on-the-job training or learning activities. 
Gender or sex is another variable of the demographic factors; it is usually 
used in labour economics to refer to male and female workers or men and women. 
Social, cultural and traditional values have their influences on the earnings 
distribution between men and women, particularly in the developed countries and 
urban areas in the developing countries. In addition, other factors such as religious 
and family conventions also determine women's participation in the labour market 
in many developing countries such as in Saudi Arabia and some other Middle East 
countries. Under the competitive labour market conditions, wages are determined 
on the basis of labour productivity, and inequality of unit wage rate is thought to be 
an unfair practice. So disparity of work payment between men and women creates 
wage or earnings differentials between them. Many economists examined the wage 
inequality between men and women over different historical periods and in different 
countries, and found that generally men earn more than women even where both 
have similar productivity characteristics. In addition, gender can be a source of 
wage discrimination in the labour market, which exists when a person, particularly a 
woman, is treated on different basis due to their gender (Becker, 1971; Oaxaca, 
1971; Goldin 1990). 
Marital status is another demographic component, which relates to the labour 
supply determinant of the wage rate. It influences workers' earnings in the labour 
market and contributes to the wage differential between married and unmarried 
workers, male or female. It is known that during the past several decades since the 
1940s, women's participation in the labour market has increased, particularly 
among married women in the developed countries (Pencavel, 1986 and Goldin, 
1990). In contrast, most women in some of the developing countries are still 
struggling to get themselves a place in the labour market instead of keeping behind 
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the doors at home, such as in Saudi Arabia and some other Middle East countries. 
On both theoretical and empirical levels, there is a wide agreement among labour 
economists that married men earned more than their unmarried colleagues 
(Korenman and Neumark, 1991). But economists give different explanations for 
the source of wage marital differential or the marriage premium for the married 
men. It is assumed that productivity of the married males explains difference in 
wages, as married males tend to provide more working hours (Lillard and Waite, 
2000; Krashinsky, 2000; Rodgers and Stratton, 2003; among others). Moreover, it 
is found that workers who enter the marriage institution by a year later earn less 
than earlier-married people, which might further strengthen the wage marital 
differential (Korenman and Neumark, 1991; Bergstorm and Schoeni, 1992). It is 
also assumed that employers discriminate against married women in favour of 
married men. The reason is that employers discriminately regard married women 
as a factor of employment instability due to family responsibilities, which creates a 
marriage pay premium for men. Furthermore, work disturbance reduces the 
augmented work experience for the married women and then influences their 
human capital assets (Siebert and Sloane, 1981). 
The family structure has its influences on the wage differentials between men 
and women in the labour market as well. The literature on the marriage premium 
indicates that married women earn less than unmarried women (Korenman and 
Neumark, 1991; Waldfogel, 1998; Richardson, 2000). This may be due to non- 
labour earnings of other family members, especially husbands (Goldin, 1990) or 
due to the presence of children, particularly those with infants, as this interrupts the 
mother's attachment to the labour market (Lundberg and Rose, 1998). 
2.2.3 The Welfare System and Earnings 
Taxes are usually set by the government as a policy to redistribute incomes 
among individuals through various welfare systems such as family credit, child 
benefit, and old-age pensions. Direct taxes are the main forms that are used 
partially to fund such programmes. Labour tax on payroll or earning or income is 
another factor that influences the labour supply and the workers' earnings. High 
rates of income tax on high wage earners may encourage employers to pay them 
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higher wages, while tax cuts for low paid workers may allow employers to cut 
wages. Therefore, the impact of income taxes that is borne by both the employer 
and the employee is usually determined by the elasticity of labour supply and 
demand (Sloman, 1997). The imposition of taxes distorts wage equilibrium by the 
tax rate, as is illustrated by Figure (2). Assuming that the labour market is in the 
equilibrium state before the labour tax is imposed, as labour supply and demand 
intersect at the wage reservation point (W, ). With the imposition of the labour tax, 
the labour supply curve shifts vertically upwards by the tax amount, (S + tax rate). 
The new intersect point will be at the wage rate (W2). This figure shows that the 
income of workers is cut from W, to (W2 - tax). This amount represents their tax 
share, which is represented by area A; in this figure, labour supply is relatively 
elastic while employers have to pay their share of tax as shown by area B. In the 
case of inelastic labour supply, workers pay most of the tax area (A') and the 
employer firm would have to pay its share of tax by the small portion that is shown 
by area (B') in Figure (3). However, the imposition of an income tax produces 
both income and substitution effects. The income effects suggest that because 
workers' income is reduced by the tax rate, they should increase their labour 
supply to keep the same income level as before, while under the substitution 
effects, the income tax reduces the opportunity cost of leisure, as an extra hour 
taken in leisure involves smaller opportunity cost in consumption, allowing 
workers to reduce their labour supply (Sloman, 1997). Besides, it is assumed that a 
rise in the income tax rate has two opposite effects: it reduces labour supply if the 
substitution effect is greater than the income effect or it increases labour supply if 
the substitution effect is outweighed by the income effect (Smith, 1994). 
Tax revenues are the main source of financing the welfare system that 
provides specific benefits to different people. In developed countries, however, 
benefits are either cash or in kind. The cash benefits in turn are of two types. One 
is means-tested benefits whose amounts depend on the recipients' income that falls 
23 
Wage Rate 
S+tax 
W2 
B 
w, 
W, 
-tax 
A 
-- --------- 
Q2 QI 
Incidence of Income Tax ( Elastic Labour Supply) 
Figure (2) 
24 
Wage Rate 
S+tax 
W2 
WI 
W. 
_tax 
2 
------------ 
--------- --ý---- 
o. 
------- ---- 
1 
S 
D 
Qý 
Incidence Income Tax ( Inelastic Labour Supply) 
Figure(3) 
25 
below a certain level. This type of benefits requires the qualified people to declare 
their personal circumstances to the authorities. The other type of cash benefits is 
the universal benefits that cover different people such as pension benefits, 
unemployment benefits, and social relief, health care and invalidity benefits. This 
type of cash benefits can be provided to different people irrespective of their 
income. Workers usually pay social security contributions on the basis of their 
earnings. When they are retired, or become unemployed or fall sick, they are 
entitled to these benefits. On the other hand, the benefits in kind are not direct 
monetary payment; they take the form of the provision of free or subsidised goods 
or services. The two most common forms of the benefits in kind are health care and 
education (Sloman, 1997). In addition, there are some social insurance programmes 
that are directed to compensate workers who are unable to work because they face 
a temporary work injury, or a permanent disability, or being laid off. Under these 
programmes, benefits are only paid to those who are not working. 
Income 
Yn 
0 Employment 
Figure (4) 
Social Welfare and Labour supply 
However, the productivity theory assumes that payment of social welfare 
benefits is based on the difference between individual's actual earnings and his/her 
needs. Ehrenberg and Smith (2000) explain that this difference creates a net wage 
26 
needs. Ehrenberg and Smith (2000) explain that this difference creates a net wage 
rate of zero. Their main arguments are illustrated by the guaranteed annual income 
programme in US. Under this programme the income of an eligible person is 
determined based on family size, area living costs, and local welfare regulations. 
The person's actual earnings are subtracted from the needed income. If the person 
does not work he or she receives a subsidy of (Ye ), see Figure (4). If the person 
works; but faced with reduction in his/her welfare benefits, then the budget 
constraint like ABCD is created. They suggested that, an extra hours work might 
yield no net increase in the person's income; because the extra earnings result in an 
equal reduction in the welfare benefits and the net wage of a person is zero, which 
is expressed in the figure by the segment (BC). But the welfare programme could 
increase the person's income by moving the lower end of the budget constraint out 
from AC to ABC as indicated by the dashed constraint. They argued that, this shift 
creates an income effects tending to reduce labour supply from hours at point E 
(hours of work) to point F (hours of leisure). 
Jackman, Layard, and Nickell (1996) studied the effects of the 
unemployment policies on wages. They found that though unemployment benefits 
reduce the fear of unemployment and thus directly increase wage pressure from the 
unions, these benefits reduce the effectiveness of the unemployed workers. This 
encourages employers to raise wages. In addition, these benefits tend to reduce the 
competition that newly unemployed workers will face in their search for jobs. This 
again encourages the unions to push for higher wages. The authors argued that 
under elimination of benefits due to long unemployment, the wage flexibility 
policy will increase employment but will produce more unequal wages. Thus this 
policy will not eliminate unemployment in the long run. They discussed the impact 
of taxes on employment, arguing that reduction of payroll tax and increase of 
consumption tax rate will leave the tax wedge unchanged but will lower the 
equilibrium of unemployment so long as non-labour income is zero. They 
considered the impact of tax on labour costs in the long run, and found that tax has 
no significant effects on real labour costs in the long run in OECD countries. 
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2.3 LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION AND WAGE 
DETERMINATION 
The standard theory of labour market segmentation initiated by Doeringer 
and Piore (1979) interprets different aspects of the labour market in the context of 
dualism. According to the theory, dualism occurs because of allocation of certain 
rights and privileges to a group of workers governed by certain rules that form an 
internal labour market, rather than others in the external labour market. Doeringer 
and Piore(1979) argued that the dualism phenomenon of the labour market is 
clearly interpreted by segmentation of the labour market into primary and 
secondary sectors. The two segments of the labour market are interconnected as 
movement between them occurs at certain job classifications that form ports of 
entry and exit to and from the internal or primary labour market. Meanwhile, jobs 
within the internal labour market are occupied by the promotion or moving of 
workers. Then this market is protected from external competition. 
However, wage determination in the internal labour market is usually based 
on three factors that include: 
9 wage level, which describes the internal wage structure; 
" vertical wage difference that refer to the differences in the 
wage rate across jobs; and 
9 horizontal wage differences which refer to the differences in 
the wage rate among individuals in the same jobs. 
These factors are incorporated into three wage-setting instruments that 
comprise job evaluation, community wage surveys, and engineered production 
standards. More specifically, job evaluation is associated with vertical 
differentiation as it aims to set jobs into hierarchical ranks with different wage 
rates. It is based on some characteristics that are related to the job, such as skills, 
working conditions, managerial and technical responsibility, and some personal 
characteristics related to the worker holding the job, such as education, training 
and experience. Under the job evaluation procedure, a maximum number of points 
or weights is set up for each of these characteristics, and the wage rate is based on 
these points. The second instrument is the community wage surveys that associate 
the firm's wage level with its competitors in the labour market. This instrument is a 
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systematic procedure by which the firm compares its wage structure with that of its 
competitors for employment. However, wage surveys might extend to cover 
various aspects of working conditions. Doeringer and Piore (1979) argued that the 
firm not only surveys the wage rates, but also vacations, holidays, retirement 
benefits and other fringe benefits paid by the competitors. Bulow and Summers 
(1986) emphasise importance of wage surveys for the firms in the primary sector, 
because firms need to assess where they are standing in the wage distribution in the 
labour market. The third instrument is engineered production standards associated 
with the horizontal differentiation as suggested by the standard theory of internal 
labour market. The horizontal differentiation shows wages adjustment made by 
firms based on workers' merit rates and the incentive system. Under the merit 
rating system the firm sets some criteria to decide the workers' rates within the job 
classification and reviews the employees periodically in light of these criteria. 
While under the incentive rules, the wage adjustment or the horizontal 
differentiation factor shows payment by results or reward of the output. 
However, the segmentation theory assumes that the two labour market 
sectors behave differently with a limited labour mobility between them. This is due 
to the hierarchy system of the primary sector, and to its administrative rules that 
limit inter-sectoral mobility between the two segments. The theory attributes 
appearance of these barriers to the characteristics of the secondary sector. These 
characteristics mainly comprise instability of employment, high unemployment 
rates, low wages and poor chances for advancement, poor training opportunities, 
and lack of administrative rules of work (Doeringer and Piore, 1979). These 
barriers arise even though the workers in the secondary sector have the necessary 
work skills and proper work habits for the primary sector. This keep these workers 
standing in the queue as a reserve of the labour force in the primary sector, so they 
might be assigned to jobs for short periods in the secondary sector (Rosenberg, 
1989; Doeringer and Piore, 1979). Workers in the primary sector can move across 
job ladders through structured and administrative rules of advancement of the 
upper and lower tiers of the primary sector. Those in the primary upper tier have 
good pay and work status that provides them with greater advancements and job 
mobility opportunities, as compared to their colleagues in the primary lower tier 
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(Osterman, 1975; Rosenberg, 1989). However, there are some factors that 
influence existence of the dual labour markets. These factors include specific 
skills, on-the-job training, and custom. Doeringer and Piore (1979) convened 
specific skills to the ways these skills can be utilized within different internal 
labour markets. They argued that skill specificity influences existence of these 
markets in three ways. First, when skills become more specific it becomes 
increasingly difficult for the worker to utilize them elsewhere than his/her current 
firm. Thus, this reduces his/her incentive to invest in specific training, but 
increases the incentive for the firm to increase such training in order to reduce 
employees' turnover (Rosenberg, 1989). Second, through on-the-job training, the 
performed work cannot be duplicated in the classroom, because this training is 
derived from the content of the job itself, and then confined only to skills required 
for the job. In addition, on-the-job training has certain advantages over classroom 
instruction, because instruction on the job is made individually and can be tailored 
to the learning capabilities of each trainee; in addition, the relevance of the 
instruction is immediately apparent. Therefore, specificity promotes this type of 
training by reducing number of people learning a particular skill at a given time. 
Doeringer and Piore (1979) argued that the specificity of training makes skills, 
which it produces highly specific to the enterprise they were required. The third 
way is the firm custom that confines to the way employers are developed to govern 
work performance and how individuals relate to each other in the work process. 
Rosenberg (1989) inferred that customs are usually codified in the internal labour 
markets. 
2.4 LABOUR DEMAND AND WAGE DETERMINATION 
Wage determination is also influenced by the demand for labour, which in 
turn is affected by changes in some factors that comprise technological innovation, 
consumer tastes, and impacts of international trade on employment. However, 
demand for labour is defined as the amount of labour that the employers employ 
during a certain period and at a particular wage rate. The demand for labour is a 
derived demand on goods and services, because labour is demanded not for its own 
sake but for its contribution to the production of goods and services. 
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This section discusses the impact of the above factors on wage 
determination in the labour market. 
2.4.1 Technological Change and Labour Demand 
Technology refers to people's use of their inventions and discoveries to 
satisfy their needs and desires (The World Book Encyclopaedia, 1996). 
Technological change, which may encompass the introduction of new products and 
production techniques as well as changes in technology, enables firms to cut costs. 
It may affect demand for labour through demand for product; therefore, shifts in 
product demand tend to shift labour demand in the same direction, and changes in 
the elasticity of product demand will tend to cause similar changes in the elasticity 
of labour demand. Thus, introduction of new products, e. g., word processors that 
serve as a substitute for old ones (such as typewriters), will tend to shift the labour 
demand curve in the older sector to the new one, causing loss of employment in the 
former sector. Another dimension of the technological change is that associated 
with the substitution of capital for labour, which is related to reduction in cost of 
capital. Let's consider the elasticity of substitution between the two variables, i. e., 
the percentage change in the capital (K)/ labour (L) ratio due to a1 percent change 
in the relative price of labour. With the assumption that output (Y) is constant, the 
elasticity of substitution is measured by Equation (6) as: 
Elasticity of Substitution= 
%AK/L (6) 
%A W/r 
where W/r is the ratio of labour wage (W) to the labour cost (r). If the relative 
price of labour increases, the capital/labour ratio increases, resulting in positive 
elasticity, and then the elasticity is said to be a gross substitute. If the elasticity is 
negative, the gross elasticity is said to be a gross complement. 
However, the extent to which capital and a particular type of labour are 
gross substitutes depends on the nature of the industry and the production 
processes. Moreover, it is generally true that unskilled labour and capital are more 
likely to be a gross substitute rather than the relation between skilled labour and 
capital, which tends to be a gross complement. Therefore, it is suggested that 
technological change increases the demand for skilled labour more than for 
unskilled labour. On the other hand, the standard theory of labour demand assumes 
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that the technological change may increase demand for skilled workers by more 
than unskilled workers because of the skill-biased technological changes. It is 
assumed that if the technological changes are good substitue for the unskilled 
labour and complement for the skills of highly educated workers, these changes 
would lower the demand for the unskilled labour, and increase the demand for the 
skilled labour, and then they have their impacts on the wage structure of both 
categories of the workers (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2000; Borjas, 2002). Figure (5) 
links wages to supply of and demand for skills. It represents two types of workers, 
skilled and unskilled workers, and (wo) is the equilibrium wage ratio of the number 
of skilled and unskilled workers. The demand is depicted as downward sloping 
because the greater the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers, the lower 
the fraction of skilled workers that employers would like to hire. The relative 
supply of skills (p; ) is assumed to be inelastic in the short run, to indicate that a 
certain fraction of the workers is skilled regardless of the wage gap between skilled 
and unskilled workers (Borjas, 2002). Under the conditions of the competitive 
labour market, equilibrium of supply (So) and demand (Do) attains at point (A) and 
the relative supply of skill (Pi) given by (wo). Under these conditions, there are two 
ways in which the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers could have 
increased. The first is initiated by the supply curve to shift to left indicating a 
reduction in the relative number of skilled workers and then increase their relative 
wage. The second is the demand curve to shift to the right (D1), indicating a 
relative increase in the demand for skilled workers and again rising their relative 
wage. On the other hand, shifting supply from (So) to (Si), keep other things 
constant, the labour market equilibrium shift to point (B) reducing the relative 
wage of skilled labour to (w'). On this figure, with shifting of the demand curve 
for skilled labour from(Do) to(Di) will increase the relative wage of skilled labour 
to(w") with the equilibrium point (C). 
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Moreover, some economists have referred to a historical aspect of the effects 
of technological change on labour demand. Acemoglu (2002), and Ehrenberg and 
Smith (2000) argued that technologies of the early nineteenth century were skill- 
replacing (unskilled-biased), because the increased supply of the unskilled workers 
in cities of England made introduction of the new technology that was based on 
skills more profitable, while the technical change in the last sixty years of the 
twentieth century is skill-biased because the rapid increase in the supply of skilled 
workers has induced development of skill complementary technologies. 
The debate on the impact of technological change on labour market issues 
extends to involve wage inequality among workers. In general, economists agreed 
on contribution of the technological change on wage inequality by skills, between 
higher skilled workers and those with lower human capital, as technological 
change essentially is an outcome of application of research and development that is 
based on human capital investment. Card and DiNardo (2002) discussed the 
influence of technological change on wage inequality between male-female and 
black-white workers in the US. They concluded that technological change over the 
1970s and the 1990s had some effects on relative wages, as during the 1970s the 
wage inequality for white workers fell from 28% to 18% for men and from 18% to 
4% for women. While during the 1980s, when the overall wage inequality was 
rising and the gender gap was closing, the black-white wage gap was relatively 
stable. In the 1990, racial wage gap were roughly constant. In addition, the skill- 
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biased technological change by itself has not provided evidence to understand the 
shifts in the wage structure in the US labour market in the last quarter of the 20`h 
century. 
Reenen (1993) examined the impact of technological change on wage 
inequality by using data of the Industrial Relations Survey of 1984 in the UK. He 
found that technological change has strong effects on wages of skilled manual 
groups of workers. He found that the skill-biased technology (SBT) widened wage 
inequality, as the wage differentials associated with new technology is estimated 
between 5 and 7%. He also found that high union intensity in workplaces reduces 
the impact of technology wage inequality, especially for skilled manual workers. 
Allen (2001) provides another work on the relationship between technology 
and wage distribution. He explained this issue in the context of schooling, 
experience, and gender in the US. He found that increases in Research and 
Development (R&D), and acceleration in the growth of the capital-labour ratio 
coincide with increased wage gaps by schooling within industries. Moreover, he 
found that increases in R&D are associated with wage gap between college and 
high-school gradates in non-scientific occupations; as a one percentage increase in 
R&D intensity increases the wage gap between the two groups by 1.6% in contrast 
to 2.1 % for all occupations. He also found that the impact of the technological 
change on wage inequality is stronger with R&D, and workers in the R&D- 
intensive sectors have greater wages than their colleagues in sectors with little 
R&D. He found that R&D fell by 0.8% in fabricated metals and rose by 1.7% in 
the public utilities, and the wage gap between the two groups of workers in these 
sectors increased by 3.6% between workers in the public utilities and 1.7% 
between workers in the fabricated metals. Yin (2002) discussed the impact of the 
technical change on wage and employment disparity among the skilled and 
unskilled workers in the context of general equilibrium of the labour market. He 
argued that the skill-biased technological change (SBTC) provides an explanation 
for the causes of such disparity. Many economists (Katz and Murphy, 1991; 
Johnson, 1997; Yin, 2002), argued that the increased demand for highly-skilled 
workers, in the 1980s and the early 1990s, played a leading role in increasing the 
earnings gap between skilled and unskilled workers in most developed countries, 
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particularly in the UK and the USA. Yin (2002) argued that a shift in demand from 
unskilled to skilled workers is associated with changes in the composition of the 
products that an economy produces and the way these products are produced. 
Therefore, a change in the composition of products will induce a change in relative 
demand for the skilled or the unskilled labour. However, when Saudi Arabia 
planned to change its economy from a subsistence pattern into a modern one, 
demand for skilled labour was required to operate oil industry and highly- 
technological petrochemical plants, and in the meantime the demand increased for 
unskilled labour to meet the demands of the construction and production sectors. 
Different products (or sectors) have different skill characteristics and require 
different combinations of skilled and unskilled labour to produce the respective 
product or products. 
Considering skilled and unskilled wage determination, Yin (2002) argued 
that the disparity in skilled-unskilled wages and employment is largely influenced 
by the business cycle. Therefore, economic booms and recessions may be 
associated with a reduction or an increase in the elasticity of supply of skilled and 
unskilled labour, and a difference in the elasticity or inelasticity of the supply of 
skilled and unskilled labour may explain the relatively stagnant nature of the 
unskilled workers' wage growth and their unemployment, as unskilled workers 
have less bargaining power in their wage determination than their skilled 
counterparts. Moreover, it is expected that during recessions, labour mobility 
across skills can be downward rather than upward, because the skilled workers can 
do many unskilled occupations, while the unskilled workers cannot enter the 
skilled job market, at least without a considerable period of training to augment 
such skills. But during economic booms, for example, the skilled workers are 
reluctant to move downward for unskilled jobs, while the unskilled workers may 
have some bargaining power to determine their wages, and the divergence of 
elasticity of labour supply between them and the skilled workers tends to decrease. 
2.4.2 International Trade and Demand for Labour 
Iinternational trade theory is mainly initiated by the works of the classical 
economists (Mill and Ricardo among others), while the modern contributions to 
the theory are based on the principle that trade is driven by the relative costs of 
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producing various commodities or comparative advantages that make a country 
specialise in products that provide it with the greatest comparative advantage over 
the others. 
Countries have various endowments of factors of production. This variety 
tends to persist because factors of production are relatively immobile between 
countries. Therefore, the ability to supply commodities involves differences in both 
absolute and comparative advantages. The absolute advantage refers to the ability 
of a country to produce a product at a lower cost with fewer resources than another 
country. If country A can produce X product with fewer resources than country B, 
which can produce Y product with fewer resources than country A, then each of 
the two countries has an absolute advantage in the respective product, and 
production of both X and Y commodities will be maximised by each country. On 
the other hand, comparative advantage refers to the ability of a country to produce 
a product at a lower cost relative to the cost of producing the same good in another 
country. According to the theory of comparative advantage, trade between two 
countries can be rewarding even if one of them could produce all goods with less 
resources than the other, provided that the relative efficiency of producing these 
goods differs between the two countries; i. e., to produce with a lower cost in one 
country than in the other. Therefore, countries gain from international trade by 
specialising in goods that have a comparative advantage and importing goods that 
have a comparative disadvantage. This is known as the law of comparative 
advantage. 
The modern theory of international trade assumes that countries have a 
comparative advantage in abundant goods. This factor concerns the classification 
of countries relative to their most available factor of production, mainly labour and 
land. The country is said to be labour abundant relative to another country, if the 
first country (A) is endowed with more labour per unit of land in relation to the 
second county (B). Similarly, the country is land or capital abundant, if it is 
endowed with more land per labour in relation to another country. However, the 
abundant factor is usually associated with the factor intensity that refers to units of 
labour or land or capital that are required to produce units of commodity. For 
example, if commodity Y requires more labour per unit of land than commodity X, 
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then commodity Y is labour intensive relative to commodity X in the production 
process. This relation can be put in another way: commodity X requires more units 
of land per unit of labour than commodity Y. In that case, commodity X is said to 
be land (capital) intensive relative to commodity Y. 
These aspects contribute to a country's specialisation in terms of Hecksher- 
Ohlin's comparative advantage principle. However, a country's pattern of 
specialisation also depends on the terms of trade; that is, the relation between 
export and import prices or the exchange ratio of exports and imports. Therefore, 
the terms of trade are highly influenced by prices of exports and imports. These 
prices in turn depend on the demand and supply of the traded goods and their 
elasticities in the respective countries. Economists argue that introduction of 
international trade under a perfectly competitive product market has its effects on 
labour demand. Chacholiades (1978) confirms that with the introduction of 
international trade, workers become worse off while employers (landlords) become 
better off, irrespective of the peculiarities of their indifference maps or curves. This 
point can be illustrated by the case of a perfectly competitive product market with 
two commodities and two factors of intensity (for example, product Y is land- 
intensive and X is labour-intensive). With the advent of international trade, 
production of Y expands while that of X contracts and both commodities become 
more labour intensive and the marginal physical product of labour (MPPL) will 
fall, while the marginal physical product of land (MPPT) will rise in the two 
industries. Therefore, when the ratio MPPT/MPPL increases, the relative income of 
workers falls, and the relative income of landlords rises. Borjas and Ramey (1995), 
among others, have discussed the impact of the international trade on employment. 
They examined the relationship between trade in durable goods that are produced 
by concentrated industries and wage inequality. They recognized that these 
industries employed many skilled and unskilled workers who earn high wages. The 
authors explained that when foreign firms enter markets in which domestic firms 
have market power, their entry increases the wages of highly-educated workers in 
two ways. First, because revenues of domestic firms have fallen, the wage ratio of 
workers remaining in these industries decreases. Second, to the extent that foreign 
competition reduces employment in the concentrated industries, many of the 
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workers move to lower-paying competitive sectors, while the wages of less- 
educated workers fall relative to the educated workers. The authors emphasised 
that the more competitive the industry, the lower the impact of net imports on rents 
per workers and, consequently, the smaller the decline in wages. Thus, the negative 
impact of net imports on wages is stronger when the industry is more concentrated. 
They assumed that the wage ratio of the less-educated workers to the more- 
educated workers is influenced by wages in the concentrated and competitive 
industries. They argued that an increase in net imports of the goods produced by 
the concentrated industries shifts labour from these industries to the competitive 
industries, and decreases wages of the less-educated workers in both industries. 
Wages decrease in the competitive industries because the supply of less-educated 
workers has increased. This results in an overall decrease in the average wage of 
the less-educated workers relative to the more-educated workers. Concerning the 
impact of foreign competition on the overall market of the penetrated industry, 
Borjas and Ramey (1995) argued that the negative impact of this competition on 
wage inequality would be smaller when the industry being penetrated is more 
competitive. Using data on wages and employment from USA Current Population 
Surveys from 1977-1991, they examined an assumption that foreign competition in 
highly concentrated industries is an important factor underlying the increase in the 
return to skills observed in the 1980s in the USA. They found that the shift of 
workers out of the concentrated sector into the rest of the economy could account 
for up to 23% of the increase in the wage inequality between 1976 and 1990. 
Borjas and Ramey also found that trade could explain about half of the decline in 
employment in these industries during this period. They concluded that changes in 
trade in the concentrated industries could account for 10% of the aggregate 
increase in wage inequality over the period. Greenaway et al. (1999) discussed the 
effect of foreign competition on wages in the UK. They introduced import and 
export variables to the earnings equation. They suggested that foreign competition, 
as expressed by trade, the level of union density, labour productivity, and human 
capital, influences the ability of firms to pay, and unions to obtain, large wage 
increases. They found that an increase in the level of import penetration causes a 
fall in wages in both the short run and long run, and increases in the level of export 
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activity also have a negative impact both in the short and long terms. They argued 
that since trade negatively affects wages, if those at the bottom end of the income 
scale are disproportionately affected by trade liberalisation, then this would cause 
income distribution to become more unequal. They contended that the origin of 
imports has its impact on the wage distribution among workers; for example, trade 
between the UK and East Asia tends to increase the wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers, while the expansion of intra-industry trade within the European 
Union tends to affect the relatively highly-skilled workers. 
2-4.3 Changing Consumer Behaviour 
Consumer demand expresses the amount of a commodity or a service that 
consumers are willing to buy at a given price during a stated period. Demand of 
individual consumers gives rise to the market demand for goods and services. The 
theory of consumer behaviour assumes that the consumer has complete 
information on the range of goods and services available in the market, and that 
he/she knows about the capacity of these products to satisfy his/her needs. In 
addition, the theory postulates that the consumer knows about the prices of these 
products. This information set could help him to maximise his/her utility subject to 
an income constraint. On Figure (6) the downward budget line shows the different 
combinations between goods the consumer can purchase with a limited income, 
with the assumption that income is spent on Xi and Yi products. The figure shows 
that the consumer cannot get any combination of goods on the right to the budget 
line. He can choose only combinations on the budget line between points Q and S 
that are touched by the indifference curve, which shows combinations of goods 
that yield the same level of total satisfaction. So, the consumer is indifferent to the 
choice between these combinations. Based on this notion, each point on the budget 
line yields some specific level of satisfaction or utility. As seen on this figure, there 
are an infinite number of attainable combinations represented by points Q, L, P, R 
and S on the budget line. Many of these combinations can be trailed, but the 
optimal one is represented by point (p) where an indifference curve is just tangent 
to the budget line. At that point, the consumer has attained the maximum level of 
satisfaction. 
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total satisfaction a consumer gains from all units of a product consumed within a 
given time period produces his/her total utility (TU) derived from consuming that 
product, and consuming one extra unit within a given time period gives rise to 
his/her marginal utility (MU). In the short run, if consumer tastes change such that 
the marginal utility of a particular product rises, this will lead to an increase in 
consumption of this product, and then to its market price. However, any change in 
the consumer's demand for products or goods and services has its impact on the 
firm's demand for labour, which is derived from the demand for these products. 
However, both increase in products demand and rise in their market prices make 
the marginal revenue (MR) of firms exceed their marginal cost (MC). In the short 
run, a firm can make changes in its employment under the conditions of a perfectly 
competitive product market. The short run is defined as a time that is sufficiently 
brief that the firm cannot increase or decrease its capital stock; i. e., the firm's 
capital stock is fixed at a specific level K( (Borjas, 2002). Therefore, the firm as a 
profit maximiser would decide whether or not to employ an additional unit of 
labour to meet the demand to produce its goods and services. It should weigh the 
increase in revenue that would result from employment of an extra unit of labour 
against the resulting increase in its costs. Since the firm operates in a perfectly 
competitive product market, the prices it charges for its product and the prices it 
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pays for its inputs are largely determined by the market; i. e., the firm works as a 
price taker. Therefore, to evaluate the contribution of an additional unit of labour 
to the firm's revenue, the firm has to calculate its marginal revenue (MR). This can 
be settled by multiplying the firm's marginal product of labour MPL by the given 
market price (P). This is referred to as marginal revenue product of labour (MRPL). 
On Figure (7), the marginal revenue product of labour (MRPL) represents the 
firm's short-run labour demand curve. If the market wage rate were at point (W), 
the firm would employ a quantity of labour at (L) hours. At this level, the wage 
(W) equals MRPL, but if the wage rate falls to (W'), the firm would expand its 
demand for labour to a new profit-maximising level of (L2) hours, at which point 
the (MRPL) equals the new lower wage rate (W'). This figure shows that if the 
firm were to hire more than (L2) hours, it would still have lower marginal revenue 
product, while the firm cannot exceed its employment beyond (LI), since, for the 
additional labour hours, the marginal revenue would exceed the wage rate (W). 
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Figure (7) 
Firm's Labour Demand (in Short Run) 
But at the industry level, the demand for labour expresses the overall firms' 
demand for labour. Of course, it is incorrect to add up the firms' curves to arrive at 
the industry demand. This is because a firm's labour demand curve in the short run 
is based on its marginal revenue (MR). Each firm in a perfectly competitive 
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industry is small in relation to the industry as a whole, so it cannot influence the 
prices of the products that it sells in the market. But if all firms in the industry 
consider the labour wage to increase their employment, there would be more 
output in the industry, which would drive the market price of the output to fall. So 
at the level of industry, a decrease in the wage rate will make each firm tend to 
increase its labour input, and then its output. From Figure (8a) the firm's labour 
demand is depicted by the demand curve d, d,; if the wage rate is W the firm 
employs e, units of labour at point (a). Aggregating on the industry level, on 
Figure (8b), the labour demand at the current wage rate (W) is Ll units of labour at 
point (A). When the wage rate declines to W', because labour supply increases at 
the previous wage rate, the firm would expand its demand for labour along 
d, d, curve at point (b'), and employing e' units of labour. When all firms expand 
their employment of labour, the total output expands. As the commodity prices 
fall, the individual firm's labour demand curve declines to dd' and the wage rate 
decreases to W' at point (b) employing e2 units of labour. Aggregating for all 
firms, the industry employs L2 units of labour with the current market wage rate at 
point (B) on the industry demand curve DD1. 
The responsiveness of labour demand in the industry to changes in the 
wage rate is measured by the elasticity of labour demand, which is defined as the 
percentage change in employment resulting from a1 percent change in the wage, 
as expressed in Equation (7): 
%AE 
%Awi 
(7) 
where ii is the elasticity demand for labour, %A: the percentage change, and 
subscript (i) denotes category of labour (i). 
Since the labour demand curves usually slope downward, an increase in 
the earnings will cause employment to decrease; then the elasticity of demand will 
be negative. However, the magnitude of the responsiveness of the demand for 
labour in relation to a change in the wage rate is measured by the absolute value of 
the elasticity. Therefore, if a1 percent increase in wages leads to an employment 
decline of greater than 1 percent, this is referred to as an elastic demand curve. In 
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contrast, if the absolute value is less than 1, the demand curve is said to be 
inelastic. If demand is elastic, aggregate earnings of workers will decline 
when the wage rate increases, because employment falls at a faster rate than wages 
rise. In contrast, if the demand is inelastic, aggregate earnings will increase when 
the wage rate increases. From the equilibrium state of the labour market, an 
increase in wages causes employment to decrease and then produces a negative 
elasticity of demand. Therefore, the larger the absolute value of the elasticity of 
demand, the larger the percentage declines in employment with any level of 
increase in wages. The standard theory of wage elasticity postulates that the 
elasticity of demand for a category of labour, holding other things constant, will be 
high when the price elasticity of demand for the product being produced is high, 
other factors of production can be easily substituted for the category of labour, the 
supply of other factors of production is highly elastic, and the cost of employing 
the category of labour is a large share of the total cost of production. 
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Industry Labour Demand 
2.5 WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 
D' 
This section discusses some applications of models that are usually used to 
interpret and explain wage differentials and wage discrimination in different 
countries, especially in the developed countries and some urban areas of the 
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developing countries. Most of these applications cover wage inequality between 
two groups of workers, for example, males and females, and black and white 
workers. 
Wage differentials between workers in the labour market may arise due to 
different social and economic reasons. Variation in culture, tradition, and ethnicity 
may support the phenomenon of the wage differential existence in the labour 
market. On the other hand, wage discrimination is usually associated with the wage 
differential or earnings gap between different groups of workers. Many economists 
(Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973; and Glodin, 1990; among them) examine and 
analyse wage differentials between these workers in the labour market. They 
decomposed the total wage differentials into two parts: the unexplained portion, 
which is referred to as the wage discrimination, and the explained portion, which is 
attributed to personal and productivity characteristics of the workers. The wage 
discrimination is attributed to gender or racial or ethnicity reasons or to other 
subjective factors. According to Becker (1971), economic discrimination arises in 
the labour market when a group of workers who have identical work characteristics 
to another group is treated differently because of personal characteristics rather 
than economic endowments. This makes discrimination a subjective and highly 
contentious subject matter that depends on social, ideological, and physical 
distance between the two groups. Gender discrimination is a form of market 
discrimination. It exists if individuals are treated differently on the basis because of 
their gender. Similarly, racial discrimination and ethnicity discrimination in the 
labour market are based on social and cultural factors behind this phenomenon. He 
uses a discrimination coefficient (DC) to measure the magnitude of the variable or 
variables that influence wage discrimination between workers in the labour market, 
and defines this coefficient as the proportional difference between the wage rates 
of these workers. Becker measures the level of discrimination under the state of 
wage rate equilibrium of two groups of workers whose wage rates, if paid 
discriminatively, differ. He argues that this state of equilibrium exists in the 
absence of discrimination and nepotism, and when each of the two groups of 
workers perfectly substitutes for the other. Market discrimination against a group 
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of workers exists if the average net wage rate or (income) of this group is reduced 
by a greater percentage than the other group of workers. 
On the other hand, the standard theory of wage discrimination postulates 
that direct and indirect contact in the work place, the level and duration, and 
intensity of this contact, have their effects on discrimination level. Becker (1971) 
argued that discrimination is less severe against Blacks in the case of temporary 
jobs in comparison to those in permanent jobs, because the duration of contact in 
the former type of employment is less than in the latter case. Similarly, 
discrimination by blacks against one another is much less than it is by whites 
against blacks, and this may result from the more intense contact among blacks 
than between blacks and whites. Moreover, Becker found that discrimination is 
greater against older and better-educated non-whites. This may reflect a positive 
relation between discrimination and occupational status of these workers, since 
older and better-educated non-whites have higher and more responsible 
occupational positions and thus they have higher relative income to their other 
colleagues. Becker also found that region or area of residency has its impact on 
tastes for discrimination. 
Arrow (1995) discussed discrimination in the labour market; he confirms 
that discrimination might be practiced by both the employers and employees in the 
workplace. Arrow contended that when the employer firm discriminates between 
two groups of workers, e. g., blacks (B) and whites (W), it seeks to maximize its 
utility function through equalizing the workers' marginal productivity (MP; ) to 
what is paid to them as a compensation for their labour. In this case, the wage of 
the black worker, for example, is the market wage (WB) plus the price the 
employer is willing to pay in terms of profits (71), which is denoted as (dB) that is 
taken to be the marginal rate of substitution of profits for black workers (MRnB) . 
This provides the marginal productivity of these workers, expressed (in Equation 8 
as follows: 
MPB =WB + dB where dB = MRTh B (8) 
Similarly, in the case of the white worker, the marginal productivity is expressed 
(in Equation 9) as: 
MPW = WW + dW (9) 
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From Equation (8) dB will be negative if the employer has no positive 
liking for having (B) workers, who are paid less than their marginal productivity; 
even the two workers (B and W) are interchangeable in production. Therefore, this 
creates employer discrimination against black workers, while (W) workers, from 
Equation (10), gain or at least are not losing. 
On the other hand, Arrow assumes that all employers have the same utility 
function, U(ir(B, W) ), which depends on the ratio (W/B) workers, but some 
employers may be more discriminatory than others. Therefore, firms that display 
the highest values of (dB) have the highest ratios of (W/L), i. e., white to total 
workers. He contended that a partial degree of segregation shows that the (B) 
workers tend to be found in the less discriminatory firms and the (W) workers in 
the more discriminatory ones, and in the competitive labour market the degree of 
discrimination tends to decrease, as only the least discriminatory firms survive. 
On the other hand, discrimination might be practiced by co-workers in the 
workplace. This happens when a group of workers, say, foremen, who are 
indicated as (F), likes working with (W) workers and dislikes working with (B) 
workers. Such work relations are governed by the ratio WB. However, this kind of 
discrimination restricts the employment opportunities of the discriminatory 
workers (F) to be based on both wages and the W/B ratio in the labour market, 
which determine the equilibrium point of these workers as in Equation (10): 
COF = 0)F(W/l. ) (10) 
Where co F 
is the foremen's wage and L is the total labour force of the firm 
(W+B). But if firms have no discriminatory tastes and seek only to maximize 
profits, they will still not hire (B) workers at equal wages with (W) workers, since 
an increase in (W) decreases the wages and thus the cost of foremen (F) workers, 
while an increase in (B) workers increases the cost of (F) workers. Arrow argues 
that if all employers have the same levels of (W) and (B) workers, the extent of the 
wage difference between (B) and (W) workers depends on the extent of the 
discrimination. This can be measured (in Equation 11) by the following formula: 
(0W - (0 B- 
wF SF 
MPL 0F SL 
where: 
(11) 
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(OW and c are the wage rates of (W) and (B) workers, respectively, (OF is the 
derivative of (0F and SF is the total payments for foremen, and SL is the total 
payment for floor workers (W and B). As seen on Equation (12), the left-hand side 
is the market wage differential that exists due to discriminatory tastes of foremen 
relative to the wage level in the absence of discrimination, and due to the observed 
wage differential that depends on the ratio 
SF 
S. L 
Bergmann (1971) discussed the economic consequences of discrimination 
to white and black employers and employees. She explained that black workers 
generally have relatively less education and are concentrated in certain jobs. She 
argued that the effects of limiting certain jobs for these workers depend on the size 
of their labour force relative to the restrictions on hiring them. Therefore, 
discrimination in employment of black workers, as Bergmann (1971) concluded, 
crowds them into certain occupations because of the refusal of most employers to 
consider hiring them for jobs in other occupations. This has caused the marginal 
productivity of these workers to be lower in comparison to that of white workers 
with the same level of education. Using data from the Census Bureau's Current 
Population Report of 1969, she estimated changes in wages of white and black 
workers in response to lessening in discrimination. She found that the group that is 
most affected by a lessening in discrimination is the white male workers who did 
not finished their elementary education, and their loss in income is between 6 and 
9%, while losses among white female workers extend to all those who did not 
finish high school, which count between 9-14%. Other findings of her study show 
that a rearrangement of the labour force, under elimination of discrimination, by 
moving labour out of occupations with marginal productivity, has a low effect on 
aggregate income. She also found that occupations that black workers had 
specialised in might lose one-fourth or more of their workers, and this would cause 
a change in relative wages due to the absence of discrimination. 
Malkiel and Malkiel (1972) studied pay differentials between males and 
females in professional occupations. Using data of a single corporation for the 
period 1966-1971, they based their research on the human capital approach, and 
concluded that the characteristics of the two groups were responsible for between 
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54-63% of the total pay differential between men and women over 1966 and 1971, 
in favour of males. Moreover, differences in human capital characteristics of the 
two groups can explain between 37-49% of the total pay differentials between 
them, in favour of males. They further estimated the impact of schooling levels, 
individual's publications, area of specialisation, and marital status on pay 
differentials. It is found that the pay difference attributed to these characteristics of 
the two groups is still high as it stood at between 54-73% of the total pay 
differentials over 1966-1971, supporting higher payment to males. They found that 
the adjusted difference due to these variables and post-schooling investments is 
slightly decreased to levels between 36% and 46% for males. When they include 
the occupational status to these characteristics, the level of the unexplained 
residual is reduced to about 3% of the total pay difference between the two groups 
of workers. 
Oaxaca (1973), in his seminal work, also analysed and explained sources of 
the hourly wage differential between male and female (white and black) workers. 
He contended that social attitudes and uneven occupational distribution between 
male and female workers accounted for the wage differentials between them. He 
developed a decomposition technique that allocates the sources of the wage 
differentials into an explained part that is due to difference in the endowments of 
the two groups and another part that is due to discrimination in the labour market. 
He argued that discrimination against females exists in the labour market when the 
relative wage of males to females exceeds the relative wage that would prevail if 
males and females were paid fairly. Based on this concept, he formulated a 
discrimination coefficient (Equation 12) as: 
D_ 
Wm / Wf-(Wm / Wf )° 
(Wm / Wf)o 
(12) 
D represents the discrimination coefficient, Wm/Wf is the observed male-female 
wage ratio, (W.. /Wf)° is the male-female wage ratio that would prevail in the 
absence of discrimination in the labour market, and (W; ) is the hourly wage rate of 
i -th worker. He suggested that the discrimination coefficient could be estimated on 
the basis of either of the following two assumptions: 
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1) the current wage structure faced by females would also apply to males if 
there were no discrimination, or 
2) the current wage structure faced by males would also apply to females if 
there were no discrimination. 
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides, Equation (12) can be transformed into 
the following expression: 
In (D+1)=1n(Wm/Wr)-ln(W. /Wr)° (13) 
The wages equations for males and females can be estimated (Equation 14) as: 
1n(W; ) = X; B; +U (14) 
where W; = the hourly wage rate of the i-th worker, X; denotes individual 
characteristics, B; is the coefficient on the i-th characteristic, and U is the 
disturbance term. 
He estimated the gross wage differential (Equation 15) as: 
ln(G+1) =1n(Wm)-ln(Wf) (15) 
where G is the gross wage differentials, which is calculated as (G=W. -\V r ). 
wr 
According to Oaxaca, when the gross wage differential is expressed in a term of 
natural logarithms (In(G)), the discrimination coefficient (D) implies that the 
differential can be decomposed into the effects of discrimination and the effects of 
differences in personal characteristics. Therefore, the discrimination coefficient 
(D) is a part of the gross discrimination (G), as it calculates as a proportion of the 
gross wage differential (G). 
Then from the ordinary least squares estimation, he constructed the wage 
equation for each race-sex group separately (Equations 16 and 17) as 
In (Wm)=XmBm (16) 
In (W f )=X fB f (17) 
where: 
Xm and Xf are the vectors of the mean values of the characteristics for males and 
females, respectively; and A. andB f are the corresponding vectors of the 
estimated coefficients. Substituting (16) and (17), he calculated the gross 
differential into Equation (18) as: 
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ln(G +1)XmBm-Xf Bf (18) 
Using data from the 1967 US Survey of Economic Opportunity, Oaxaca 
(1973) estimated the wage differentials between males and females among white 
and black workers separately for each race group and for full-scale wage equation. 
The explanatory variables included variables that are related to socio-economic 
characteristics and personal characteristics of these workers. These variables 
mainly comprised percentage share of unionised and non-unionised workers, 
industry, occupation, health problems, part-time work status, migration, size of the 
urban area, marital status, region, education, and experience. He concluded that 
the estimates of discrimination coefficient (D) were at 40% for white workers, and 
45% for black workers (both males and females). The gross wage differential (G) 
was estimated at 54% for the white group and 49% for the black group (both males 
and females). These results tell that discrimination accounts for 74% of gross wage 
differentials for white workers and 92% for black workers. On the other hand, the 
difference between the gross wage differential (G) and the discrimination 
coefficient (D) represents an estimate of the wage differentials that would prevail 
in the absence of discrimination. He calculated this wage differential at 14% for 
white workers and 4% for black workers. However, estimates of the full-scale 
sample give the wage discrimination coefficient as 29% for white workers and 
25% for black workers. From these results, Oaxaca (1973) calculated the 
discrimination effect at 53% of the gross wage differential for white workers and 
52% for black workers. 
Blinder (1973) discussed a similar decomposition technique as Oaxaca 
(1973) to examine wage differentials by sex and race. He argued that wage 
differentials generally comprise two parts: the explained one that might be 
attributed to certain characteristics such as education and work experience, and the 
other unexplained portion that is attributed to wage discrimination in the labour 
market. He decomposed wage differentials between two groups of workers by 
estimating the earnings equation (Equation 19) for each group as: 
n 
(19) 1n(Wi)=a0+ xiBi +ul 
i=1 
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where: 
In (W; ) is the natural logarithmic earnings of individual workers, x; (i = I....., n) 
represent the observed individual worker's characteristics that are used to explain 
wages; the parameters (B) indicate effects of changes in the workers' 
characteristics on their earnings; while (u; ) are the disturbance terms that takes into 
account the influence of various errors, such as errors of omitted variables, errors 
of the functional form of the model, errors in measurement of dependent variables, 
and effects of human behaviour. He formulated the explained portion of the wage 
differential (Equation 20) as: 
ZBH XH 
- 
EBB Xt (20) 
where the H superscript indicates the high-wage group and L indicates the low- 
wage group. The unexplained portion, or the portion attributed to discrimination, is 
expressed (in Equation 21) by: 
BH BL 
00 (21) 
Blinder calculated the explained portion and broke it (Equation 22) down into: 
EB"X" -EBýXL = EB" (X" - XL) +EXL (B" - BL) (22) i, Ii ii i ii i 
The first term on the right hand side expresses the wage differential that arises 
from the advantage of the high-wage group in the endowment of characteristics 
over the low-wage group. The second part indicates the differential that arises from 
the fact that even if the high-wage group has the same characteristics as the low- 
wage group, the high-wage group enjoys superior marginal effects due to these 
characteristics than the low-wage group. 
Blinder estimated and decomposed wage differentials between white males, 
white females and black males in the USA using data from the Michigan Survey 
Research Centre's Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1968-1970 and data 
from the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity. Blinder examined various factors 
that contribute to the wage differentials between white and black workers. These 
factors include education, age-wage profile, work experience, union membership, 
geographical distribution, and occupations. He found that between 60-70% of the 
wage differentials were due to educational and other objective characteristics, such 
as work experience. The remaining 30-40% was attributed to discrimination, 
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including discrimination in occupation. The wage differential between white males 
and females is estimated at 46%. 
Swaffield (2000) analysed the gender wage differential in the UK. She 
argued that after three decades of applications of the Equal Pay Act (1970), 
difference in average wages between men and women is still evident. The main 
factors are education, experience, marital status, work-oriented women, home- 
oriented women, aspiration and household constraints, full-time and part-time 
employment status, and union membership. Using a decomposition technique 
based on the Oaxaca-Ransom (1994) model, she formulated the technique 
(Equation 23) as: 
ln(G+1)=(Bm -B* )Xm +(B* -Be) Xf +(Xm- Xf )B* (23) 
As seen on this equation, the first term on the right-hand side is an estimate 
of the male wage advantage, and the second term is an estimate of the female wage 
disadvantage. The third term is an estimate of the productivity differential between 
male and female workers, and (B) stands for the wage structure observed in a 
non-discriminatory labour market. 
She estimated the controlled variables by using data from the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) of 1991-97 across six waves of surveys. 
Estimates covered full-time and part-time employees aged between 18 and 65 
years old with manual and non-manual jobs. She estimated four categories that 
included experience (both potential and actual experience), motivation factors for 
work-oriented women and home-oriented women, aspiration variables, and 
household constraints. Each category comprises some other related variables, and 
is formulated to be associated with actual and potential experience. She estimated 
the gross gender wage differentials at 31% for all employees and about 20% for 
full-time employees with the unexplained portion between 41.4 and 70.4% for all 
employees across the four categories, and between 44.3 and 70.4% for full-time 
employees across these categories. The calculated adjustments of gender earnings 
inequality showed that the aggregate earnings differential is about 36% for all 
employees. The skill level of the female employee's mother has a positive effect on 
the female wage, estimated at 8%. The unexplained or discriminatory portion of 
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the gender wage differential is calculated to be between 12-43% when potential 
labour market experience is included in the wage equation. 
Goldin (1990) discussed the history of American women's participation in 
the labour force over the period 1790-1988 in order to understand the grass roots of 
the gender wage gap in America. She formulated a statistical technique to measure 
the wage discrimination and difference in wages between males and females, based 
on the decomposition techniques attributed to Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). 
She contended that wage discrimination might be due to the difference in slopes or 
the difference in intercepts. Goldin (1990) suggested two natural logarithmic 
earnings equations separately for each of the two groups (Equations 24 and 25) as: 
LogWf=of+EBfXf (24) 
LogWm =am +EBm Xm (25) 
where LogNY and LogWW represent natural logarithmic earnings of female and 
male, respectively. The variables X. and Xf indicate personal characteristics of 
male and female, respectively, while (Bf) stands for slopes of female and (Bm) for 
slopes of male, and the terms am and af represent the intercept of the equation. 
Then she calculated the difference between slopes and intercepts of the 
two groups of workers, by combing the two Equations (24) and (25). She argued 
that such a difference could be multiplied by the mean values of the characteristics 
of any of the two groups as expressed in Equation (26). 
Log(Wm-Wf)=(am-of)+F. Xflm(Bm-Bf)+EBflm(Xm-Xf) (26) 
Using data from the Survey of California and Michigan workers in the 
manufacturing sector, she measured the determinants of female earnings during the 
period between 1888 and 1907. The study found a substantial difference in average 
annual earnings between males and females in this sector over different years. In 
1890, females earned 54% of the male earnings, 55% in 1900, and 56% in 1905. 
Goldin (1990) found that married men received 17% more earnings than married 
women, while associating marital status and work experience reveals that the 
difference in earnings between unmarried workers in their early work experience is 
about 47% for male workers, but decreases to 8% for those with 10 years of 
experience. Moreover, she found that wage discrimination accounted for 35% of 
the earnings differential between the two groups of workers in this sector over 
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1888-1907, while training and experience were responsible for 25% of this 
difference in favour of males. Goldin (1990) examined wage discrimination among 
clerical workers in 1940 in the USA. She found that work experience for five years 
increased male earnings by 11% more than females with the same years, and males 
earn 19% more than females for 10 years' experience. Besides, education is found 
to augment workers' earnings in clerical jobs and consequently widens the wage 
differential between males and females. She found that a college diploma yielded 
11 % for males but 7% for females. A married man is found to earn on average 
12% more than a single man. On the other hand, a clerical female who changed 
both the employer and occupation might get a 60% increase in earnings in 
comparison to only 20% for her colleagues in the manufacturing sector. However, 
she estimated the explained portion of the wage gap to be 39% in clerical jobs, 
compared to 65% in manufacturing. Moreover, the clerical females would have 
earned 24% more in the absence of discrimination, which would close the earnings 
ratio between female and male to 80% rather than 64% under discrimination. 
Preston and Crockett (1999) discussed gender earnings in the context of 
deregulation of the Australian labour market during the 1990s, when the rules of 
pay determination at the state and federal levels transformed from a centralised 
arbitrary system into an enterprise bargaining system. They followed the Oaxaca- 
Blinder technique to estimate and decompose wage differentials between males 
and females with the assumption that male earnings structure would have prevailed 
in the absence of discrimination. They decomposed male and female wage 
equations using the standard model. Using data from the 1996 Census Household 
Sample, they restricted the sample to full-time earners aged between 16 and 64 
years old. They controlled for workers' endowments that comprise education, 
potential experience, overtime payment, birthplace (Australian-born, born in 
English-speaking country, and born in non-English speaking country), marital 
status, industry, region, and work in the public sector. They estimated the wage 
differentials between the two groups of workers as 14.1% in favour of males for 
the country as a whole, and between 13.3% and 17.6% across regions. They argued 
that there is some evidence that labour market deregulation has contributed to 
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growth in the gender wage gap in Australia. They found that the more deregulated 
the labour market, the greater the gender gap. 
Vartiainen (2002) explained gender wage differentials in the Finnish labour 
market. She followed the Oaxaca technique and set up earnings equations 
separately for males and females, and based her analysis of this issue on data from 
the 1998 Household Income Distribution Survey (HIDS). With application of the 
standard theory of wage decomposition, she first estimated firm size, age, and 
education. The study reported the gross wage differential at 21.48% and the 
explained portion at about 3%, and the estimated unexplained portion at about 97% 
of the raw wage differential between men and women in the Finnish labour market. 
Introduction of industry and occupation characteristics slightly reduced the gross 
wage differential to 21.5%, with the explained portion at about 53% and the 
unexplained portion at about 47% of the gross wage differentials. Then she 
decomposed wage differentials between workers across five sub-sectors that 
included manufacturing workers (monthly earnings), manufacturing workers (pay 
per hour), local government workers, central government workers, and private 
service sector workers. She found that the gross wage differentials among workers 
in these workplaces was between 15% and 31%, while the explained portion was 
between 43% and 91% across these sub-sectors, and the unexplained portion was 
between 9% and 57% across these workplaces. 
Drolet (2002) discussed the persistent gender pay differentials in Canada by 
applying the decomposition technique and controlling different variables that were 
classified into four categories. The first controls the human capital components 
such as full-year full-time work experience (FYFTE), educational level and major 
field of study, job tenure, marital status, and age of the youngest family member. 
The second category controls components such as part-time status, union status, 
region, geographical size, and firm size. The third specification includes job 
responsibilities, and the fourth controls occupation and industry. The estimates of 
the study were based on data drawn from the 1997 Survey of Labour and Income 
Dynamics (SLID) in Canada, with a sample of paid workers aged between 18 and 
64 years old. Dorlet calculated the gross wage differential across the four categories 
as 22%, while the explained portion across these categories was calculated to be 
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between 21.4% and 49.1%, and the unexplained portion was between 50.9% and 
78.6% across the four specifications. She found that the ratio of female to male 
earnings was between 84.1 % and 89.4% across these specifications. 
In summary, empirical studies of wage inequality and discrimination 
have largely been based on the decomposition techniques, which assume 
that: 
1) the decomposition model is mainly based on the individual's 
earnings that relate to his/her life-cycle human capital investments, 
but data on such investments are not entirely available. Therefore, 
cross-sectional data on earnings and other socio-economic 
characteristics of individuals is considered the most appropriate 
source for empirical applications of the decomposition technique; 
2) the decomposition technique uses cross-sectional data that is mainly 
related to the labour supply determinants, rather than using data 
expressing the labour demand determinants; 
3) the decomposition model has improved the traditional linear 
earnings regression technique by postulating a separate earnings 
equation for each group of workers, with lower and higher earnings, 
and then incorporating the two equations, whereas the traditional 
regression treats the coefficient of the characteristics or attributes of 
the lower and higher earnings groups as the same. This can be 
expressed in Equation (27) as: 
Y; =a1+a2D, +BX; +U; (27) 
where: Y; is monthly earnings of workers, X. = years of experience 
(for example), and D; =1 if higher earnings group, 0 otherwise. 
Therefore, the traditional regression model makes the two groups of 
workers have the same earnings-experience slope (B), and eliminates 
the lower earnings group from the equation. In contrast, the 
decomposition model makes the coefficient vary for the two groups of 
workers, and it expresses the differences in the characteristics of the 
two groups (Equations 13-26); 
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4) the decomposition approach assumes participation of the workers in the 
labour force; i. e., it assumes that workers in the sample have to be 
employed to easily measure the wage gap and to measure the effects of 
discrimination on earnings distribution among the participants; 
5) variation in the workers' endowments requires various personal 
characteristics, workplace characteristics, location, industry and many 
other similar characteristics that might influence the workers' earnings 
to reduce the level of the unexplained portion; 
6) the approach considers subjective factors such as variables 
misspecification or variable omission to be part of the discrimination or 
the unexplained portion. Thus, as Blinder (1973) argued, the true extent 
of wage discrimination may remain unknown. 
However, these assumptions provide reasonable methods to analyse and 
interpret the wage differentials and wage discrimination among workers in the 
labour market. Their rationality is supported by the wide applications of the 
decomposition model in different countries. Therefore, this research adopts the 
same assumptions in applying the decomposition technique to the analysis of 
wage differentials and wage discrimination in the Saudi labour market. 
2.6 GENERAL CONDITIONS OF LABOUR DEMAND AND SUPPLY IN 
SAUDI ARABIA 
This section discusses general conditions related to labour demand and 
supply in the Saudi labour market, and the aggregate earnings distribution between 
Saudi and non-Saudi workers. Due to lack of adequate data, it first discusses the 
factors influencing earnings distribution between the two groups of workers as 
derived from available released data and information on these factors in Saudi 
Arabia in general, and then discusses the general features of demand and supply in 
the chemical and petrochemical industries. However, it is known that educational 
attainment, occupational status, experience, demographics and family, social 
welfare subsidies, and similar factors have their impacts on the wage 
determination in the labour market. These factors are mainly related to the labour 
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supply side, while the labour demand factors comprise international trade patterns, 
technological change, and consumer preferences. 
2.6.1 Supply Factors 
In Saudi Arabia, aggregate monthly earnings data present the overall 
distribution among workers by educational qualifications, gender, and occupational 
status. Table (2-1) presents the aggregate earnings distribution based on the 
ethnicity of Saudi to non-Saudi workers in the labour market. As can be seen on 
this table, earnings inequality between the two groups of workers widened over 
1994-2002. The aggregate average monthly earnings ratio of Saudi to non-Saudi 
workers is calculated between 3.3 and 3.8 over this period, in favour of Saudi 
workers. The table reveals that though the earnings ratio between the two groups 
decreased slightly from 3.81 in 1999 and 2000 to 3.75 in 2002, but it is still higher. 
Table 2-1 
Earnings Ratio of Saudi to Non-Saudi 
Over 1994-2002 
Year Saudi Non-Saudi 
Saudi/Non- 
Saudi 
1994 7220 2179 3.31 
1995 7620 2127 3.58 
1996 7489 2062 3.63 
1997 7369 1952 3.78 
1998 7021 1870 3.75 
1999 6757 1774 3.81 
2000 6560 1722 3.81 
2001 6166 1639 3.76 
2002 5824 1554 3.75 
Source: Saudi Monetary Agency " Annual Report" No. 40 
Regarding the impact of educational attainment on earnings of the two 
groups of workers, it was mentioned earlier that Saudi Arabia was a subsistence 
economy even after oil exploitation started. Up to the 1950s, the number of 
educated Saudis was very low and the lucky ones were those who finished their 
general secondary education, as post-secondary educational institutions did not 
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exist in the country. Those who received post-secondary education did so by 
studying abroad. With the booming oil industry in the 1970s, the country targeted 
education and classroom training to improve the skills of Saudi nationals. Chapter 
Three of this study refers to numerous free educational and training programmes 
that were launched by the government. Educational attainment is considered as a 
successful means of influencing labour supply and structure of the labour force, 
which influence the competitive wage in the labour market (Borland, 2000). Table 
(2-2) shows the impacts of the educational status of workers on the monthly 
earnings of Saudi and non-Saudi workers in 1996 and 2000. The table reveals that 
Table 2-2 
Monthly wage Ratios of Saudi to Non-Saudi Workers 
by Education Over 1996-2000 
! Cana; Rivalcl 
1996 2000 
Educational Level 
Saudi Non- Saudi Ratio 
Saudi Non-Saudi Ratio 
Illiterate 3245 1123 2.89 3155 1136 2.78 
Read & Write 3512 1247 2.82 3450 1260 2.74 
Primary 4462 1323 3.37 4600 1378 3.34 
Intermediate 5174 1599 3.24 5437 1587 3.43 
Secondary 8198 2305 3.56 7200 2580 2.79 
Post-Secondary 6293 2652 2.37 6810 2880 2.36 
Graduate 11691 5131 2.28 10893 5581 1.95 
ost graduate 23634 10412 2.27 21112 10856 1.94 
Source: Central Department of Statistics (CDS) " Survey of Establishments", 1996and 2000 
Saudi workers with higher educational qualifications earn more than their fellow 
citizens with low educational qualifications. In 1996, the earnings ratio of Saudi 
workers with post-graduate qualifications to their colleagues with university 
qualifications is about 2.0. In 2000, the earnings inequality between the two groups 
decreased slightly to 1.91 in favour of post-graduates. In turn, Saudis with 
university educations earned more than their colleagues with lower qualifications 
over the two years. The earnings ratio of Saudi university graduates to their 
colleagues with secondary education(tertiary) is calculated at 1.51 and 1.57 in 
59 
1996 and 2000, respectively, while the earnings ratio between Saudis with 
secondary education and their fellow citizens with intermediate educations is 
calculated at 2.6 in 1996 and about 2.0 in 2000. This confirms the assumption that 
workers with higher education earn more than those with lower educational 
qualifications. However, the table records a similar trend of wage differentials 
across -educational qualifications among non-Saudi workers. It shows that the 
monthly earnings ratio of non-Saudi graduates compared to their colleagues with 
university qualifications is about 2.2 in 1996 and 2.0 in 2000, while those with 
university qualifications earn 2.2 compared to their colleague with secondary 
qualifications in both 1996 and 2000. As shown on this table, non-Saudi workers 
with secondary educations earn more than their colleagues with intermediate 
qualifications by 0.38 in 1996 and 0.60 in 2000. 
Considering the impact of educational status on the wage inequality 
between Saudi and non-Saudi workers, this table shows that Saudi graduates earn 
2.28 and 1.95 times as much as their non-Saudi graduate counterparts in 1996 and 
2000, respectively. The table indicates that Saudi workers with secondary 
qualifications have earnings ratios of 3.56 and 2.79 to their non-Saudi workers 
with the same qualifications in 1996 and 2000, respectively. Wage inequality 
between the two groups of workers extends to those with lower educational 
qualifications. As seen on this table, the earnings ratio of Saudi workers with 
intermediate educations compared to their non-Saudi counterparts with the same 
qualifications is higher than those with higher qualifications. It is calculated at 3.24 
and 3.43 in 1996 and 2000, respectively. Moreover, uneducated Saudi workers also 
have higher earnings than their non-Saudi counterparts. The earnings ratio of Saudi 
to non-Saudi workers among the illiterate workers is calculated at 2.89 and 2.78 in 
favour of Saudi workers in 1996 and 2000, respectively. It is clear that the macro- 
data on the earnings by educational status for Saudi and non-Saudi workers reveals 
the influence of the educational attainment, as a human capital component, on the 
earnings of these workers in the Saudi labour market. 
The literature presents wage differentials associated with the occupational 
status of workers, which is referred to as occupational wage differentials. The 
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literature assumes that the occupational status of workers has its influence on their 
earnings distribution. In the Saudi labour market, there are many occupations that 
were created by the foreign workers who entered the country after the oil discovery 
and particularly in the 1970s. Meanwhile, the expansion of education and training 
programmes that were instigated by the government, both inside and outside the 
country, have contributed to an increased participation of the Saudi workers in 
some of these occupations, particularly in the white-collar jobs. The released 
macro-data on the occupational distribution of Saudi and non-Saudi workers reveal 
the impact of the occupational status of these workers on their monthly earnings. 
This data indicates the existence of wage inequality among these workers across 
occupations over 1985-2000. Table (2-3) shows that Saudi workers have 
significant higher earnings than their colleagues over this period. Their aggregate 
average monthly earnings ratios compared to non-Saudi workers are calculated 
between 1.24 and 3.00 over the period. For workers in the professional jobs the 
earnings ratio is between 1.01 and 1.97 to the advantage of Saudi workers, in the 
managerial jobs, the occupational wage differential between Saudi and non-Saudi 
workers was slightly lower over 1985-1989, as the earnings ratio for workers 
in 
these jobs is calculated between 1.09 and 1.88 for non-Saudi over 1985-1989, with 
exception of 1987. In clerical jobs the ratio is calculated between 1.04 and 
1.71 in 
favour of Saudi workers over 1985-2000, with exception to 1985. However, 
analysis of the earnings across occupations in the table reveals that the earnings 
gap between the two groups of workers widened over 1985-2000. 
Some more supply factors include demographics, experience, on-the-job training, 
and non-pecuniary wage compensations that are governed by specific regulations, 
such as pension, job risks, promotion, health services, and other similar privileges. 
As is discussed earlier, these factors contribute to the prevailing working 
conditions in the country. Moreover, labour regulations, especially the rules that 
relate to wage determination, are in force to increase earnings inequality between 
Saudis and non-Saudis in the labour market. As it is mentioned before, the labour 
law allows Saudi workers to gain more wages than their non-Saudi counterparts 
even though they have similar personal characteristics, such as education and 
experience. Pension and health care services institutions are largely offered to 
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Table 2-3 
Monthly wage Ratios of Saudi to Non-Saudi Workers 1985-2000 
Across Occupations 
Over 1985-2000 
Educational 
Level 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1996 2000 
Professional, 
Technical 1.01 1.41 1.62 1.29 1.36 2.10 1.97 
Managerial 0.60 0.92 1.10 0.71 0.53 1.09 1.13 
Clerical Works 0.96 1.04 1.63 1.05 1.09 1.71 1.63 
Sales works 0.77 1.01 1.16 1.17 0.79 2.54 2.13 
Services 1.10 1.74 1.66 1.55 2.14 3.00 3.15 
Production 1.29 1.67 1.78 2.02 1.71 2.94 3.57 
Construction 1.25 1.15 1.19 1.21 0.86 0.00 
Transportation 1.19 1.48 1.69 1.19 1.08 0.00 
Agricultural 1.41 2.45 2.72 2.09 2.50 3.68 3.19 
Aggregate 1.24 1.70 1.97 1.71 1.66 3.00 2.99 
Source: CDS " Employment and Earnings Survey" , 1985-2000 
support Saudi workers and augment the total compensation packages in the Saudi 
labour market. Therefore, these factors are identified by the literature as the 
primary causes and sources of wage differentials and wage discrimination in this 
labour market as well as in other labour markets. 
2.6.2 Demand Factors 
From a demand perspective, the Saudi labour market has also undergone 
significant changes over the past few decades. Such changes were first of all 
brought about by the process of industrialisation and evolving economic structure 
in Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia as well as in the other Gulf countries, the oil 
industry has played a great role in transforming its economy into a modern one, 
and the oil revenues have had a significant impact on the structure of the labour 
market in the country. Labour demand from the early oil industry during the 1930s 
was met by: i) recruitment of skilled workers from developed countries, 
particularly among British and American professional and technical experts; ii) 
skilled and semi-skilled artisans and clerical workers from Asian countries; and iii) 
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unskilled workers among indigenous population, particularly the pearl diving 
workers. With the expansion of the oil industry during the 1950s, demand for 
labour grew faster than local supply. So the oil companies were obliged to import 
large numbers of foreign workers to meet the demand for skilled and semi-skilled 
labour in different occupations. With rising oil revenues in the 1970s, Saudi 
authorities launched ambitious development programmes that produced a great gap 
between the demand and supply of labour associated with the skill shortages 
among indigenous workers. This caused wages to rise in the local markets in 
comparison to the neighbouring countries and in turn increased the inflow of 
foreign workers into the country (Seccombe and Lawless, 1986), Moreover, the 
Second Economic Development Plan of 1975 in the country was directed to 
creating vast gas energy projects, which were considered some of the largest 
engineering and construction programmes in the world, creating huge industrial 
cities on the Red Sea and the Gulf Coast. Such projects spurred labour demand for 
thousands of skilled and unskilled workers who were brought from outside the 
country by the contracting multinationals (Woodward, 1988). 
On the other hand, the country has adopted an import substitution policy 
that aims to create some local manufacturing industries, which are largely based on 
imported inputs. But many products of these industries have generally low 
domestic demand (Datta et al., 2000) due to competition from foreign products. 
Moreover, the demand for domestic products was also constrained partially by the 
low consumption level of most of the foreign workers who tended to send their 
remittances abroad rather than spending them within the country. The constrained 
capacity to consume among the foreign workers might have also reduced the 
demand for imported goods and service as the remittances of these workers 
represented between 22 and 77.5% of total imports over 1985-2003 (Table 2-4). 
The reason why foreign workers were unwilling to spend their income inside Saudi 
Arabia was a direct consequence of the country's immigration policy which 
prevents most of the foreign workers from bringing their families with them, or 
becoming citizens of the country. Therefore, foreign workers see no future in Saudi 
Arabia and thus no need to improve their long-term livelihood in the country. Due 
to the sheer number of foreign workers, the consequence for Saudi Arabia can only 
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Table 2-4 
Remittance of Foreign Workers to Imports 
in Saudi Arabia (in Millions SR) 
over 1985 1003 
Year Remittance Imports Re/im ort 
1985 18834 85564 22.01 
1986 17788 70780 25.13 
1987 18478 75313 24.53 
1988 24384 81582 29.89 
1989 31994 79219 40.39 
1990 42083 90282 46.61 
1991 51483 108934 47.26 
1992 50172 124606 40.26 
1993 58860 105616 55.73 
1994 67792 87449 77.52 
1995 62227 105187 59.16 
2000 57713 113240 50.97 
2001 56699 116931 48.49 
2002 59451 121089 49.10 
2003 55861 138435 40.35 
Source: SAMA, Ibid 
mean a subdued level of aggregate demand for goods and services and thus limited 
further rises in the demand for labour services. 
Moreover, the skills distribution in the labour market reveals a weak skill 
structure in the country. Table (2-5) shows the skill structure of the employed 
workers in the Saudi labour market over 1980-2000. The fraction of workers who 
completed their university education rose from 10% of the total in 1980 to 16.5% 
in 1987, but it decreased to 14.06% of the total in 2000. This is probably due to the 
Saudisation policy. The macro-data on the educational status of the workers do not 
show figures on post-graduates in the labour market over 1980-1987, but that of 
the 1990s reveal that the number of the post- graduates or highly educated workers 
increased slightly from 1.4% of the total in 1992 to 2.2% in 2000. The fraction of 
unskilled workers with education less than secondary level, i. e., primary and 
intermediate, counted a large weight that increased from 15% in 1980 to about 
34% of the total in 2000. 
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Moreover, although the number of the illiterate (unskilled) workers 
decreased from 46% in 1980 to 29% of the total in 2000, it is still a large portion of 
the skill structure in the labour market. Both categories of unskilled workers 
account for about 63% of the total in 2000. This reflects a poor skills structure with 
a significant level of low skill in the Saudi labour Market. As a result, the country 
has to rely on the importation of skilled workers from abroad in order to fill in the 
skill gaps. In this context, the Human Development Report states that the ratio of 
expenditures on R&D in the country are not more than 0.3% of GDP over 1996- 
2002, in comparison to 3.45% for UK, 2.8% for USA, and 2.5% for Germany. 
However, the rate is higher for Jordan and relatively for UAE as it counts 6.3% 
and 1% for the two countries, respectively, which largely have similar labour 
markets and social and political environments to Saudi Arabia (HDR, 2004). 
On the other hand, the table indicates a growth of skills demand over 1980 
and 2000. The demand for skilled or educated workers with university 
qualifications increased at 177% over the two years with an annual average rate of 
8.8% over the period 1980-2000, while the demand for the unskilled workers with 
low education levels rose between the two years with a significant ratio of 549%, 
with an annual average of 27% over 1980-2000. The level of skilled or university 
educated workers among the new entrants in 1994 was 14% of the total in the UK, 
13% of the total in France, and 23% of the total in the USA (Report of Skills Task 
Force, 1998). 
International trade is another factor that influences the demand for labour. 
It reveals the integration of the domestic labour market into the international 
economy through mutual trade of imports and exports of goods and services 
between different countries. Since early in the 1970s, Saudi Arabia has 
experienced a significant expansion of its external trade, particularly exports. The 
structure of Saudi exports is composed of oil and non-oil products (mainly import 
substitution products), which are exported to the neighbouring countries in the 
region. Oil exports represent the main source of the country's revenues; these 
exports contribute largely to GDP, though their contribution slightly decreased 
from 38% in 1970 to 37% in 2000. On the other hand, the country imports various 
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products from different parts of the world. The ratio of imports to GDP increased 
slightly over 1970-2000. It was calculated at 6% and 30% of GDP over 1970-1980 
in comparison to ratios of 16% and 24% of GDP over 1990-2000. The structure of 
these imports mainly consisted of raw materials, semi-final products or the 
intermediate products, and finished products for final consumption (SAMA, 2003). 
In the meantime, the ratio of imports to non-oil GDP has slightly changed over the 
two periods. It is calculated between 25-50% during 1970-1980, in comparison to 
relatively low ratios of 26% and 40% during 1990-2000. However, this indicates 
how the non-oil sector depends on imports to create demand for its products that in 
turn push demand for labour to meet the needs of the labour market. 
However, oil prices could have their impacts on the workers' earnings in 
the Saudi labour markets. Bivins (2001) argued that as oil prices fell in the 1980s 
and in the 1990s, the revenues collected by the governments of GCC countries 
decreased, as did the real domestic wages. On the other hand, development of the 
oil revenues affected demand for labour, particularly in the public agencies. Table 
(2-6) shows the burden of employment with public departments on the 
expenditures of the general budget that were mainly covered by the oil revenues. 
As seen on this table, most of the government revenues were allocated to pay 
wages and privileges of workers in these departments. It reveals that over 1986- 
2003, the public budget allocations for employment represent between 38-118% of 
the oil revenues, and between 29-67% of the total government revenues. 
As is discussed earlier, the Saudi labour policy also has major ramifications 
for the demand for labour. It is known that the demand for labour in the 
government departments is fuelled by generous compensation and non-wage 
benefits that attract natives to primarily seek employment in these departments, 
which offer plentiful job opportunities in different occupations annually. It is 
mentioned elsewhere that the government has changed its recruitment policies 
since 1990 when it started to restrict its labour demand for certain jobs that were 
related to the health sector and educational services, and instructed the private 
sector to recruit Saudi workers to meet its demand for labour. However, most of 
the native job seekers in the labour market have low educational levels and many 
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of them are new entrants to the labour market. Moreover, most of these workers 
have no skills that match the labour demand of the private sector; therefore, many 
Table 2-6 
Annual Salaries Allocations to the General Expenditure, Revenues, and Oil 
Revenues in Saudi Arabia 
Over 1986-2003 
Year 
Expendi 
ture Salary 
Salary 
/Expen 
d% 
Oil 
Revenues 
Salary/ 
Oil Rev 
Total 
Revenues 
Salary/T 
otal 
Revenue 
1986 174709 50475 31.6 42464 118.9 76498 66.0 
1987 159646 55652 39.4 67405 82.6 103811 53.6 
1988 141200 56288 40.1 48400 116.3 84600 66.5 
1989 140460 58276 16.2 75900 76.8 114600 50.9 
1991 359601 62485 17.4 246297 25.4 316639 19.7 
1992 181000 72940 40.3 128790 56.6 169647 43.0 
1993 196950 76964 39.1 105976 72.6 141445 54.4 
1994 160000 67713 42.3 95505 70.9 128991 52.5 
1995 150000 61409 40.9 105728 58.1 146500 41.9 
1996 150000 61256 40.8 135982 45.0 179085 34.2 
1997 181000 94670 52.3 159985 59.2 205500 46.1 
1998 196000 I E+05 51.5 79998 126.3 141608 71.3 
1999 165000 95801 58.1 104447 91.7 147454 65.0 
2000 185000 106958 57.8 214424 49.9 258065 41.4 
2001 215000 110022 51.2 183915 59.8 228159 48.2 
2002 202000 111354 55.1 166100 67.0 213000 52.3 
2003 209000 116433 55.7 231000 50.4 293000 39.7 
Source: SAMA, Ibid 
employers view them as both less productive and more expensive than foreign 
workers (Datta et al., 2000; Girgis, 2000). Table (2-7) shows the weight of the 
Saudi educated among job seekers in the labour market over 1992-2001. It 
indicates that the proportion of the university graduates was between I and I I% of 
the total job seekers over this period; those with secondary qualifications counted 
between 10 and 43%, while workers with intermediate education represented 
between 15 and 28% of the total Saudi job seekers, and those with lower 
educational levels counted the majority of the Saudi job seekers, between 17-72% 
of the total over this period. However, the job seekers in the labour market are 
induced by wages and benefits in the public sector as they do not accept wages 
paid to their non-Saudi counterparts who are targeted to be replaced by Saudis 
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Table 2-7 
Weight of Educated Among Saudi Job Seekers 
Over 1992-2001 
Year 
Illitera 
to 
Read - 
write 
Prima 
ry 
Intermedi 
ate Secondary University Total 
1992 14.8 20.0 30.8 18.5 13.8 2.0 28355 
1993 14.3 19.2 31.7 19.7 13.1 1.9 27464 
1995 14.0 19.8 29.9 20.8 13.8 1.7 24232 
1996 12.1 15.1 30.7 21.4 17.2 3.5 43596 
1997 11.4 14.3 30.6 21.6 18.2 3.9 55373 
1998 9.1 11.0 29.5 21.4 24.5 4.5 66386 
1999 7.8 10.5 25.5 22.2 27.6 6.4 65078 
2000 6.1 8.1 3.1 28.5 43.1 11.1 65194 
2001 2.7 3.7 20.5 24.0 42.4 6.7 81006 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Annual Reports (Various Years) 
(Mellahi, 1999), so they expected that the private sector would pay them extra 
wages that represent the difference between the current monthly wage of the non- 
Saudis. Datta et al. (2000) estimated the influences of labour policies affecting the 
private sector in GCC countries, which have similar characteristics, and their 
labour markets operate with similar policies. The authors assumed that the labour 
supply of foreign workers is perfectly elastic at a given wage and they are 
exclusively employed by the private sector, which produces non-tradable goods 
(especially services) and import-traded goods. The authors also assumed that the 
domestic labour has two wage rates: one is the government wage (exogenous 
wage), which the employers may resort to, and the wage determined in the labour 
market by the employers (endogenous wage). However, variables of the model are 
extended to cover exports, GDP, and government spending. Using macro-data for 
the period 1975-1998, they found that wages of domestic labour, both exogenous 
and endogenous, are higher than that of foreign workers, by 67% and 77% for the 
two types of the wages, respectively, and the demand for foreign labour exceeded 
demand for domestic labour by 61 % in the GCC countries. This, in turn, increased 
the fiscal deficit of the government expenditure, which has to be balanced by an 
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increase in exports. They argued that an increase in the wages of the domestic 
increases demand for foreign labour, and increases demand on imports and non- 
traded goods. 
We now turn to examine the general features of the demand and supply 
conditions in the labour market for the chemical and petrochemical industries. 
These industries have a significant role in the industrial structure of Saudi Arabia. 
They are generally considered to be nascent industries that mainly depend on local 
production of gas and some imported chemical inputs. The chemical and 
petrochemical industries started in the country in 1956 and the rate of its growth 
picked up with the establishment of Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) 
in the 1970s. By 2003, per capita consumption of plastics in Saudi Arabia reached 
40 Kilograms, which was higher than the level in many Asian countries and more 
than double the level for the Middle East as a whole( US-Saudi Arabian Business 
Council, 2003). Saudi Arabia has become a producer and exporter of a variety of 
petrochemicals, with these industries contributing to the country's total exports by 
5% as in 2002. In terms of contribution to manufactured exports, the share by the 
chemical and petrochemical industries is even higher at 69% of the total non-oil 
manufactured exports over the 1996-2000 period (CSD, 2000). The chemical and 
petrochemical industries have also become an increasingly more important 
supplier to the domestic market, as it is expected that the annual domestic demand 
for the products supplied by these industries would increase at 7-10% in the 
coming years (Al-Mady, 2000). The rapid growth in these industries is bound to 
change the composition of demand for labour in Saudi Arabia. Since most of these 
industries, with the exception of SABIC, are mainly labour-intensive, as their 
capital/labour ratio is calculated at 2.8 in comparison to 5.3 for SABIC in 1995 
(Ministry of Industry, 1995), it is expected that the growth in these industries may 
lead to a rise in the relative demand for unskilled labour. 
Concerning factors influencing wage differentials and wage discrimination 
in the chemical and petrochemical industries, Chapter Three (coming) has revealed 
some sources of such factors that are mainly related to the supply side. The first 
category of factors primarily reflects the human capital components that include 
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educational qualifications, on-the-job training, and work experience. The second 
category of factors reflects the demographic characteristics that comprise workers' 
ages, marital status, and number of children. The final category of factors is related 
to some non-pecuniary working conditions that reveal wage differentials in the 
chemical and petrochemical industries. The wage differential among workers in 
these industries is supported by the simple statistical measures that reflect the 
influences of all of the above categories of factors on earnings of these workers. It 
is expected that decomposition of the controlled variables will shed further light on 
their influence on the wage differentials and wage discrimination. Chapter Five 
will provide a detailed investigation of the extent and sources of the wage 
differentials and wage discrimination in these industries. 
However, the previous chapters confirm that Saudi workers gain many more 
benefits in the labour market than their non-Saudi counterparts, who are largely 
disadvantaged. Saudi workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries 
generally have higher earnings than their non-Saudi counterparts, they have better 
working conditions than non-Saudi workers, and they have permanent jobs, while 
the non-Saudi workers do not. These factors are expected to have their contribution 
to the wage differentials and wage discrimination in these industries. However, it is 
expected that a portion of the wage differential between these workers is explained 
by some personal and productivity characteristics that include the mentioned major 
human capital components. Other variables include demographic factors, 
specifically workers' ages, marital status; and appearance of children, and 
workplace conditions that comprise occupational status, promotion, work injury 
risks, health services, mobility in the labour market, and paid leave. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SALIENT FEATURES OF THE SAUDI LABOUR MARKET 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of the main features of the 
Saudi labour market. It makes use of the available summary data on the main 
characteristics of the Saudi labour market. In particular, this chapter examines 
features of the segmentation phenomenon in the Saudi labour market based on 
labour regulations that characterise this labour market and provides an initial 
assessment of the main causes of this phenomenon in Saudi Arabia. The main 
features of the Saudi labour market are discussed in the following sub-sections; 
they comprise the Saudisation of the labour force, the supply of labour, skill 
shortages among Saudi workers, foreign workers in the Saudi labour market, and 
the regulations that govern the labour market. 
3.2 SAUDISATION OF THE LABOUR MARKET 
As mentioned earlier, Saudisation refers to the Saudi government policy 
that was introduced to replace non-Saudi workers by Saudi workers, particularly in 
the private sector and skilled occupations. The Saudisation(see Appendix I) policy 
was largely prompted by the unemployment problem that first became significant 
in the country during the 1990s. The term unemployment refers to the number of 
workers who participate in the labour force but are not employed for pay during a 
particular period. The ratio of the unemployed to the total labour force (the 
participants) is the unemployment rate. However, the unemployment rate explains 
a fraction of the labour force that is not working, the remaining part of the labour 
force being accounted for by the employed workers in the labour market. In Saudi 
Arabia, unemployment among the native workers started to appear clearly during 
the mid- I990s for the first time since the oil discovery (Wood and Mellahi, 2002). 
During the 1970s and the 1980s, the labour market policy in the country was 
directed towards. increasing the supply of skilled Saudi workers in different 
occupations. This policy was backed up by a generous recruitment of these 
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workers in government departments that provided better remuneration, generous 
work privileges, and facilities superior to the private sector (Al-Towaijri, 1992). 
However, with the emergence of the economic problems of the mid-1980s, when 
the country's oil revenues started to decrease due to falling oil prices, the single 
export product in Saudi Arabia, recruitment in government departments was 
adversely affected. This problem became more severe in the 1990s. The 
government then restricted recruitment to only education and health-care jobs and 
froze employment in other departments. Consequently, unemployment among 
Saudi workers suddenly jumped to 13.4% in 1992, but subsequently decreased in 
1999 and 2000 with a similar rate of 8.1%, as Table (3-1) illustrates. From this 
table, it can be seen that unemployment among Saudi females increased from 
11.8% in 1992 to 15.8% in 1999 and then to 17.6% in 2000. Although the rate 
among Saudi male workers decreased from 13.6% in 1992 to 6.5% in 2000, it is 
still a significant problem when viewed from a historical perspective. 
The rise in unemployment was accompanied by labour shortages in 
different occupations. Theoretically, as Frey and Livraghi (1996) explained, labour 
shortages can exist even when there is a quantitatively sufficient supply of 
economically active workers. These shortages often are accompanied by the 
mismatch between the demand for and supply of different skills, as discussed 
by 
Ehrenberg and Smith (2000). In Saudi Arabia, the government has launched many 
subsidised educational and training programmes in the academic, vocational, 
technical, and higher education sector since the 1970s with the onset of the oil 
boom. This enabled the country to increase its trained and educated human 
resources, but despite these programmes there is still excess demand for skills, 
particularly technical and vocational skills (Seventh Development Plan, 2000). 
Governments are normally concerned about unemployment; therefore, they 
intervene in the labour market through various policies such as payroll taxes, wage 
subsidies, and minimum wage policies. While the Saudi government froze 
recruitment in the public sector, it sought to force firms in the private sector to 
recruit Saudi nationals. This policy was known as `Saudisation', and was aimed at 
substituting Saudi for non-Saudi workers who actively participated in the Saudi 
labour market. 
73 
0 
n 
*- co wa4 
0 cö DD BCD 
3 
n0 
O ur 
oo 
R_ o 
ny 
(D 
-3 fý 
'0 
d 
00= ar 
ýaO 
ö 
o 
CD 
o 
my 
o 
0 
o a) 1ý 
C 
N 
O 
O 
O 
74 
öC 
.4 : 
P, Zo 
ýi. 
O 
00 10 00 
N . 06 't-J, two N 
--C) W 
Ö 
W 
a% 
9' 
O -4 
cl, 
Oo N G-% W 
1 Oo 
00 
4- 
0th\ 
CD 
00 0ö 
r ýO _ö 00 
WN 
r~"" 
NO 
ýÖÖ 
Q1 1ý0 (ON 
0 
?N 
rr CD NW ýO 
00 °Ö 
gyp, 
. 
'JC v 
cl, It= 
O 
Cý. " O 
öýul ör° 
w t1i cN 
CD 
ö 
N 
ýD A to 
ti 
P. - 
N 
%. c fA p. 
00 C) -ýl 0 
0-P. 
CLA 
0 CD 
9 
b 
0 
eD 
W 
0 
01 
ey 
o fD 
Ä `r 
0 C 
ýs 
ý+ 
ýO 
ýD 
N 
NO 
O 
O 
0 
0 0 
m 
Further, `Saudisation' included nationalisation, which was used for the first 
time in the 1970s to nationalise 60% of foreign banks' share of capital for Saudi 
investors and keep the rest to the original owners, who could only trade their shares 
in the local markets. 
The Saudisation policy was first applied in the labour market during the 
1980s, when the foreign companies completed construction of the huge industrial 
cities and chemical and petrochemical manufacturing plants in the country. It 
aimed to replace key posts occupied by foreign workers in these industries by 
Saudi nationals. Woodward (1988) argued that Saudi planners tried to alleviate the 
problems of reliance on foreign labour, and points to the massive training 
programmes inside and outside the country run by the government to enable Saudi 
workers to manage and operate the new government corporations and to replace 
expatriates with Saudi nationals. He revealed that multinationals in the country 
including Shell, Exxon, Mitsubishi, Unions Carbide, and Bechtel all understood 
that the American, European, or Japanese management in these industries would 
be phased out under the Saudisation labour policy. 
The second wave of Saudisation in the labour market started in the 1990s. 
It aimed at replacing non-Saudi workers in the white and blue-collar occupations 
by Saudi nationals and reducing the numbers of foreigners in the country. In 1994, 
a ministerial decree, Resolution 50, declared specific steps towards Saudisation. It 
induced firms to attract Saudi nationals to join their services and to secure 
permanent jobs for them, and compelled firms that employed twenty workers or 
more to increase their number of Saudi employees by 5% a year. Non-compliant 
firms would incur punishments including a freeze on the firm's applications to 
import new foreign workers, a freeze on the firm's applications to renew residency 
cards (Iqama) for their current foreign workers, excluding non-complying firms 
from competing for government tenders, restricting their access to government 
financial support, and limiting the firm's access to government subsidies and 
facilities inside and outside the country. 
The potential cost to non-compliant firms could be substantial, as the 
government provided firms, particularly those in the manufacturing sector, with 
cheap financing costs that were paid once at a rate of 2.5% of the total financed 
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amount. Further, the government also subsidised water and electricity and levied a 
low rate of taxation (Zakhat) at 2.5% for Saudi firms, while foreign companies had 
to pay between 25-45% on corporate profits (Datta et al., 2000). Furthermore, the 
government provided the private sector with abundant business opportunities and 
other incentives such as tenders for public utilities projects, government 
procurements, and agricultural subsidies. 
The decree designated some job positions to be occupied by Saudi nationals 
only. These included departmental staff, reception staff, government affairs 
(Muaqib) staff, cashiers, and security guard staff. Because of this decree, many 
occupations were listed by the High Council of Manpower (HCM) to phase out 
foreign workers. Some of these occupations were strictly assigned to Saudis, such 
as salespeople in the vegetable retail and wholesale sectors, auctioneers, and 
workers in real estates offices, whereas in other sectors it was planned to phase out 
foreign workers gradually (HCM, 2003). 
The policy of substituting foreign workers by natives has become a 
common policy across the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries. Apart from 
Saudi Arabia, a similar process has also occurred in other Gulf states, such as 
Kuwaitisation in Kuwait (Al-Nasser, 1995), Omanisation in Oman (Hobbs, 1995), 
Bahrainization in Bahrain (AL Darazi, 1995), and Qatarisation in Qatar (Looney, 
2004). 
However, despite the concerted Saudisation efforts in Saudi Arabia, labour 
shortages still existed and many foreign workers were brought into the country to 
supply labour. Figure (9) shows a striking increase in the number of work permits 
issued to recruit new foreign workers in managerial and administrative jobs during 
recent years between 2002-2003. From this figure, number of the issued work 
permits to brought new foreign workers in the Saudi labour market is still high as it 
hovered around 400,000 permissions annually over the period 1999-2003, and 
most of them are allocated for workers in production occupations. 
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3.3 THE LABOUR SUPPLY OF SAUDI WORKERS 
3.3.1 Low participation rates by Saudi workers 
Participation in the labour force reflects labour supply either in the form of 
the number of employed workers or in the form of hours worked (Killingsworth 
and Heckman, 1986). The participation rate of individuals in the labour force is the 
proportion of the participants in the labour force, employed or unemployed, in 
relation to the total working age population (Rima, 1981; Ehrenberg and Smith, 
2000). 
Many factors influence the labour participation of individuals. These 
factors include late entry to the labour market due to schooling years, early 
retirement from the labour force, working hours, average household income, and 
labour market regulations. In addition, several other indirect factors include 
general health of the population, physical ability of the workers, social security 
systems, and customs and social traditions (Pencavel, 1986; Smith 1994). Many 
empirical studies (Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986; Chagny et al., 2001; Goldin, 
1990), especially in the developed countries, have revealed decreased participation 
rates for men in comparison to women between 1950 and 1999. 
It is suggested that there are some factors that influence the participation of 
women in the labour market in the developed countries and in urban areas of the 
developing countries. These factors are mainly the changing role of women in the 
household, decline of fertility rate, the changing age structure, and share of part- 
time employment in total employment (Chagny et al., 2001). 
Insofar as total labour supply is concerned, the most significant factors are 
the size of the population, its structure, and distribution of the working age 
population, which comprises individuals of fifteen years old and over (Sapsford, 
1981; Ehrenberg and Smith, 2000). The native Saudi population can be described 
as a young population with about 38.2% being between 15 and 39 years old and 
42.2% being less than fifteen years old. Saudi females made up about 50% of the 
native Saudi population in 2000 (Table3-2). 
In Saudi Arabia, there is no adequate statutory classification for an eligible 
working age at which a worker should enter the labour market. Employment 
regulations also impose different age limits for recruitment in different sectors of 
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the economy. While labour regulations applying to the private sector make it 
illegal to recruit individuals under fourteen years old, regulations relating to 
employment in the public sector set the minimum recruitment age for work at 
eighteen years old for a Saudi candidate and twenty years old for non-Saudi 
candidates. 
Table 3-2 
Population Distribution of Saudi and non-Saudi 
By Sex and Age Group in 2000 
(in Thousands) 
Saudi Non-Saudi Total Age Group 
No. % No. % % No. 
>1 to 14 7052.4 45.3 1346.3 25.6 40.3 8398.7 
15-39 5961.2 38.2 2857.8 54.4 42.3 8819.0 
40-64 1996.5 12.8 1006.2 19.1 14.4 3002.7 
65+ 578.6 3.7 47.8 0.9 3.0 626.4 
Ae ate% 15588.7 100% 5258.1 100% 100% 20846.8 
Male 7800.1 50.04 3514.9 66.85 54.28 11315.0 
Female 7788.8 49.96 1743.2 33.15 45.7 9532.0 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)" Annual Keportsutn --, 
Riyadh, 2002 
Despite the discriminatory regulations, summary data on labour force for 
the period 1980-1992 by the Central Department of Statistics (CDS) showed that 
the starting working age was 12, whilst more recent statistics showed it to be 15. 
With these inconsistent classifications in mind, it should be noted that the age 
structure of the Saudi participants in the labour force showed some changes among 
different age groups over 1980-2000. Table (3-3) shows that the number of Saudi 
nationals in the aggregate working-age population more than doubled over 1980- 
2000. The working-age population increased from 3.7 million in 1980 to about 
8.22 million in 2000. This reflects a high growth rate of increase in the working 
population among Saudis, which is, on average, 3.5% over 1980-2000. However, 
the participation rate among Saudi workers is low (the level of non-participants 
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peaked at 70% of the working population in the mid-1980s) because the majority 
of non-participants are women, who are largely eliminated from the labour market, 
as well as elderly people and students. The proportion of the Saudi non- 
participants started to decrease steadily over the 1990s and stood at about 64% in 
2000, and in turn increased in the aggregate participation rates, particularly among 
Saudi women over 1999-2000. 
2.3.2 Gender issues 
Turning to the gender issue, in contrast to the male-female comparison in 
the developed countries, the aggregate participation rates of males in the labour 
market of Saudi Arabia are much higher than female rates over 1980-2000. Saudi 
males dominate the labour market, as their share of the labour market participants 
(in labour force) is slightly increased particularly between]. 987 and 2000. 
From Table (3-3), it is clear that Saudi male participants in the labour market 
accounted for about 30% of the Saudi working age population during 1980-2000, 
while Saudi females' participation rate in the labour market peaked to about 5.2% 
of the working population in 2000, rising from a mere 1.5% in 1980. Despite this 
three-fold increase over the two decades, the labour market participation rate 
among Saudi females remains very low. The main reasons for this can be attributed 
to conservative religious teachings and social traditions prevailing in the country 
(Al-Ghannam, 1987, and Al-Khudari). In addition, education and training 
programmes segregate women in academic education, which restricts their job 
opportunities for certain occupations. The Saudi education system prevents women 
from enrolling in engineering, journalism, pharmacy, and architecture, but largely 
they are trained in fields of education and clerical jobs (Baki, 2004). Al-Hassuen 
and Al-Manaa (1989) argued that the prevailing traditional views eliminate the 
political, economic, cultural and social role of women in Saudi Arabia and 
consider them unproductive members of the society, and thus make women 
dependent on men. Al-Hazzaa (cited in Makar, 1996) attributed the exclusion of 
women from their economic role to the effects of oil revenues. He argued that this 
made it economically feasible to perpetuate the old customs of veiling and 
seclusion of women in Saudi society. Besides, the abundant oil wealth enhanced 
the role of the clergymen whose teachings largely affect the social and economic 
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role of women in the country. As the majority of women were kept out of the 
labour market, opportunities were then only available for men (Mammen and 
Paxson, 2000). 
In addition to these reasons, Sado (1999) argued that firms in the Saudi 
labour market preferred to recruit men than women. Employers think that women 
work fewer hours or they refuse to work double shifts, which is a common practice 
of work in the country. This indicates the employers' discriminatory attitudes 
against females, which contributed to the low participation rate among not only 
non-Saudi females but also Saudi females. 
3.3.3 Social and economic factors 
For Saudi workers as a whole, several general social and economic factors 
cause their low participation. School attendance and social traditions largely 
influence the participation of Saudi workers in the labour force. Table (3-4) shows 
that students and housewives accounted for large proportions of the non- 
participants in the labour market. From this table, it is clear that school pupils 
amounted to 35% of the non-participants in 1980,40% in 1987 and about 45% in 
1992. The standard theory of labour supply attributes high rates of non-labour 
status among young people to the rising trends in school attendance where 
individuals spend a long time and enter the labour market after schooling 
(Pencavel, 1986; Rima, 1981; Dixon, 1996; Preston, 1999). As far as the Saudi 
housewives are concerned, they represent a significant share of the working-age 
female population in Saudi Arabia, although this share declined from 52% in 1980 
to 43% in 1992. 
Another reason for the low participation rate among the Saudis is 
government social support. During the first years of development plans of the 
1970s and the 1980s, the government provided Saudi nationals with easy access to 
numerous services and generous welfare benefits. It is argued that these benefits 
have promoted a preference for much more leisure time among Saudis, and this in 
its turn has changed the work ethic among Saudi workers, and makes them 
moreinterested in positions of social status and authority rather than positions in 
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production and services occupations (Al-Shuabi, 1984; AL-Khouli, 1985). In 
addition, the economic development process creates new opportunities in trade and 
other business activities, so many educated Saudis prefer to work in the trade and 
service sectors, which have their cultural roots in the country. They are primarily 
engaged in these sectors to maximise such opportunities, to avoid discipline, rules 
commitment, and instructions procedures that are required in the industrial sectors 
(A1-Khouli, 1985). The extended family is another factor that influences 
participation of the Saudi workers in the labour market, as it makes some family 
members largely dependent on other members. It is known that, in Saudi Arabia 
and many developing countries, the working male in the family has to support his 
other non-working family members, especially his parents and unmarried sisters 
(Al-Towaijri, 1992). 
3.3.4 Working hours 
Working hours are another aspect of participation in the labour market; 
weekly working hours reflect the quantitative aspect of the labour supply decision 
as well as the level of a worker's participation in the labour market. Empirical 
studies on working hours in the labour markets in the developed countries confirm 
decreasing trends of the weekly working hours across these markets (Altonji and 
Paxson, 1985; Blyton, 1995; Husbands, et al., 1995; Boheim and Taylor, 2001; 
Grossbard-Shechtman and Neideffer, 1997; Clarkberg and Moen, 1999; Bowles 
and Park, 2001; Bosch and Wagner, 2001). In their general review of global trends 
in working hours from 1984 to 1994, Husbands et al. (1995) showed that the 
weekly working hours in some countries were reduced to around 35 hours and 37.5 
hours of work on average. In Saudi Arabia, long weekly working hours still 
prevail. Although labour regulations strictly determine the weekly working hours 
to be 48 hours over six working days, these regulations make it possible to extend 
the working hours to 60 hours per week for certain jobs in the private sector, 
particularly those in the service sector such as wholesale and retail shops, 
restaurants and hotels. While in the public sector the weekly working hours are 35 
hours over five working days. 
84 
The labour regulations in Saudi Arabia allow a short rest period between 
daily working hours for meals and prayers. Therefore, it is common for work to 
stop many times during the day for prayer. Al-Mohawis (1986) confirmed the long 
weekly working hours in the Saudi labour market, illustrating it with the fact that 
in the 1980s the average weekly working hours in the construction sector were 
between 52 and 75 hours. Besides, while workers in the developed economies can 
decide on the number of hours they wish to work, either on a part-time or full-time 
basis (Smith, 1994), in Saudi Arabia full-time work is the norm and part-time work 
is rare. 
However, data on hours of work in Saudi Arabia is rare and inaccurate. The 
summary data in Table (3-5) presents average weekly working hours for full-time 
workers across occupations over 1980-2000, for both Saudi and non-Saudi 
workers. Data for 1980-1987 provides information for each group of workers, 
while that for 1999-2000 provides the average weekly working hours for all 
workers, as reported in the last three columns of this table. It is clear that Saudi 
workers generally supplied fewer working hours than their non-Saudi counterparts. 
This reflects low participation levels in the labour market among Saudi workers 
who supplied on average between 41.3 and 44.2 working hours per week over 
1980-1987, while the non-Saudi workers provided on average between 49.7 and 
51.5 working hours per week over the same period. The table reports that the 
aggregate average of the weekly working hours among Saudi workers steadily 
declined from 44.2 hours per week in 1980 to 41.3 hours in 1987. It also indicates 
variations in the number of the weekly working hours across occupations among 
these workers. Saudis in sales jobs have the highest average working hours at 
between 48.2 and 50.5 hours over the period from 1980 to 1987, followed by 
workers in managerial jobs, who worked between 45.2 and 49.1 hours per week 
during the same period. From this table, it may be seen that Saudi workers in 
professional jobs have provided weekly working hours less than the standard level, 
as they, on average, worked 37 hours per week over 1980-1987. Similarly, workers 
in clerical jobs provided fewer weekly working hours that declined on average 
from 43.2 to 40.2 hours between 1980-1987. Saudi workers in machine operating 
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jobs provided on average about 48.3 hours per week in 1980, but the number of 
weekly working hours was gradually reduced to 43.4 in 1987. 
Considering gender and marital status associated with weekly working 
hours, Table (3-6) shows that Saudi females provided low weekly working hours 
that hovered around 36 hours per week over 1980-1987, in comparison to the 
Saudi males who worked between 42.5 and 53.1 hours in average per week during 
this period. 
The table reveals that there is a minor difference in number of the weekly 
worked hours between married, never married, and divorced Saudi males over 
1980-1987. In 1980, these three groups of workers provided between 43.2 and 
44.8 hours, in 1983 they provided between 42.7 and 43 hours, and in 1986 their 
weekly worked hours are calculated between 42 and 42.7. In 1987, the divorced 
Saudi males provided higher weekly hours of 58.6, in comparison to 41.8 hours for 
the married and never married males. On the other hand, the table indicates that 
divorced Saudi females have provided higher weekly worked hours that hovered 
around 40 hours over 1980-1987, in comparison to about 37 hours on average for 
their married female colleagues over this period. 
3.4 SKILLS SHORTAGE AMONG THE INDIGENOUS LABOUR FORCE 
Skill shortages may arise due to a mismatch between employers' 
requirements and labour supply of the required skills, economic and technological 
changes, and changes in the occupational pattern (Handel, 1999; Arnal et al. 2001; 
Compbell, 2001). 
In Saudi Arabia, skills shortages emerged in the 1930s, particularly among 
skilled workers in technical and administrative occupations, but severe shortages 
of skills arose in the 1970s to cover different occupations. Table (3-7) shows the 
occupational gap as set by the development plans over 1970-2000. As shown on 
this table, the gap increased annually across occupations, with the exception of the 
agricultural occupations that have skills shortage only over 1995-2000. 
The main reasons for skills shortages in the country are due to the little 
development in education and training in the country before the discovery of oil, 
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prevalence of the religious education, and elimination of women from both labour 
market and education, as female formal education only started in the early 1960s. 
These aspects created a state of mismatch between the available skills 
among native workers and the requirements of development that were based on 
modem technology (used in manufacturing, construction, and services) rather than 
the nomadic pattern that prevailed before the 1970s. Many economists (Becker, 
1975; Tachibanaki, 1998; Rima, 1981; among them) confirm the existence of 
complementary factors between education and skills attainment. Tachibanaki 
(1998) considers education as a precondition to attain various occupations and 
perform jobs successfully. The standard theory of human capital considers that 
general education and scientific capability can be raised in formal education, while 
there are many specific skills that can be attained through specific professional 
education, such as medicine, economics, and law faculties. Therefore, many 
countries provide subsidies and facilities for education and training programmes to 
improve the productivity and skills of their population by allocating a portion of 
social investment to carry out these programmes. Most of these countries, 
particularly developing countries, believe that increasing enrolment in educational 
institutions, specifically the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, is the key to 
national development strategy providing the labour market with educated and 
trained workers (Todaro, 1997). Such a strategy, which views education and 
training as the main mechanism for human resource development, was adopted in 
Saudi Arabia. As a result, many Saudis graduated from different educational and 
training programmes. Table (3-8) shows that the number of Saudi university 
graduates increased by about three folds over 1990-1997. The majority of these 
graduates came from social sciences faculties, particularly from education and 
humanities. Most of these graduates prefer to join managerial and administrative 
jobs rather than technical and vocational jobs that are occupied by non-Saudi 
workers, because these jobs have low wages. Mellahi (2000) argued that the wage 
differences between the white-collar jobs and skilled manual jobs distorted the 
labour market and affected Saudi individuals' incentives to invest in vocational 
training. Considering the relationship between education and training, and 
occupational status of the workers, Table (3-9) confirms that the proportion of 
90 
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highly-educated Saudi workers in the total Saudi workforce was low over 1980- 
2000. Their number decreased from 8.8% of the total workers in 1999 to 5.5% in 
2000, though it increased from 3.6% in 1980. The table confirms the fact that these 
graduates were concentrated in professional and managerial jobs, particularly 
during 1980 and 1983, while their numbers decreased in these jobs in 2000. On the 
other hand, the table indicates that Saudi workers with secondary education have 
significant proportions in the professional and managerial occupations over 1980- 
2000. Moreover, the uneducated workers and workers with low education of 
primary and intermediate qualifications appeared across occupations, and they, on 
average, represent between 5.8% and 48.6% of the total workers across 
occupations over this period. 
3.5 FOREIGN WORKERS IN THE SAUDI LABOUR MARKET 
Labour regulations restrict the right to work in Saudi Arabia to natives. 
However, under the pressure of the skills shortages, the government was obliged to 
open its doors to foreign workers to enter the labour market to work as temporary 
workers under strict conditions. As explained before, the presence of foreign 
workers or non-Saudi workers (Ajanib) goes back to the 1930s with the discovery 
of oil. 
In the 1950s and the 1960s, only small numbers of foreign workers were 
employed in certain government agencies, but with the launching of the ambitious 
development projects in the public and private sectors, particularly over the 1970s 
- Le 1980s, many foreign workers with different skills gained access to the 
Saua. '-'4our market. Public departments and private firms sought to import these 
workers to meet the skill shortages of skilled, semi-skilled, and even unskilled 
workers. However, foreign workers were largely found in the construction sector, 
particularly during the 1970s and the 1980s. These workers came from more than 
190 countries and nationalities across the continents (Ministry of Interior, 1995); 
they had high participation rates in the Saudi labour market. From Table (3-10), it 
may be seen that non-Saudi males had high participation rates, hovering around 
80% of the total non-Saudi working population over 1980-1986, and then 
decreasing to around 70% over 1987-2000, in comparison to significantly low 
93 
participation rates for non-Saudi females in the labour market, which gradually 
increased from 1.4% of the non-Saudi working population in 1980 to 11.9% in 
1999 before decreasing again to 10.7% in 2000. On the other hand, non-Saudi 
workers generally have a higher participation rates than their Saudi counterparts in 
terms of working hours (see Table 3-5). 
Table 3-10 
Participation Rates of non-Saudi by Sex Over 1990-71)(11) 
Male Female 
Year 
in 
Labo 
ur 
Force 
out 
Labour 
Force 
Male 
Working 
Age 
in 
Labour 
Force 
out 
Labour 
Force 
Female 
Workin 
Age 
Female/ 
Total 
W. Pop 
Total 
Working 
Population 
1980 83.97 9.19 2121512 1.14 5.70 155603 1.14 2277115 
1983 84.04 9.85 2822669 1.07 5.04 183574 1.07 3006243 
1986 81.03 10.06 2823864 2.01 6.90 276081 2.01 3099945 
1987 77.37 12.52 2726565 2.39 7.73 306744 2.39 3033309 
1992 70.20 4.70 2820452 10.23 14.86 944964 10.23 3765416 
1999 67.89 4.31 2736882 11.87 15.93 1053565 11.87 3790447 
2000 66.53 5.28 2829322 10.73 17.46 111042 10.73 3939751 
Source: C DS, Ibid 
Another interesting observation from the Table (3-11) is that in 2000, non- 
Saudi workers with university educations were expelled from the labour market. In 
the previous year they accounted for 41.4% of the total non-Saudi workers in 
different occupations, but by 2000 their proportion decreased to only 3.7% of the 
non-Saudi workers in various occupations. This is a direct result of the Saudisation 
policy, as a major plank of that policy is to replace non-Saudi workers by Saudi 
workers, particularly in professional occupations. From this table, it can be seen 
that non-Saudi workers with secondary and university educations concentrated in 
the professional, managerial and clerical occupations over 1980-2000. 
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Non-Saudi workers are employed in both the private and government 
departments (the public sector). They occupy jobs in manufacturing firms that 
provide public utility services, construction, trade, and education and public 
administration. Table (3-12) shows the occupational structure of the two groups of 
workers; it reveals that non-Saudi workers dominate production and construction 
occupations, while their Saudi counterparts are concentrated in the white-collar 
jobs, particularly in the managerial and clerical occupations. This is similar to how 
foreign workers are concentrated 
in the same occupations in Singapore (Stahl, 1984; Cornwell and Rupert, 1995). 
As seen on this table, non-Saudi workers amount to more than 70% of the workers 
employed in these occupations over 1980-2000. However, these workers dominate 
sales occupations, with a share of 53.6% in 1980 and more than 70% of the 
employed workers in these occupations in 2000. The proportion of the non-Saudi 
workers in the professional jobs started to decrease since the last year of the second 
development plan in 1985, as their share in these occupations decreased from 63% 
in the professional jobs in 1980 to about 55% in 1986, and then declined further to 
34.3% in 2000. This is similar to their proportion in the managerial and clerical 
jobs. Besides, the share of non-Saudi workers fluctuated in services and in 
agricultural occupations. It is abundantly clear that the Saudisation policy has 
largely replaced non-Saudi workers from professional, managerial and clerical 
occupations by Saudi workers over the years. 
3.6 LABOUR MARKET REGULATIONS 
Labour market regulations are the main instruments that the government 
uses to intervene in the labour market. They comprise economic, social and 
judicial measures. These measures cover issues such as protection of workers' 
rights, protection of the vulnerable, minimum wage, and assurance of good 
working conditions (Downes et al., 2000). The standard theory of labour market 
segmentation confirms influence of such regulations on dualism in the labour 
96 
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market (Doeringer and Piore, 1979). Government intervention reveals its social 
role towards its citizens. Betcherman et al. (2001) argued that labour market 
interventions include market regulations that depend on individual contracts 
between the employer and the employees, statutory regulations that are based on 
rules and procedures set up by laws, and collective bargaining procedures. All such 
aspects present among the organised workers, particularly in the public sector, in 
developed countries and some developing countries. 
In Saudi Arabia, there are various regulations that strictly regulate the 
labour market in both the private and government or civil service departments. 
These regulations include labour law, civil service rules, pension and insurance 
regulations, the related regulations of residency of foreign workers, and the Iqama 
rules. They have contributed significantly to the segmentation of the labour market 
and create a state of duality in the labour market in Saudi Arabia. The main 
features of segmentation in these regulations include: 
3.6.1) Labour Law 
It applies to workers in the private sector and commercial government 
corporations. The labour law as a statutory regulation has various aspects 
indicating segmentation; these include: 
i) Employment Security - Employment or job security provisions in this 
law refer to hiring and firing rules that involve the contracts, but that are not 
provided screening recruitment procedures that could maintain employment 
security as in the public sector. It is known that employment in the private firms in 
Saudi Arabia is based on personal contracts, but there is no standard contract even 
in the same workplace. This creates different separate work relations between the 
employers and the workers, and makes the private sector lack adequate 
administrative rules that could maintain job security. It is in contrast to the 
government departments that have written recruitment procedures and regulations 
for each of the Saudi and non-Saudi workers. Moreover, the labour law entitles the 
employer to fire the worker for many reasons without any administrative 
investigation or explanation about his/her faults and mistakes, while the 
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regulations of the Civil Service protect workers against any punishment without 
investigation by the relevant authority, 
ii) Work Compensation - In the private sector of Saudi Arabia, the wage rate is 
fixed through direct negotiation between the two contracting parties: the employer 
and the worker. Firms' regulatory wage scales or levels are rare in this sector and 
collective bargaining is absolutely non-existent in the country; there are not even 
any minimum wage measures. However, there are no adequate measures that 
determine the wage rate in this sector, such as salary scale or any other form of 
personal or productivity characteristics such as experience, education or any other, 
which is in contrast to the public sector in Saudi Arabia, where such characteristics 
are considered. This creates wage differences among workers in the private firms 
and even in the same workplace. Moreover, labour regulations require employers 
to pay their Saudi workers 2%* more than their non-Saudi workers. Such 
provisions discriminate between workers and support segmentation in the labour 
market. 
iii) Dispute Resolution - Workers' complaints with labour laws and dispute 
settlement represent major aspects of the labour regulations in different countries. 
In Saudi Arabia, there are no specific labour courts. The work dispute settlements 
in the private sector are arranged through specialised committees that are appointed 
by a ministerial decree. 
In contrast to the public sector where the Supervision and Investigation 
Commission, which is responsible for application of the Civil Regulations, works 
as an autonomous body that has its own regulations and staff, the committees that 
are responsible for the application of regulations governing employment in the 
private sector are affiliated with the respective labour offices in different parts of 
the country. Obviously, in cases of dispute that were submitted to the committees, 
the workers are usually the main complainants against the employer. This is 
another factor offering the private sector a characteristic of segmentation that 
affects employment security in this sector. 
*Rules of employment of Non-Saudi in the public sector Article 13, and Labour Law Article 45. 
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2.6.2 Civil Service Regulations 
The civil service regulations mainly apply to workers in government 
departments. These regulations consist of various laws covering many aspects of 
the employees' lifetime in employment with the government. The civil service 
regulations are more consistent than that of the private sector. They make the 
public sector appear more structured and organised than the private sector. The 
latter suffers a lack of adequate institutional relations between the worker and the 
employer, who can subjectively abuse his/her rights against the worker. 
However, the civil service regulations cover different workplace 
characteristics that include occupational classifications, recruitment procedures and 
some screening measures, pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensations, promotion 
and annual allowances, scales of wages and salaries of different occupations, 
training procedures, and paid leaves. These characteristics distinguish workers in 
this sector and provide them with a large employment protection and allow them to 
access better working conditions than their colleagues in the private sector. These 
characteristics make the public sector more attractive for Saudi workers rather than 
the private sector. 
3.6.3 Pensions and Insurance 
The regulatory systems of different countries cover pension programmes 
for retired workers. These programmes represent a main component of the social 
security system of the respective country. The pension programmes may be 
organised through private funds or through public schemes. But in recent years the 
role of the state to provide pension is declining whilst the private pension funds are 
playing a more and more significant role, particularly in developed countries. In 
the United Kingdom, for example, the pension system comprises different forms of 
pension plans, including state pensions and the private-sector pension schemes. 
Under the state pension system, workers can select either the Basic State Pension 
plan, which entitles the retired employees to pensions financed by the National 
Insurance Contributions (NIC), or the additional State Pension or State Earnings- 
Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). Both of these plans are paid by the Department 
of Social Security. Besides, workers can select from a range of private pension 
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schemes that include occupational pension schemes or company or workers' 
pension schemes as well as many other alternative schemes (see Blake, 2003, for 
example). Other types of private pension choices include personal pension 
schemes, group personal pension schemes, and stakeholder pension schemes 
(Pension Service, 2003). 
In Saudi Arabia, there are two main forms of social security programmes, 
including the civil pension fund for government employees, and pension and 
insurance for private sector employees. The main statutory features of these 
regulations that provide additional aspects of segmentation of the labour market in 
the country are discussed as follows. 
i)Civil Pension Fund - Employees in government departments are entitled to a 
pension from the Civil Pension Fund (CPF) that covers only permanent full-time 
Saudi workers with government departments. Pension entitlement under CPF is 
based on age, or job tenure. Non-Saudi workers in the government departments are 
not covered by the CPF as they are entitled to a one-off compensation based on 
their job tenure with the government regardless of their age. This clearly fragments 
the public sector and allocates Saudi workers for better working conditions and 
provides them with more job security in comparison to non-Saudi workers in both 
the public (the internal sector), and in the private sector (the external sector), and 
thus contributes to the labour market segmentation. 
ii)Pension and Social Insurance - Workers in the private sector are covered by the 
pension and work injuries insurance programme, which is run by the General 
Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI). According to the GOSI's law, pension 
and work injuries insurance covers only Saudi workers, while non-Saudi workers 
are only covered by work injuries insurance and they are entitled to only a one-off 
compensation based on their job tenure. Thus the pension and social insurance 
regulations contribute to the labour market segmentation in the country, as they 
discriminate in provision of non-wage benefits that contribute to the social security 
of the workers. These regulations, clearly, deprive non-Saudi workers in the 
private sector of enjoying such job security privileges and thus affect employment 
protection in the labour market. 
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3.6.4 Migration Regulations 
Migration dominates a great part of humankind's history on the planet. 
International migration is a worldwide phenomenon that happens in both 
developed and developing countries. Migration policy is the main component of 
the migration regulations. It aims at measuring, organising and controlling 
international migration or cross-border labour movements. In the context of 
international migration, the admission policy is a factor that controls status of the 
migrants into the country. 
Many empirical studies about international migration policies distinguish 
between permanent residency and temporary residency of migrants into different 
countries. Borjas (1994) explains that workers can only migrate if the host 
country's government allows migration. He argues that the migration market is 
highly regulated, as most countries have strict policies describing the demographic 
characteristics of people who are allowed to enter the country. These 
characteristics might include skills, national origin, or family ties with current 
residents in the host country. He argues that migration policy is determined by the 
host country's political and economic gains from migration, as there are different 
benefits that could be gained from admitting skilled or unskilled migrants 
depending on the skills composition of the native labour force in the host country. 
On the other hand, temporary labour migrants are those who migrate for a 
short time, ranging from a few months to several years, to take up employment in a 
foreign country (Castles, 2000). The international migration experience shows that 
countries that have fully embraced the free market principle, countries like the 
United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, have adopted 
permanent settlement as a main form of immigration. In contrast, some other 
countries where there are severe labour shortages, such as the Middle East oil-rich 
countries, have to rely on temporary migrants as temporary workers. There are 
also some other non-migrant receiving countries, such as Japan, that open their 
doors for permanent and temporary migration (Morales, 1992). 
In Saudi Arabia, since the 1970s, international migration has been a 
prominent feature of the labour market. There is no comprehensive migration 
policy in the country, but features of such policy can be derived from the Iqama 
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regulations, (literally, the Residency Act), and the related instructions issued 
occasionally by the Ministry of the Interior. Foreign or non-Saudi` workers 
cannot enter the country unless they have a sponsor (called a Kafeel) of an eligible 
employer, or a permitted Saudi household in the case of domestic workers. When a 
foreign worker enters the country, he or she has to get a residency card, Iqama, and 
a work permit. The Passport Authority issues the former, and the work permit is 
usually issued by the Labour Department in the concerned district of Saudi Arabia. 
Once the worker gets the Iqama card, he/she has to give his/her passport to 
the Kafeel (the sponsor) and only gets it back when he/she leaves the country, as 
the Iqama card comes instead of the passport. A non-Saudi cannot change his/her 
sponsor or job unless he/she gets a release from his/her sponsor, finds another 
employer to offer him sponsorship, and obtains approval from the Passport 
authority to change his/her sponsorship; it may take several months to settle the 
matter. However, the sponsor has the right to refuse to give a release, to deport the 
worker and to ask the authority to ban the worker from coming back to the country 
for two years. These regulations apply to non-Saudi workers in both the private 
and public sectors. In this way the residency regulation distorts the labour market 
and eliminates the non-Saudi workers from the labour demand and supply to match 
their opportunity in the labour market, as these regulations restrict their mobility in 
the labour market while their Saudi counterparts can move freely in this market. 
Insofar as residency status is concerned, in contrast to the situation in the USA and 
the UK where many temporary migrants have the right to proceed to obtain 
permanent residency, in Saudi Arabia permanent residency is exclusively restricted 
to Saudi citizens according to the Nationality Law. Although the Saudi Citizenship 
Law gives a foreigner the right to apply for Saudi citizenship if he has lived in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for at least five years (a new proposal extends it to ten 
years) and is of irreproachable reputation, in practice it is very difficult to get 
permanent residency. Even among the small minority of migrants who are granted 
Saudi citizenship, they still face further discrimination in other situations. For 
" The Saudi Citizenship Law defines migrants as foreigners or non-Saudi who comprise migrant workers and their 
dependants, and foreign investors who usually make a minor part of the total migrants. In Saudi Arabia temporary migration 
is the only form that allows foreign workers of non-Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries to enter for employment. 
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example, regulations of the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council both stated 
that the member of the respective council should be of Saudi origin by parents. 
Foreign workers in professional, technical and managerial occupations with 
post-secondary education have the right to bring their families with them to Saudi 
Arabia. However, relatives of workers in other occupations have the right for only 
a short visit that might be extended to three months or another duration. This 
creates another aspect of employment instability among the disadvantaged workers 
and fragments both the private and public sector, as it allocates to some non-Saudi 
a pecuniary benefit not offered other colleagues only because they are not in 
specific jobs or they lack certain educational qualifications. 
3.7 SEGMENTATION IN THE SAUDI LABOUR MARKET: 
CONCLUSION 
Imperfect labour markets discriminate among workers in similar jobs or 
even in the same workplace with the same qualifications. The discrimination can 
arise from either labour market policies or individual firms' rules of work. These 
policies segment labour market into two groups of workers: one is economically 
advantaged, and the other group is disadvantaged or less advantaged. 
The standard theory of labour market segmentation was originally 
developed by Doeringer and Piore (1979). This theory interprets different aspects 
of the labour market disparity in the context of the internal labour market, within 
which certain implicit or explicit rules accord existing workers certain exclusive 
rights and privileges over another group of workers in the external labour market. 
Doeringer and Piore (1979) argue that this creates a dual labour market, which is 
segmented into primary and secondary sectors with different characteristics. Jobs 
in the primary sector are generally characterised by high wages, good working 
conditions, employment stability, equity, chances of advancement, and process in 
administration of work rules. By contrast, jobs in the secondary sector are 
characterised by low wages, poor fringe benefits, poor working conditions, little 
chance of advancement, and the fate of being subject to arbitrary management 
practices. It is common that the disadvantaged workers are confined to the 
secondary labour market. 
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Migrants are affected by labour market segmentation in the host countries 
where the primary labour market accords various work privileges to the native 
workers over migrants who are found in the secondary labour market. Piore (1979) 
reveals that migrant workers in France, Germany, Switzerland, and Britain are 
usually employed in occupations rejected by indigenous workers. Müller (1999) 
analysed the welfare outcomes of migration policies in the context of a dual labour 
market on the basis of the state of temporary migration. He concluded that 
migration policies in Germany led to sectoral segregation between natives and 
migrants, where the "guest workers" system allocates migrants into the secondary 
sector and yields higher gains for natives at the expense of overall efficiency. 
In Saudi Arabia, native workers prefer to find employment with the 
government departments or public sector that provides good compensation, 
prestigious social status, and job security. Very few Saudi workers are willing to 
join the private sector that has lower wages, and lower non-pecuniary benefits such 
as vacations, training, chances for promotion, working bonus, and working time 
schedules (Al-Khouli, 1985; Al-Moammar, 1983; Al-Towaijri, 1992; Al-Nimer, 
1993; Datta et al., 2000; Wood and Mellahi, 2002). Table (3-13) reveals that most 
Saudi workers are employed by the public sector. In 2000, their share of 
employment in the public sector was nearly 88%, which is above the share in 1985 
by about 25%. Meanwhile, the share of non-Saudi workers in the public sector 
decreased from 37% in 1985 to only 12% in 2000. This indicates a significant 
effect of the recent ministerial decree aimed at ending services of non-Saudi 
workers who had completed ten years in the service of this sector except for those 
in health care and higher education. In complete contrast to the employment 
pattern in the public sector, this table shows that non-Saudi workers dominate the 
private sector with an average rate of 79% over the period 1985-2000, even though 
their share in this sector decreased from 84% in 1985 to about 77% in 2000. 
From previous sections, it is obvious that labour market regulations 
influence the segmentation of the Saudi labour market, as these regulations attract 
Saudi workers to concentrate mainly in the public sector on the one hand, and 
largely restrict the employment of non-Saudi workers to the private sector on the 
other hand. Doeringer and Piore (1979) argued that legislation related to the labour 
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Table 3-13 
Distribution of Workers in the Government and Private Sector 
(in nercentaue) ()vPr t ORS_Mnnn 
Government Private 
Year Saudi Non-Saudi Total Saudi Non-Saudi Total 
1985 62.9 37.1 327188 16.0 84.0 1653900 
1988 64.4 35.6 406083 17.6 82.4 1864600 
1995 N. A N. A N. A 20.3 79.7 2208279 
1996 78.9 21.1 609011 19.7 80.3 2680507 
1997 N. A N. A N. A 22.1 77.9 2553797 
1998 82.2 17.8 616291 22.3 77.7 2638082 
1999 86.7 13.3 668423 22.7 77.3 2691440 
2000 87.7 12.3 674554 23.0 77.0 2810901 
Source: CDS" Economic Survey of Establishments". NA= available 
market has the effect of creating a secondary and a primary sector in this market. 
They illustrate the fact that unemployment compensation, social security, and 
minimum wage legislation all exempt some workers, even in the secondary sector, 
from coverage. They confirmed that such legislation affects the stability of the 
labour market; therefore, such legislation distorts the labour market. Lopes (2001) 
argued that legislation related to the Portuguese labour market provides workers in 
the public sector and large enterprises with a large employment protection, while 
workers in the small and medium-sized enterprises, the self-employed, and non- 
regular workers receive little protection from labour market regulations, which 
creates the dualistic phenomenon in the Portuguese labour market. In this context, 
regulations related to the Saudi labour market distort it and contribute to the 
segmentation phenomenon in this market. For example, migration and Iqama 
regulations prevent non-Saudi workers from moving freely in the labour market 
and tie them to their sponsors. These regulations regard movements of the non- 
Saudi workers in the labour market as illegal practices unless they obtain the prior 
consent of their sponsors to transfer officially to another employer. This prevents 
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non-Saudi worker from competing in the labour market, while the Saudi workers 
have the right to move and look for better jobs freely in the labour market. Bivins 
(2001) noticed that for many individual workers only one firm being assigned 
permission for employment of migrant workers in the Gulf Co-operation Council 
(GCC) countries, there is a monopsony in the migrant labour market. The 
monopsonist only offers a migrant worker a wage rate that is slightly more than the 
wage he/she may receive at home, as there is no other Saudi firm that is able to 
hire him/her. 
Furthermore, regulations of the Civil Service prevent non-Saudi workers from 
changing their service from the private sector to the public sector, with the 
exception that some of these workers are allowed to work for doctors or a non- 
Saudi worker's husband or wifer wife who works in the public sector. However, 
Saudi workers can easily move between the two sectors without any barriers. 
As Doeringer and Piore (1979) point out, this policy reflects a protection 
for workers in the internal labour market of the public sector from competition 
from other non-Saudi workers in the private sector, which represents an external 
labour market. 
Labour regulations also state various and distinct conditions of work for 
Saudi and non-Saudi workers in both the private and public sectors. Distinction 
between the two groups of workers involves recruitment procedures, working 
hours, vacations, training, promotion, compensations, and pension. 
Recruitment standards decide the quality and location of jobs for skilled 
and unskilled workers (Gitteman, 1993). The civil service regulations in Saudi 
Arabia set some criteria for job recruitment in the public departments. These 
criteria are based on some screening measures such as a minimum age of 17 for 
Saudis and 20 for non-Saudis, educational qualifications, health state, criminal 
records, and the previous work records if any. The recruitment procedures restrict 
non-Saudis to devote their work to only one government department. 
In contrast to the public sector, regulations in the private sector do not state 
specific recruitment procedures. It is in the employer's interest to select among 
candidates, as there are no predetermined screening measures for job attainment in 
the private sector. Nevertheless, the labour law requires that a foreign worker in the 
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private sector should be recruited among skilled and qualified workers, although it 
did not set down any screening measures about recruitment of these workers. This 
opens the doors for skilled and unskilled foreign workers to join to the private 
sector since these workers are recruited in their home country by a local agent to 
whom the Saudi employer has to pay (Elenes et al., 1992; Barsalou, 1985; 
Woodward, 1988). This assigns unskilled workers to the private sector, particularly 
in construction and production sectors that are dominated by private investments 
(see Table 3-12). Foreign workers in the public sector are recruited abroad through 
representatives of the Saudi General Civil Service Department. This allows public 
departments to recruit non-Saudi or foreign workers with specific skills and 
qualifications that are required for the work. 
Working hours and vacations are another aspect of labour market 
segmentation in Saudi Arabia. Section 2 of this chapter about hours of work in the 
Saudi labour market reveals differences in weekly working hours between the 
private and public sectors. It shows that, in general, workers in the public sector 
are working fewer hours than their counterparts in the private sector. While the 
weekly working hours in the public sector extend to 35 hours over five days, the 
standard work week hours in the private sector ranges between 48 and 60 hours 
over 6 days across occupations. 
Considering vacations as a non-pecuniary benefit, labour regulations entitle 
workers in the public sector to have longer vacations and holidays than their 
colleagues in the private sector. Saudi workers in the public sector enjoy various 
vacations that include official holidays, annual paid leaves, emergency paid leave, 
work-injuries paid vacations, sick paid leave, school examinations paid leave, and 
paid vacation to accompany a sick family member. A Saudi worker in this sector 
may get the right for sick paid leave to get medical treatment outside the country. 
In such cases, the Saudi worker has a right to get free air tickets and financial 
support for treatment. The periods of vacation privileges for Saudi workers range 
between 5 days and 18 months, but non-Saudi workers in the public sector have 
limited kinds of paid vacations that only include official holidays, paid annual 
vacations, and sick leave for a limited period. The periods of these vacations may 
extend to 75 days in total. Married female Saudi workers in the public sector have 
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a right for maternity vacation of up to 60 days, while their non-Saudi counterparts 
in this sector have a right for 45 days only. 
Concerning training, labour regulations and government programmes 
devote a great deal of attention to the training of Saudi workers in the public 
sector. These regulations restrict training courses sponsored by the government to 
Saudis only, whether the training takes place inside or outside the country, whereas 
non-Saudi workers in this sector are denied any training opportunity. Labour law 
requires the employers who employ more than 100 workers to train 5% of his 
Saudi employees. It does not extend such privileges to non-Saudi workers. 
These aspects and others not only segment the labour market in Saudi 
Arabia, but also discriminate between migrants and natives. As DeBeiji (1995) 
points out, discrimination occurs when migrant workers receive inferior treatment 
compared to native workers in spite of comparable education, qualifications, and 
experience. Piore (1979) further discusses the situation of discrimination on the 
basis of nationality; that is, good jobs are reserved for natives whilst migrant 
workers are excluded from privileged jobs even if they are more skilled and more 
productive. 
Therefore, these practices make the labour market in Saudi Arabia 
significantly different from that of other countries that receive a large numbers of 
migrant workers, such as the USA and the UK, whose employment regulations 
strictly prevent discrimination in the labour market. Work permit regulations in 
UK require the employer to offer work conditions and pay no less favourable than 
those offered to a resident worker doing the same job (Glover et al., 2001). 
Regulations regarding temporary migrants in the USA require an employer to treat 
all employees the same, whether they are natives or migrants (USA Department of 
Justice, 1991). 
Another aspect of the labour market segmentation in Saudi Arabia is work 
advancement. The recruitment regulations in the public sector give Saudi workers 
the right for promotion after a maximum period of four years that a worker spends 
in his/her current position, whereas non-Saudi workers in either the public or 
private sectors generally have no such rights whatsoever. The only exception is for 
non-Saudi university teaching staff, who are governed by separate recruitment 
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regulations that provide them with better conditions of work compared to other 
non-Saudi workers. Even so, they still do not enjoy the same privileges as their 
Saudi counterparts. 
Considering work compensation in the public sector, wage scales across 
occupations reveal that Saudi workers have more benefits than their non-Saudi 
counterparts. For example, the difference in the entry salary between the graduate 
Saudi doctor and non-Saudi doctor is estimated at 50% in favour of the former (Al- 
Taweel et al., 1995). In addition, Saudi workers have the right for an annual salary 
allowance that is valued between SR 70-640 Saudi Riyals across occupations. As a 
comparison, their non-Saudi counterparts in this sector might be paid an annual 
salary allowance that is equal to about 5% of the basic salary, without job 
promotion. However, non-Saudi workers in the public sector have an annual 
accommodation allowance and travelling tickets, which are not allocated to Saudis. 
Firms in the private sector have no specific wage scales. Payment is settled 
according to personal contract or an oral agreement between the employer and the 
worker. There are no collective agreements on work compensations. The labour 
law sets loose rules about wages and compensations of the workers in the private 
sector in comparison to that in the public sector. The Labour Law makes some 
differences in payment between Saudis and non-Saudis, as it requires the employer 
to assign 51% of the employer's total budgeted compensations to Saudi employees 
(Article 45). However, wage differential (more details below) between Saudi and 
non-Saudi is a prominent feature in the labour market. 
As explained before, pension privileges also represent a part of conditions 
of work that contributes to the segmentation of the labour market in Saudi Arabia. 
Most of these privileges are allocated to Saudi workers rather than their non-Saudi 
counterparts who only have very few social security benefits. 
In summary, the Saudi labour market can be argued to be a highly 
segmented one and the segmentation is manifested through significant differences 
in pay and working conditions across different groups of workers in the Saudi 
labour market. The segmentation phenomenon can be observed among workers of 
different nationality, gender, and sector (particularly public versus private). 
However, many factors, historical, cultural and policy-oriented, have contributed 
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to the segmentation phenomenon that in turn has contributed to the prevalence of 
the wage differentials and wage discrimination in the labour market and in one 
particular industry in Saudi Arabia, the chemical and petrochemical industries, 
which is the main focus of the remaining chapters of this study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PAY AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE SAUDI CHEMICAL 
AND PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the pay and working conditions in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries in Saudi Arabia. It reports the findings of a survey of 
Saudi and non-Saudi workers. These findings are set in the context of the relevant 
theory and literature and secondary data where available. 
Working conditions, which have administrative, social, and economic 
rights, are framed by statutory laws, or collective bargaining, or individual 
contracts. Further, they embrace many pecuniary and non-wage features of the 
workplace, such as working time, skills development, particularly through training, 
discrimination by gender or race, health and safety, social relations in the 
workplace, holiday entitlement, and contract. In addition, working conditions 
extend to the physical environment, which has ambient features (noise, vibrations, 
temperature, light, air quality, chemicals) and ergonomics features (equipment and 
furniture positions, repetitive movements, loads) (Paoli, 1992; Houtman et al., 
2002; Fagan and Burchell, 2002). However, working conditions are in a state of 
continual change, particularly in developed countries which have adopted more 
advanced working conditions to improve the quality measures of the workplace 
(EURFLWC, 2002). 
Working conditions in the Saudi chemical and petrochemical industries are 
influenced by the labour regulations and the individual contracts between the 
employers and the employees. Working conditions influence a worker's earnings, 
so that unequal and unfair treatment, either explicit or implicit, in contracts 
contributes to earnings inequality among workers in the same occupations. In 
addition, earnings inequality is influenced by other factors that include 
demographic variables such as workers' age and marital status, as well as their 
human capital components, which mainly comprise education, training and work 
experience. 
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This chapter begins with a discussion of the sources and methods of 
information collection in the chemical and petrochemical industries. The chapter 
then focuses on the identification and interpretation of empirical patterns in the pay 
and employment structure of Saudi and non-Saudi workers as shown by the results 
of the cross-sectional survey. A formal investigation into the determination of 
wages and the extent of wage discrimination in these industries is presented in 
Chapter Five. 
4.2 SOURCES AND DATA COLLECTION 
Lack of data is a major constraint for economic research in Saudi Arabia. 
This problem stems from the laws that restrict access to the detailed micro data* of 
the census and surveys that are conducted by the Central Department of Statistics 
(CDS). However, macro data in the form of summary tables on the labour market 
is available, but the information is not comprehensive and is often inconsistent 
and/or unavailable. This study makes use of the released summary data on the 
labour force, wages, and employment that were irregularly prepared and issued 
during the 1980s and 1990s by the CDS. In addition, similar time series data 
reported by other government departments is drawn on. 
Since very limited official data exist, the present study has had to rely on a 
specially-designed survey to collect primary information on the pay and working 
conditions in the chosen industries. This section discusses the various sources of 
secondary data and, in particular, details of the design and implementation of the 
survey for collecting primary information. The survey covers a sample of workers 
in the chemical and petrochemical industries in the three main cities of Saudi 
Arabia: Riyadh**, Jeddah and Dammam. 
4.2.1 Sample cluster 
The sample cluster refers to the location where a sample of respondents is 
chosen. In this research, the sample cluster corresponds to a chemical or a 
Statistics law (Articles 10 and 11) was enacted by the Royal Decree No 23 1959. 
Riyadh is the capital city of Saudi Arabia, Jeddah is the main sea port to the western part of the 
country, and Dammam is the main port on the Gulf to the east of Saudi Arabia. The three areas are 
far from each other. The distance between Riyadh and Jeddah is estimated as 1963Km, and between 
Riyadh and Dammam is estimated as 467Km. 
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petrochemical plant that is located in any of the industrial areas of the three main 
cities of Saudi Arabia: Riyadh, Jeddah, and Dammam. According to the industrial 
classification in Saudi Arabia, which adopts the International standard of Industrial 
Classification (ISIC), chemical industries include units that produce chemicals, 
refined petroleum, and petroleum-solvent products and plastics that include 
petrochemicals of Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC). 
4.2.2 Sample frame 
When a list of the sample population or the sample frame is constructed, 
the sample should then be selected on a random basis (Deaton, 1997). In the 
absence of adequate data and information about the workers in chemical and 
petrochemical industries (which is the population of the research), it is difficult to 
construct such a list. It is almost impossible to construct the necessary sample 
frame for workers in the three towns to select a random sample of the chemical and 
petrochemical industries due to resource constraints. Therefore, a quota sample 
system is adopted in this research. 
Previous research on the labour market in Saudi Arabia has used quota- 
sampling techniques to collect cross-sectional data. For example, Al-Ghofaily 
(1980) selected a sample of 600 students for his study on attitudes of Saudi youth 
towards vocational education. Al-Towaijri (1992) collected data from a sample of 
two strata including workers in the government and private sectors. He did not 
predetermine his sample size, but distributed 1345 questionnaires to workers in 
both sectors and received 780 responses. This technique has been followed by 
other studies on social issues in Saudi Arabia. 
4.2.3 Sample Size 
The sample size is 600 workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries 
in the three cities. It was distributed proportionally on ratio 4: 3: 3 in 74 chemical and 
petrochemical plants (the cluster) in Riyadh, Jeddah, and Dammam, respectively. 
The number of plants covered by the survey represents about 50% of the total 
chemical and petrochemical plants in Saudi Arabia. Table (4-1) shows the sample 
and cluster distribution among workers and plants across the three main cities of 
Saudi Arabia. 
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A pilot questionnaire was designed, in both Arabic and English, and tested 
among a group of ten workers in three chemical plants in the Riyadh area, and then 
the required amendments to the questionnaire were made. A copy of the final 
version of the questionnaire is shown in the Appendix II. Data collection was 
conducted through different methods: in Riyadh, the questionnaires were handed 
directly to workers to be completed and then collected, as requested by the plant 
management. In some cases, they were completed through face-to-face interviews 
with workers, while in some other cases, plant managers insisted on checking the 
questionnaires before and after completion. Some managers were unwilling to co- 
operate and refused the questionnaires off-hand. In Jeddah and Dammam, the 
questionnaires were distributed by mail and followed-up by phone calls before and 
after they had been mailed to the plants. Some of the mailed questionnaires were 
not returned, even after frequent follow-up calls by phone. The total number of 
distributed questionnaires in the three towns was 2570 and the total number of 
replies was 610, representing a response rate of 24%. Of these 610 returns, 50 
questionnaires had to be rejected due to severe incompleteness. Therefore, the total 
completed and valid questionnaires were 560. 
Table 4-1 
Sample Distribution across Plants 
in the Three Main Cities of Saudi Arabia 
Area Riyadh Dammam Jeddah Total 
Plants 30 22 22 74 
Workers 240 180 180 600 
4.2.4 Scope of the survey questionnaire 
Numerous variables determine the structure of wage and employment in the 
labour market. Given the constraints of the present study, the focus of the present 
survey questionnaire is to obtain information on these variables or factors that are 
related to the supply-side of the labour market in the Saudi chemical and 
petrochemical industries. More specifically, this study focuses on variables that 
reveal personal and productivity characteristics of the workers in order to examine 
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their influences on the compensation of these workers. These variables include: 
age, marital status, experience, education, training, occupation, insurance, mobility 
in the labour market, health services, job security, and work advancement or 
promotion. Other important variables include the workers' ethnicity and the mean 
monthly earnings of these workers, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
4.3 THE FINDINGS 
4.3.1 Earnings gap between Saudi and non-Saudi workers 
Economists usually use the term `earnings' to mean income gained in 
return for work, whether earned as wages and salaries or income from self- 
employment (Lerman, 1997). An earnings gap that arises between different groups 
of workers who have identical work characteristics and equal chances of 
employment is usually considered as a consequence of occupational 
discrimination. 
Economists provide various explanations for earnings or wage differentials 
between these groups of workers. Tachibanaki (1998) referred to the importance of 
skills that are associated with education and training for different occupations as 
the main factors that influence earnings differential among workers across wages 
and occupations. In addition, the demand for and supply of labour have important 
implications for wage distribution between workers in these occupations (a 
detailed discussion of the demand and supply factors is provided in Chapter Five). 
However, wage differentials prevail in the Saudi labour market. Recent data shows 
that Saudi males have higher wages than other workers, both males and females, 
and especially non-Saudi and Saudi females. Table (4-2) presents the average 
monthly earnings distribution of Saudi and non-Saudi males and females over 
1994-2002. It shows that Saudi males earn between 1.83 and 2.21 to their fellow 
female citizens over this period, and these males have earnings ratio calculated 
between 3.67 and 3.91 to that of their non-Saudi male counterparts over this 
period, while the earnings ratio of Saudi females to non-Saudi males is calculated 
between 1.7 and 2.03 in favour of Saudi females, over 1994-2002. This result is 
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not really surprising, as the Saudi female workers are largely concentrated in the 
public sector that offers generous pay and benefits. 
Interestingly, among the non-Saudis, female workers earn more than their 
male colleagues. This result is rather unusual, as traditionally among workers of 
the same ethnic background male workers earn more than female workers. This 
anomaly may be due to the fact that non-Saudi female workers are particularly in 
high demand across a number of occupations for the following reasons. First, in 
Saudi Arabia, social custom dictates that women must not work alongside men 
(with the exception of the health services) so some jobs can only be done by 
women. Second, traditionally, the labour market participation rate among Saudi 
females is extremely low. Therefore, a significant number of job vacancies can 
only be filled by non-Saudi females. This tends to boost their market power and 
wage rates. The earnings ratio between the two groups is between 1.33 and 1.46 
for non-Saudi females, over this period. However, the table shows the aggregate 
earnings ratios of Saudi to non-Saudi as between 3.31 and 3.81 for Saudi workers 
over this period. 
The wage differential phenomenon exists in the chemical and petrochemical 
industries. In this chapter, a simple technique is used to investigate this 
phenomenon between Saudi and non-Saudi workers, while Chapter Five provides 
estimates of the earnings gap and its sources between the two groups of workers. 
The percentile technique is used to rank the observations of earnings for both 
Saudi and non-Saudi workers at lower (10%), middle (50%) and upper (90%) 
percentile points earnings in these industries. In different countries, earnings per 
hour are considered to be the basic measure of wage rate determination, while the 
common base of wage measurement in Saudi Arabia is the monthly wage, which is 
used in this study to analyse earnings distribution between the two groups of 
workers. 
Table (4-3) presents the earnings distribution of Saudi and non-Saudi 
workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries across the three percentile 
ranks. A clear pattern of earnings inequality emerges between the two groups of 
workers in these industries. The monthly earnings ratio of Saudi to non-Saudi 
workers is calculated at 1.8 for the lower percentile, 1.75 for the middle percentile 
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and 1.85 for the upper percentile of workers. Further, the aggregate mean earnings 
ratio confirms the earnings differentials between the two groups of workers as 1.92 
in favour of the Saudi workers. From this table, the coefficient of variation (C. V. )* 
indicates that Saudi workers have a larger level of variation in their earnings than 
their non-Saudi counterparts, with the former group having a C. V. of 46% 
compared to the C. V. of 35% for the non-Saudis. 
Table 4-3 
F. arninus of Saudi and non-Saudi Workers in Percentile 
Mean Monthly Earnin s 
Earnings Rank 
Saudi non-Saudi Ratio 
10th Percentile 4129 2286 1.81 
50th Percentile 6961 3989 1.75 
90th Percentile 12118 6558 1.85 
Aggregate Mean 7904 4106 1.92 
C. V. 0.46 0.35 
4.3.2 Earnings gap by demographic characteristics 
This section presents monthly earnings of Saudi and non-Saudi across the 
three percentiles associated with their demographic features that comprise age, 
children and marital status. 
i) Earnings gap by age 
Age generally indicates a worker's physical condition and the stage of the 
worker's participation in the labour market. As the standard theory of labour supply 
and different empirical studies suggest, the time people spend at work tends to 
decline when they extend their time in education or take early retirement (Becker, 
1965; Heckman, 1986; Sapsford, 1981; Rima, 1981; Dixon, 1996). Therefore, 
people at the extremes of the age structure have low participation rates. Usually the 
* The CV is calculated as CV = standard deviation / mean. It measures data dispersion compared to 
the mean. When the CV is small, the data dispersion compared to the mean is small, but when the 
CV is large the amount of variation is large. 
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age variable is associated with job tenure, which obscures the effects of age on 
wage differentials in the labour market (Tachibanaki, 1998). Economists have 
confirmed the influence of age on the wage differentials across different age 
groups. They argue that earnings increase with age, which is taken to reflect 
experience and seniority in the workplace (Diaz-Gimenez et al., 1997). Dixon 
(2000) attributed the influence of age on earnings to the educational level between 
younger and old workers as people attain education before entering the labour 
market and they become less interested in subsequent upgrading of knowledge. 
Tachibanaki (1998) found that age was responsible for a great part of wage 
differentials in Australia and Canada in comparison to gender, industry, and 
occupation. 
This section examines the influences of age on the wage differentials 
between Saudi and non-Saudi workers across and within age groups of 15-60 year 
olds. Figure (10) shows that earnings of both Saudi and non-Saudi workers 
increase with age across age groups. Table (4-4) provides more details about the 
earnings differentials between the two groups of workers. It shows that Saudi 
workers have higher earnings than their non-Saudi counterparts across ages. In the 
comparable age groups between 20 and 49, the average monthly earnings of Saudis 
are more than twofold the average monthly earnings of the non-Saudis. 
Considering the earnings distribution of the two groups of workers across 
the three percentile ranks, this table reveals that Saudi workers have higher 
earnings across age groups and percentile levels. Across the 20-49 age groups, the 
earnings ratios of Saudi to non-Saudi workers vary between 2.3 and 3.58 for the 
lower 10th percentile of earners, between 2.21 and 3.15 for the 50th percentile, and 
between 2.31 and 3 for the 90th percentile of earners. In the table, the last two 
columns present the earnings coefficient of variation (C. V) for Saudi and non- 
Saudi workers across age groups. The coefficients of variation for Saudi workers, 
which vary between 0.18 and 0.42, are generally higher than that for the non- 
Saudis at between 0.11 and 0.30. This shows the same trend as that for the 
disparity in the aggregate earnings between the two groups of workers. 
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ii) Earnings gap by marital status 
Several studies have examined the relationship between marriage and wage 
levels. These studies confirm that married workers have higher earnings than 
unmarried or single workers. Madalozzo (2002) estimated the impact of marital 
status on the earnings of women in the USA and found a small marriage premium 
in the wage at a ratio of 3.2%. Richardson (2000) revealed that the wage 
differential between married and unmarried Swedish workers significantly declined 
from 23% in 1986 to 8% in 1991, in favour of married workers. In the same study, 
while cohabiting and divorced men earned about 16% more than their unmarried 
colleagues in 1986, the earnings gap between the two groups declined to 4% and 
5% in 1991, respectively. Chun and Lee (2000) found that married men earn 12.4% 
more than unmarried men in the USA. Rodgers and Stratton (2003) reported the 
wage differential between married and unmarried white men in the USA to be 9% 
in favour of married workers. 
This section examines the influence of the marital status of Saudi and non- 
Saudi workers on their wage rates in the chemical and petrochemical industries. 
Table (4-5) presents some descriptive statistical analysis for the cross-sectional 
data on marital status of the two groups of workers. From this table, the marital 
variable is classified as married, and `unmarried' refers to single, divorced and 
widowed workers. Data in this table reveal impacts of marital status on earnings 
distribution of these workers, as the aggregate earnings ratio of the married 
workers to their unmarried counterparts is calculated at 1.42 for the married 
workers. As shown on this table, married workers earn more than their unmarried 
counterparts across the three percentile ranks as defined earlier. It reveals that the 
earnings ratios of Saudi married workers compared to that of their unmarried 
fellow citizens is calculated as between 1.52 and 1.82 in favour of married workers 
across the three percentiles. Among the non-Saudi workers, the earnings ratio 
between the married workers and the unmarried workers is calculated as 1.83 for 
workers in the lower earnings percentile, 1.41 for the middle percentile, and 1.51 
for those in the upper earnings percentile. Figure (11) shows the earnings ratios 
between married and unmarried workers of both Saudi and non-Saudi nationalities. 
The diagram clearly depicts a marriage premium for the two groups of workers. 
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However, there are also noticeable differences in the marriage premium between 
the two groups. As shown on this figure, a part from the lower 10th percentile of 
workers among whom the Saudis receive a lower marriage premium than the non- 
Saudis, across all the other percentiles, Saudi workers receive a significantly 
higher marriage premium than the non-Saudi workers. The marriage premium 
appears to be the highest among the high-income Saudi earners. Therefore, it is 
expected that marital status influences the earnings of these workers in the 
chemical and petrochemical industries. 
iii) Earnings gap by children 
Children are usually the dependant members of a family. Their appearance 
in the family with working parents has its influence, particularly on mothers' 
employment and earnings status, especially in the developed countries and urban 
areas of the developing countries. Several studies that analysed family earnings 
and focused on women's earnings confirm that women with children earn less than 
women without children (Waldfogel, 1998; Gupta, 2001; Harkness and Waldfogel, 
1999; Anderson et al, 2002; and Wetzles, 2003). 
On the other hand, other studies focused on the impacts of the presence of 
children on both parents' earnings. Lundberg and Rose (1998) found that women 
with children earn 9% less than their non-child bearer counterparts, while men earn 
8% more per hour after the birth of the first child. 
In countries like Saudi Arabia where women are severely marginalised in 
the labour market and in other aspects of social life, and men have a dominant role 
as the breadwinners, it could be expected that the presence of children has an 
influence on the male earnings. The cross-sectional data in Table (4-6) shows 
earnings differences between Saudi and non-Saudi workers with children and 
without children in the chemical and petrochemical industries. From this table, it is 
obvious that workers with children earn more than their colleagues without 
children for both Saudi and non-Saudi workers. Data from this table suggest that 
the aggregate monthly earnings ratio of Saudi workers with children to those 
without children is calculated as 1.71 for those with children, while the aggregate 
earnings ratio of non-Saudi workers with children to their non-Saudi colleagues 
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Table 4-6 
Distribution of Earnings of Saudi and non-Saudi Workers 
With and Without Children 
in the Chemical and Petrochemical Industries 
k i R E 
Saudi Mean non-Saudi Mean Saudi/non-Saudi an ngs arn 
With Without Ratio With Without Ratio With Without 
10th Percentile 5935 3769 1.57 3042 1653 1.84 1.95 1.24 
50 th Percentile 8835 5813 1.52 4677 3321 1.41 1.89 1.24 
90th Percentile 14060 7703 1.83 6240 4413 1.41 2.25 1.23 
Aggregate Mean 9832 5747 1.71 4656 3297 1.41 2.11 1.23 
C. V. 0.28 0.40 0.28 0.36 
1 f 
without children is calculated as 1.41, in favour of workers with children. The last 
two columns provide monthly earnings ratios between Saudi and non-Saudi 
workers, both with and without children. From this table, the aggregate earnings 
ratio of Saudi workers with children to their counterparts among non-Saudis is 
calculated at 2.11, for Saudi workers, whilst the aggregate earnings ratio of Saudi 
to non-Saudi among workers without children is 1.23 in favour of Saudi workers. 
We now turn to look at the percentile ranks for the earnings gap between 
workers with and without children in the chemical and petrochemical industries. 
These measures also reveal earnings differences between the two groups of 
workers across the three percentile levels. In the 10th percentile, Saudi workers 
with children earn more than their fellow citizens without children; the earnings 
ratio in this percentile is 1.57 compared to their Saudi colleagues without children. 
In the median percentile (50%) the earnings ratio between the two groups is 1.52 
for the Saudi with children, while those in the 90th percentile have earnings ratio 
of 1.83 for the Saudi workers with children. The monthly earnings ratio of non- 
Saudi having children to those without children in the lower percentile (10%) is 
calculated as 1.84. Among workers in the median and the upper percentiles, the 
earnings ratio between them is 1.41 for non-Saudis with children. Moreover, 
regardless whether or not they have children, non-Saudi workers earn less than 
Saudi workers across all the income percentiles. The coefficient of variation shows 
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that workers with children have a low variation in earnings in comparison to non- 
children workers for both Saudis and non-Saudis. 
4.3.3 Earnings gap by human capital 
i) Earnings gap by education and training 
Education and training are the main factors which can augment the human 
capital of a worker throughout his/her life cycle in the labour market. They 
influence the individual workers' occupation and specific job status within it. The 
human capital literature shows that education and training have significant impact 
on workers' productivity. Becker (1975) pointed out that the productivity of 
employees depends not only on their ability and the investment in them, but also 
on their motivation, which depends on earnings that catalyse workers' ambition to 
increase their productivity. Therefore, earnings in the context of human capital are 
viewed as a return on the human capital that individuals accumulate in the labour 
market (Mincer, 1974). Therefore, the worker with higher educational 
qualifications earns a higher wage than those with less education (Mincer, 1993; 
Becker, 1975). Mincer (1993) showed positive effects of job training on workers' 
wage growth, particularly at younger ages. He also argued that there is a 
correlation between schooling and human capital investments as individuals with 
more schooling are induced to continue with longer investments in the labour 
market. Thus, training complements education, but without suitable schooling, 
training becomes inefficient because it cannot stand as an alternative to education. 
Goldin (1990) discussed earnings distribution between female and male in the 
USA. She argued that a 50% increase in the male-female earnings differential from 
0.40 to 0.60 over the period 1890 to 1970 was due to the difference in education 
and work experience between males and females. Quinlan (2000) found that the 
pay gap between men and women in Canada tends to narrow as the level of 
education increases. 
Table (4-7) presents the distribution of workers' monthly earnings of the 
respondents in the chemical and petrochemical industries by educational 
background and training characteristics. It shows higher average monthly earnings 
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for both Saudis and non-Saudis with higher educational qualifications. However, 
Saudi workers earn significantly more than non-Saudi workers with the same 
qualifications. For workers with primary qualifications, the monthly earnings of 
Saudis are more than three times the monthly earnings of their non-Saudi 
counterparts. For workers with intermediate qualifications, the ratio of the average 
monthly earnings of Saudis to the average monthly earnings of non-Saudis is 2.49, 
to the advantage of Saudi workers. For the other qualifications, this ratio is as 
follows: university: 2.46, secondary: 1.83, and technical: 1.99, in favour of Saudi 
workers. 
Moreover, distribution of the cross-sectional earnings across percentile 
measures provides further evidence on the earnings differentials between Saudi 
and non-Saudi workers across educational qualifications. As seen on this table, 
earnings distribution among workers in the 50th percentile reveals that the earnings 
ratio between Saudi to non-Saudi workers with primary educational qualifications 
is 3.55 for Saudi workers, which is the highest earnings ratio across the educational 
qualification and percentile ranks. Among the lower and upper income percentile 
of workers with primary education qualifications, the earnings ratio between 
Saudis and non-Saudis is 2.58 and 3.36 in the two percentiles, respectively. The 
table shows that the monthly earnings ratios of the two groups of workers with 
intermediate qualifications range between 2.02 and 2.63 across the three percentile 
ranks. For Saudi and non-Saudi workers with secondary, technical and university 
qualifications, their earnings ratio ranges from 1.64 to 2.37 across the three income 
percentiles. From this table, it may be seen that the coefficients of variation (C. V. ) 
across educational qualifications reveal that Saudi workers have higher earnings 
variation than their non-Saudi counterparts in the chemical and petrochemical 
industries. For example, this measure shows that earnings distribution among 
Saudi workers varies between 0.24 and 0.36 across educational qualifications, 
compared to the low variation rate of between 0.22 and 0.28 for the earnings of 
their non-Saudi counterparts across qualifications. The table shows the impact of 
training on the earnings gap among workers in the chosen industries. As shown on 
this table, Saudi workers who spent a period of training during the last three years 
of the survey have an opportunity to earn more than their fellow citizens who have 
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not this characteristic, as the earnings ratio between the groups is 1.49 for the 
trained Saudi workers, while the training earnings gap ratio between trained Saudi 
and non-Saudi is calculated at 1.97 for Saudi workers. On the other hand, the 
earnings ratio of the trained non-Saudi workers to the untrained non-Saudi workers 
is calculated at 1.16 for the trained non-Saudi workers. The percentiles ranks 
reveal the influence of training on the earnings differences between the trained 
Saudi and non-Saudi with rates between 1.56 and 2.26 in favour of Saudi workers 
across the three percentiles, while the earnings gap between trained and untrained 
Saudi workers across the three percentiles indicate a earnings ratios of 1.28 and 
1.74 for the trained workers. Moreover, the percentiles reveal earnings gap 
between trained and untrained non-Saudi workers at ratios between 1.06 and 1.59 
in favour of the trained workers. 
Table 4-7 
Earnings Distribution of Saudi and Non-Saudi by 
Educational Qualifications 
Mean Earnings Percentile Ratio di) C. V 
Qualification 
Saudi Saudi Non- Saudi Ratio 10th 50th 
90th Saudi Non- Saudi 
Primary 5834 1785 3.27 2.58 3.55 3.36 0.34 0.22 
Intermediate 6231 2502 2.49 2.02 2.63 2.59 0.30 0.23 
Secondary 6873 3762 1.83 1.64 1.85 1.78 0.32 0.28 
Technical 7643 3835 1.99 1.77 2.31 1.95 0.24 0.28 
University 11775 4795 2.46 1.91 2.37 2.86 0.36 0.26 
Trained 8675 4410 1.97 1.56 1.80 2.26 0.45 0.30 
Not Trained 5804 3802 1.53 1.94 1.61 1.38 0.32 0.38 
Trained /Not Trained Saudi 1.49 1.28 1.31 1.74 
Trained/Not Trained Non- 
Saudi 1.16 1.59 1.17 1.06 
ii) Earnings gap by experience 
The theory of wage determination associates a worker's experience with 
his/her age profile. It considers age as a proxy for work experience, which explains 
workers' earnings profile (Mincer, 1974; Quinlan, 2002). The respondent workers 
in the chemical and petrochemical industries have reported their actual work 
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experience duration as between one year and 37 years, as shown in Table (4-8). 
This table reveals a substantial difference in labour market life cycle earnings 
between the two groups of workers with coefficient of variations (C. V) calculated 
between 0.28 and 0.42 for Saudi workers and between 0.16 and 0.30 for non-Saudi 
workers. It shows that most Saudi workers have less than 13 experience years in 
the labour market, while many non-Saudi workers have considerably longer 
experience of up to 29 years. 
This table also presents the influence of work experience on earnings of 
these workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries. It shows that Saudi 
workers in general earn more than their non-Saudi counterparts, as the mean 
monthly earnings ratio of the two groups is between 1.85 and 3.67 in favour of 
Saudi workers in different experience categories. Moreover, the distribution of 
experience and earnings across the three percentiles indicates that Saudi workers 
are still recording earnings advantages over their non-Saudi counterparts. From 
this table, it may be seen that Saudis who have work experience of between 21 and 
29 years earn more than their non-Saudi counterparts with the same experience. 
The earnings gap between the two groups of workers in this experience bracket 
reveal substantial earnings ratios, calculated to be between 1.84 and 6.91 in the 10`h 
percentile, 1.84 and 2.87 in the 50`h percentile, and 2.65 - 3.09 in the upper 
percentile in favour of Saudi workers across the three percentiles. Clearly, these 
findings suggest that the work experience of the non-Saudi workers is not 
adequately compensated in the chemical and petrochemical industries. 
Turning to the influence of experience and education on the workers' 
earnings, Table (4-9) illustrates this relationship among Saudi workers, while 
Table (4-10) shows distribution of educational and experience earnings among 
non-Saudi workers. As shown on these tables, workers with lower educational 
qualifications and long experience have relatively higher earnings in comparison to 
workers with higher educational qualifications and few years of experience. For 
example, Table (4-9) shows that Saudi workers who have university education but 
less than 5 years of experience are paid less than their fellow citizens with 
secondary education qualifications but around 13 years of experience. 
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On the other hand, the Tables show that, for both Saudi and non-Saudi 
workers, earnings increase with the level of education within any particular 
experience group, or earnings increase with experience within any particular 
educational group. Therefore, both educational qualifications and work experience 
seem to be important factors in determining workers' pay in Saudi Arabia. 
Nevertheless, given a worker's experience and educational qualification, a Saudi 
worker is paid a significantly higher wage than a non-Saudi worker with the same 
experience and qualifications, as the tables reveal. For example, for workers with 
primary education and between 17 and 21 years of experience, a Saudi worker is 
paid 4.56 times the wage of a non-Saudi worker, whilst for workers with university 
education and the same years of experience, a Saudi earns 2.79 times the wage of a 
non-Saudi. 
4.3.4 Earnings gap by occupational status 
Workers augment their skills by education and training to engage in certain 
occupations in the labour market. The human capital literature considers 
occupation as a composite of skills acquired in schooling and on-the-job training. 
It focuses on occupational earnings differentials among different worker groups 
(Mincer, 1974, Steinman, 1999; Goldin, 2002; Bauer and Zimmerman, 1998; 
Borjas, 2002). The dissimilarity index or discrimination index is usually used to 
measure the degree of occupational differences among workers across occupations. 
It can be calculated as (Dolado et al, 2000; Wootton, 1997) in Equation (28): 
D. I =1/2 
(EIXsi 
- Ynl) (28) 
where: Xsi is the percentage of Saudi workers in the occupational category (i), and 
Yni is the percentage of the non-Saudi workers in the same occupational category 
(i). The index value varies between 0 and 100 and is taken to mean the percentage 
one group has to change occupation for employment distribution among both 
groups to be identical. Thus, a value of 0 means that the two groups of workers are 
identically distributed across the occupations and no one from either group needs 
to change occupation, whilst a value of 100 means that the distribution of 
occupations between the two groups is completely unequal and half of the workers 
from both groups need to change occupations to make the distribution equal. 
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Considering the influence of the occupational differences on wage 
determination, Hayforn (1997) contended that the occupational dissimilarity 
between immigrants and the native Norwegian workers leads to a wage gap of 
79.6%, while the inter-occupational dissimilarity index between these workers 
causes a wage gap of 17.1%. He argues that either the natives or the migrants or a 
combination of both have to shift their jobs at this rate to reach identical 
occupational distribution. 
The cross-sectional occupational data among workers in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries, as reported in Table (4-11), reveal clear differences in the 
distribution of Saudi and non-Saudi workers across the seven occupations that 
include managerial, professional, clerical, salespeople, foremen, and crafts- 
workers. It reports that Saudi workers are fairly concentrated in the white-collar 
jobs, especially in the managerial and clerical occupations. This table shows that 
they account for about 67% of the Saudi respondents, while their non-Saudi 
counterparts in these occupations represent about 29% of the non-Saudi 
respondents. As was elaborated in the previous chapter, the Saudisation policies of 
the 1980s and the 1990s restricted recruitment for these occupations to Saudi 
nationals. On the other hand, non-Saudi workers in the professional, production, 
and technical occupations account for 58% of total non-Saudi respondents, while 
Saudis in these occupations make up about 25% of total Saudi respondents. The 
occupational dissimilarity index for the two groups of workers is calculated to be 
around 40%, suggesting that about 40% of either Saudi or non-Saudi workers, or a 
combination of both, have to shift their jobs for the occupational distribution 
among them to be identical. Table (4-12) presents percentile earnings distribution 
by occupation and education. It reveals similar educational and occupational 
effects on workers' earnings in the selected industries. For example, among the 
lower 10th percentile of workers, the average inter-educational group difference in 
earnings is SR 882 whilst the average inter-occupational group difference in 
earnings is SR 886. The average inter-educational group difference in earnings 
among workers in the median percentile is SR 1158, which counts a ratio of 1.31 
to those in the 10th percentile, which indicates a higher influence of educational 
status on the earnings inequality among workers in the two percentiles. This table 
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Table 4-11 
Occupational Dissimilarity among Saudi and Non-Saudi 
Occupation Saudi (Xi) Non-Saudi 
(Yi) 
2: = (Xi-Yi) Absolute 
Value 
Professionals 8.7 23.7 -15.1 15.05 
Managers 27.7 15.8 11.9 11.90 
Clerks 39.0 13.7 25.3 25.28 
Salesmen 8.2 5.2 3.1 3.06 
Foremen 3.9 7.3 -3.4 3.40 
Technician 1.7 14.0 -12.3 12.25 
Craftsmen 10.8 20.4 -9.5 9.54 
l 231 329 -98.0 80.48 ota 
100% 100% 
Difference Index =l/2(Lxi-Yi) 49.0 40.24 
shows that the inter-occupational group difference in earnings among 50th 
percentile is SR 1123. This reflects a small difference for the inter-occupational 
earnings distribution among workers in the lower and median percentile with a 
ratio of 1.27, which indicates a minor influence of the occupational status on 
earnings inequality among workers in the Saudi labour market. 
Considering the influence of the occupational status associated with education on 
earnings between Saudi and non-Saudi workers, Tables (4-13) and (4-14) present 
the percentile earnings distribution by education and occupation for the two groups 
of workers. From Table (413), it can be seen that the occupational status has 
influence on earnings inequality among Saudi workers rather than the inter- 
educational earnings distribution in the lower percentile. The average inter- 
educational group difference earnings among Saudi workers in the lower 10th 
percentile is SR 1074, while the average inter-occupational difference earnings for 
these workers in this percentile is SR 2724 with a difference ratio of 2.53. 
However, the average inter-educational group difference in earnings among Saudi 
workers in the 50th percentile is SR1417, while that for the inter-occupational 
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Table 4-12 
Occupational - Educational Earnings Distribution of 
Saudi and Non-Saudi Workers 
in the Chemical and Petrochemical 
10% Percentile 
Occupation 
Primary Interco Second Technical University 
Managerial 5278 4326 5024 4423 
Professional 3101 5292 3368 
Clerical 2738 3504 3205 3106 3294 
Salesmen 1659 2309 4321 3402 3494 
Foremen 4081 2815 3308 3046 2286 
Technicians 1813 3211 2406 2959 
Craftsmen 1434 1867 2304 2927 
Inter-educational differences in earnings among 
10th percentil e of workers( in Absolute Values) 
Occupation Primary Interm Second Techncl Universty Total 
Managerial 0 952 698 601 750 
Professional 0 0 2119 1924 2057 
Clerical 766 299 99 188 338 
Salesmen 650 2012 919 92 918 
Foremen 1266 493 262 760 695 
Technicians 0 1398 805 553 919 
Craftsmen 433 437 623 0 497 
Average 882 
Inter-occupational differences in earnings among 
10th percenti le of workers( in Absolute Values) 
Occupation Primary Interco Second Technical University Average 
Managerial 
Professional 0 0 1225 268 1055 
Clerical 0 0 104 2186 74 
Salesmen 1079 1195 1116 296 200 
Foremen 2422 506 1013 356 1208 
Technicians 0 1002 97 640 673 
Craftsmen 1434 54 907 521 0 
Total 1645 689 744 711 642 886 
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Continue/"['able 4-12 
ti O 
50% Percentile 
on ccupa Primary Interco Second Techncl Universty 
Managerial 7537 6438 8585 7332 
Professional 7659 8535 4858 
Clerical 6224 5914 5793 4067 3780 
Salesmen 6015 4350 6896 4534 4560 
Foremen 5401 3120 4125 4609 4135 
Technicians 3813 3723 3285 4354 
Craftsmen 2406 2753 3598 3842 
Inter-educational differences in earnings among 
50th percentile of wor kers( in Absolute Val ues) 
Occupation Primary Interco Second Techncl Universty Total 
Managerial 0 1099 2147 1253 1500 
Professional 0 0 876 3677 2277 
Clerical 310 121 1726 287 611 
Salesmen 1665 2546 2362 26 1650 
Foremen 2281 1005 484 474 1061 
Technicians 0 90 438 1069 532 
Craftsmen 347 845 244 479 
Average 1158 
Inter-occupational differences in earnings among 
50th percent ile of wor kers( in Absolute Va lues) 
Occupation Primary Interm Second Techncl Universty Average 
Managerial 
Professional 0 0 1221 50 2474 
Clerical 0 0 1866 4468 1074 
Salesmen 209 1564 1103 467 780 
Foremen 614 1230 2771 75 425 
Technicians 0 693 402 1324 219 
Craftsmen 2406 1060 125 557 0 
Total 1076 1137 1248 1157 995 1123 
group is SR 3067, which indicates the influence of the occupational status on 
earnings of Saudi workers. Table (4-14) shows the occupational earnings 
distribution of non-Saudi workers associated with their educational qualifications. 
The table reveals that the inter-educational group difference in earnings among 
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these workers in the lower 10th percentile is SR 662, which is closer to the average 
inter-educational group earnings of their colleagues in the 50th percentile, but 
lower than the inter-occupational group difference in earnings among workers in 
the lower 10th percentile, which is SR 1253. This table shows that non-Saudi 
workers in the 50th percentile have an average inter-occupational difference in 
earnings of SR 1558, which confirms the influence of the occupational status on 
the earnings distribution among non-Saudi as in the case of earnings distribution 
among Saudi workers. 
Considering the influence of the occupational distribution on the earnings between 
the two groups of workers across the seven occupations, Table (4-15) reveals 
substantial earnings differentials between these workers expressed by the mean 
monthly earnings ratio of Saudi to non-Saudi in the different occupations. In the 
managerial jobs, the ratio is calculated at 2.02 in advantage of Saudi workers, 
which is the highest level across occupational earnings of the two groups of 
workers. In the technical jobs the earnings ratio is calculated at 1.41 for Saudi 
workers, which is the lowest level across occupational earnings of the two groups 
of workers. This table shows that the earnings ratio between the two workers in the 
professional jobs is 1.69 for Saudi workers. The table shows that both Saudi 
workers in salesmen and foremen occupations have similar earnings ratios, 
calculated as 1.79 of earnings of their non-Saudi in these jobs, whilst the earnings 
gap ratio between the two groups of workers in craftsmen occupations is 1.89 for 
Saudi workers. Moreover, the earnings inequality between the two groups of 
workers is also evident across all the percentile ranks of workers, particularly 
among the following groups of workers: high-income earners working in the 
managerial and salesmen occupations, and low-income earners working in the 
craftsmen occupation. 
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Table 4-13 
Occupational - Educational Earnings Distribution of 
Saudi Workers 
in the Chemical and Petrochemical 
ti O 
10% Percentile 
on ccupa Primary Interm Second Technical University 
Managerial 5278 5493 8485 7637 
Professional 7104 5292 5714 
Clerical 2738 3528 4095 5961 
Salesmen 6015 4110 4304 4460 
Foremen 4082 6827 
Technicians 
Craftsmen 3594 4026 
Inter-educational differences in earnings among 
10th percenti le of workers( in Absolute Values) 
Occupation Primary lnterm Second Technical University Total 
Managerial 0 215 2992 848 1352 
Professional 0 0 1812 422 1117 
Clerical 790 567 1866 0 1074 
Salesmen 1905 194 156 0 752 
Foremen 0 0 0 0 0 
Technicians 0 0 0 0 0 
Craftsmen 0 0 0 0 0 
Average 1074 
Inter-occupational differences in earnings among 
10th percenti le of workers( in Absolute Values) 
Occupation Primary Interm Second Technical University Average 
Managerial 
Professional 0 0 1611 3193 1923 
Clerical 0 0 3009 669 5714 
Salesmen 3277 582 209 1501 0 
Foremen 1933 4110 0 2367 0 
'T'echnicians 0 0 0 6827 0 
Craftsmen 3594 0 0 0 0 
Total 2935 2346 1610 2911 3819 2724 
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Continue/Table 4-13 
Occu ation 
50% Percentile 
p 
Primary Interco Second Techncl Universty 
Managerial 6659 6659 8585 1139 
Professional 8214 8535 7334 
Clerical 6224 6047 6634 8214 
Salesmen 6430 4590 7334 5133 
Foremen 5401 7116 
Technicians 
Craftmen 5137 4036 
Inter-educational differences in earnings arnong 
50th percenti le of workers( in A bsolute Values) 
Occupation Primary Interco Second Techncl Universty "Total 
Managerial 0 878 1926 2784 1863 
Professional 0 0 321 1201 761 
Clerical 177 587 1580 0 781 
Salesmen 1840 2744 2201 0 2262 
Foremen 0 0 0 0 0 
Technicians 0 0 0 0 0 
Craftmen 0 0 0 0 0 
Average 1417 
Inter-occupational differences in earnings among 
50th percenti le of workers( in A bsolute Values) 
Occupation Primary Interco Second Techncl Universty Average 
Managerial 
Professional 0 0 1555 50 4035 
Clerical 6224 6047 1580 321 0 
Salesmen 206 1457 700 3081 0 
Foremen 1029 0 7334 1983 0 
Technicians 0 0 0 0 0 
Craftsmen 5137 0 4036 0 0 
, 
Total 3149 3752 3041 1359 4035 3067 
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Table 4-14 
Occupational - Educational Earnings Distribution of 
Non-Saudi Workers 
in the Chemical and Petrochemical 
ti O 
10% Percentile 
on ccupa Primary Interco Second Technical University 
Managerial 5278 5024 4211 
Professional 3330 
Clerical 2180 2645 2990 3285 
Salesmen 3371 3493 
Foremen 3308 2711 2286 
Technicians 3211 2399 2959 
Craftsmen 1391 1867 2245 2927 
Inter-educational differences in earnings among 
10th percentile of work ers in Absolute Values) 
Occupation Primary Interco Second Technical University Total 
Managerial 0 0 0 813 813 
Professional 0 0 0 0 0 
Clerical 0 0 345 295 320 
Salesmen 0 0 933 122 528 
Foremen 0 0 597 425 511 
Technicians 0 0 812 560 686 
Craftsmen 476 378 682 2927 1116 
Average 662 
Inter-occupational differences in earnings among 
10th percentile of workers in Absolute Values) 
Occupation Primary Interco Second Technical University Average 
Managerial 
Professional 0 0 0 0 881 
Clerical 0 0 2645 2990 45 
Salesmen 0 2180 1659 381 208 
Foremen 0 0 996 660 1207 
Technicians 0 0 97 312 673 
Craftsmen 1391 1867 966 528 0 
Total 1391 2024 1273 974 603 1253 
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Continue/Table4-14 
ation Occu 
50% Percentile 
p 
Primary Interco Second Technical University 
Managerial 6934 5431 
Professional 4656 
Clerical 2189 3780 3528 3775 
Salesmen 4180 4437 
Foremen 4023 3610 4135 
Technicians 3262 3261 4354 
Craftsmen 1710 2519 3448 3842 
Inter-educational differences in earnings among 
50th percentil e of workers( in Absolute Values) 
Occupation Primary Interco Second Technical University Total 
Managerial 0 0 0 1503 1503 
Professional 0 0 0 0 0 
Clerical 0 1591 252 247 697 
Salesmen 0 0 0 257 257 
Foremen 0 0 413 525 469 
Technicians 0 0 1 1093 547 
Craftsmen 809 0 394 0 602 
Average 679 
Inter-occupational differences in earnings among 
50th p ercentil e of wor kers( in Absolute Values) 
Occupation Primary lntenn Second Technical University Average 
Managerial 
Professional 0 0 0 0 775 
Clerical 0 2189 3780 3528 881 
Salesmen 0 0 0 652 662 
Foremen 0 0 4023 570 302 
Technicians 0 0 761 349 219 
Craftsmen 1710 0 186 581 0 
Total 1710 2189 2188 1136 568 1558 
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4.3.5 Earnings gap by worked hours 
Work hours are another factor that is suggested to be associated with 
earnings differentials in Saudi Arabia. The standard theory of labour supply 
postulates that an increase in the hourly wage rate has two opposite effects on the 
hours that a worker supplies to the labour market: an income effect which reduces 
working hours and a substitution effect which increases working hours. 
Consequently, the relationship between worked hours and earnings is generally 
unambiguous and the matter can only be settled empirically. Moreover, different 
groups of workers may respond differently to a rise in the wage rate. Pencavel 
(1997) found that in the USA a 10% increase in real wages has induced a 2.3% 
increase in the annual work hours of white men and a 2.6% increase in the annual 
work hours of black men. This suggests the existence of a wage differential 
between the two groups of workers, as the black workers have to provide more 
working hours than their white counterpart workers to get the same earnings as 
these workers. 
Moreover, the relationship between work hours and earnings varies by age, 
education and marital status, as is revealed by Pencavel (1997). He found that 
working hours among women tend to rise with age, but level off when they reach 
their fifties, while wages rise with age generally. He argued that both wages and 
working hours tend to rise with years of schooling. He showed that married women 
worked more hours and also earned higher hourly wages than unmarried women. 
Table (4-16) reports working hours in the chemical and petrochemical 
industries in Saudi Arabia for both Saudi and non-Saudi workers. It presents the 
average monthly earnings associated with weekly working hours, age, and marital 
status for the two groups of workers. This table shows that the respondent Saudi 
workers provide weekly working hours between 45 and 53, while their non-Saudi 
counterparts provide weekly working hours between 45 and 60. It reveals that 
Saudi workers have a higher hourly wage rate than non-Saudi workers. For 
example, among workers who worked for 45-48 hours per week, the monthly 
earnings ratio of Saudi workers to non-Saudi workers is calculated at 1.85 for 
Saudi workers, whilst among workers who worked between 50-53 hours per week, 
the Saudis earn 1.97 times the hourly wage rate for the non-Saudis. Thus, it seems 
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that the wage differential between Saudis and non-Saudis is even more significant 
among workers who worked for longer hours. Moreover, regardless of nationality, 
workers who worked for longer hours (50-60 per week) received a lower hourly 
wage rate than workers who worked for shorter hours (45-48 per week). 
We now turn to examining the influences of the demographic variables that 
include age and marital status on earnings associated with working hours. The 
table shows that earnings of Saudis who provide between 45-53 hours per week 
increased with age, except for a minor fall for those in the age bracket between 35- 
39. On the other hand, non-Saudi workers who provide the same weekly working 
hours have similar earnings-age profiles. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
monthly earnings of both Saudis and non-Saudis rise with their age. Nevertheless, 
earnings inequality still existed between the two groups of workers across ages and 
through different working-hour categories. For example, Saudi workers in the age 
group of 20-24 years and who provide between 45-48 hours earn about 2.19 times 
the amounts received by the non-Saudi workers in the same working-hour and age 
groups, whilst among workers who were between 20-24 years old and who worked 
for 50-53 hours a week, Saudis on average earned 2.13 times the amount received 
by non-Saudis. 
A further demographic aspect is that regarding marital status, which is also 
illustrated in Table (4-16). It is clear that the average earnings were substantially 
higher for married workers than unmarried workers. For example, the average 
monthly earnings of married Saudis were 1.7 (for the 45-48 working hour group) 
and 1.49 (for the 50-53 group) times that of the unmarried Saudis, whilst the 
earnings of the married non-Saudis were 1.39 and 1.45 times that of the unmarried 
non-Saudis. Again, regardless of the marital status, the wage differential between 
Saudis and non-Saudis is apparent. 
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Table4-16 
Distribution of Weekly Worked flours Earnings by Age, 
Martial Status and Education 
for Saudi and nnn-CantIi 
Worked Hours Saudi Non-Saudi Ratios 
45-48 50-53 45-48 50-53 60 > 45-48 50-53 
Mean Earnings 8234 6055 4451 3078 3659 1.85 1.97 
Age Grou 
15-19 3214 3111 0.00 
20-24 5488 5126 2509 2407 1847 2.19 2.13 
25-29 7148 6581 3161 2377 2583 2.26 2.77 
30-34 9689 8586 3791 3143 3415 2.56 2.73 
35-39 11905 8536 4549 3427 3716 2.62 2.49 
40-44 13295, 5174 3606 4299 2.57 0.00 
45-49 17160 5689 6911 5392 3.02 0.00 
50-54 6677 7695 0.00 
Martial Status 
Married 10000 7806 4723 3778 4061 2.12 2.07 
Un-married 5879 5253 3393 2604 2806 1.73 2.02 
Married/Unmarri 
ed 1.70 1.49 1.39 1.45 1.45 
4.3.6 Fringe benefits and earnings gap 
The fringe or non-pecuniary benefits are used synonymously in this 
research to mean non-wage benefits of the workplace that exist in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries. Such benefits typically include health care services, 
insurance and pension coverage and paid leave. The non-wage pay represents an 
important part of the compensation package that is usually considered at wage 
negotiations. These benefits usually contribute to the segmentation of positions at 
the workplace into good ones with better fringe benefits and working conditions 
and bad ones with poor fringe benefits and poor working conditions. 
The fringe benefits also contribute to wage differentials between different 
groups of workers. Many empirical researches have attempted to quantify the non- 
wage benefits (examples include Pierce, 1999 and Campbell, 2001). Pierce (1999) 
found that some fringe benefits such as paid leave, pensions, and health insurance 
increase the dispersion of compensation among the lower half of the wage 
distribution among workers, while pension alone increases the dispersion in the 
upper half of the distribution. 
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In Saudi Arabia, the regulated non-wage benefits do not apply equally to all 
the workers. For example, sick paid leave may apply to some workers but not to 
others (Barsalou, 1985). The interviewed workers in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries were asked about their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
fringe benefits in their workplace, including the promotion system, paid leave (for 
annual vacation), and access to the health services provided by the employer and 
how they evaluate job security. It should be pointed out that the evaluation of job 
satisfaction and its different components is a subjective matter, which, according to 
many economists, is beyond the purview of economic analysis (Hamermesh, 
1999). Nevertheless, many economists still discussed the relationship between job 
satisfaction and work returns (see Hamermesh, 1977 and 1999; Clark et al., 1996; 
Vanin, 2001; Grund and Sliwka, 2001; among others). Table (4-17) presents the 
distribution of satisfaction attitudes of Saudi and non-Saudi workers towards fringe 
benefits in the chemical and petrochemical industries. It reveals that most of the 
Saudi workers are satisfied with their workplace fringe benefits, but the ratio of the 
dissatisfied Saudi workers with the promotion and job security are appeared as 
high as 72.6% and 39% for the two benefits, respectively, despite applications of 
the Saudisation policy that encourages employment of Saudi workers, particularly 
in the private firms. On the other hand, the table shows that most of the non-Saudi 
workers are dissatisfied with their current job fringe benefits with the exception of 
paid leave, which makes 78% of these workers satisfied regarding their annual 
paid vacations. 
Table (4-18) reports the monthly earnings of satisfied and dissatisfied Saudi 
and non-Saudi workers. It indicates large earnings differences between the two 
groups of workers across the selected fringe benefits. It shows that the satisfied 
Saudi workers have better earnings than their non-Saudi counterparts, as the 
average monthly earnings ratio between the two groups of workers was 1.94 in 
favour of Saudi workers. Even Saudi workers dissatisfied with their current job 
fringe benefits earn more than both satisfied and dissatisfied non-Saudis with 
earnings ratios of 1.94 and 1.74 in favour of Saudi workers in the two cases, 
respectively. 
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Table 4-17 
Distribution of Satisfied and Dissatisfied 
Saudi and Non-Saudi Workers Relating to the Fringe Benefits 
Fringe Saudi (%) Non-Saudi (%) 
Benefits Satisfied Dissat- 
isfied 
Missing Satisfied Dissat- 
isfied 
Missing 
Paid leave 72.3 27.7 - 78.1 21.1 0.8 
Mobility 99.6 0.4 - 27.6 73.4 - 
Insurance 94.4 5.6 - - 73.6 26.4 
Health 
Services 
76.6 23.4 - 30.7 67.8 1.5 
Job Security 60.6 39.4 - 30.1 69 0.9 
Promotion 26.8 72.7 0.4 14 85.4 0.6 
Table 4-18 
Fringe Benefits Ratio of Satisfied and Dissatisfied 
Saudi and Non-Saudi Workers 
Fringes Mean earnings 
(Satisfied) 
Mean earnings 
(Dissatisfied) 
Saudi Non-Saudi Ratio* Saudi Non-Saudi Ratio* 
Paid Leave 8179 4206 1.94 7187 3758 1.91 
Job security 7949 4299 1.85 7836 4041 1.94 
Mobility 7836 4430 1.77 0 3984 0.91** 
Health Services 7694 3735 2.06 8594 4289 2.00 
Promotion 9296 4752 1.96 7405 4022 1.84 
Insurance 8094 0 0.00 0 4212 0.00 
Job 
Satisfaction 
8547 4397 1.94 6567 3770 1.74 
Saudi/non-Saudi 
** non-Saudi ( Difficulty to move/ Easy to move) 
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
The previous sections discuss the descriptive analysis of the cross-sectional data on 
earnings that were collected among workers in the chemical and petrochemical 
industries in the three main cities of Saudi Arabia: Riyadh, Jeddah, and Dammam. 
The survey was conducted due to lack of adequate data and to the administrative 
restrictions on access to the households surveys that are run by the Central 
Department of Statistics in the country. The analysis covered various variables that 
related to demographic, human capital, and workplace characteristics of these 
workers. It used simple statistical measures that revealed proportional earnings 
gaps between the two groups of workers, and ranks such differentials across three 
percentiles of 10th lower, 50th middle, and upper 90`h. The results of the descriptive 
analysis revealed substantial percentage differences in the average monthly 
earnings between the two groups of workers and in favour of Saudi workers across 
the variables of the three categories of characteristics: demographic, human capital, 
and workplace, and across the three percentiles. The demographic characteristics 
comprise age, marital status, and presence of children in the worker's family. The 
three variables have their influences on the earnings inequality between the two 
groups of workers with significant proportions. The human capital components 
include educational qualifications, training courses, and work experience; these 
variables impact on the earnings of workers in these industries. For example, 
training reveals its effects on the earnings gap in favour of both trained Saudi and 
non-Saudi in comparison to the untrained workers of the respective group. On the 
other hand, workplace characteristics indicate their influences on the earnings gap 
between the two groups of workers. Such characteristics cover mainly non-wage 
benefits of the workplace and comprise paid leave, promotion, job security, health 
services, injury risk insurance, and mobility. The impacts of these characteristics 
were analysed by examining the workers' job satisfaction with these 
characteristics. It is found that the Saudi workers enjoyed more job satisfaction 
than their non-Saudi counterparts on top of the earnings rates. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF EMPLOYEES' 
COMPENSATION IN THE CHEMICAL AND PETROCHEMICAL 
INDUSTRIES IN SAUDI ARABIA 
I 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Existing studies on the labour market in Saudi Arabia reveal a general lack 
of research on wage determination in that country. The present study has managed 
to identify a single report that was issued by the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce in 
1995 about wage distribution among workers in the private and public sectors. It 
considers occupation, education, and experience as the main factors of wage 
distribution between workers in the two sectors. It has only recorded and compared 
absolute figures of wage levels, years of experience, and qualifications of 
employees in the private and public sectors. However, the report does not provide 
any statistical measure to explain the wage differentials or to decompose the 
sources of the earnings inequality between workers in the two sectors. Nor does it 
provide adequate conclusions on wage inequality between workers in the two 
sectors. 
Chapters Three and Four of the current study have depicted the structure of 
the Saudi labour market in general and discussed various factors that relate to the 
pay and working conditions in the chemical and petrochemical industries in 
particular. These factors reflect the main characteristics of this labour market; such 
characteristics comprise government regulations and policies that cause 
segmentation of the labour market, labour participation, training and education 
among Saudi workers, and labour supply of the foreign workers in the country. 
Chapter Four provides a prima facie analysis of the cross-sectional data collected 
among workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries. This analysis is 
based on some descriptive statistical measures that showed the existence of an 
earnings inequality between the two groups of workers in favour of Saudi workers. 
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The cross-sectional data revealed the influence of potential supply-side 
determinants on earnings in these industries. 
This chapter goes further to undertake a more systematic and rigorous 
empirical analysis of the wage structure of Saudi and non-Saudi workers in the 
chemical and petrochemical industries using the cross-sectional data. It presents 
the econometric analysis of the determination of wages for both the Saudi and non- 
Saudi workers and the decomposition techniques that are adopted in this study to 
reveal the extent of wage discrimination. From the discussion in the previous 
chapters, it is clear that Saudi workers gain superior benefits in the labour market 
over their non-Saudi counterparts. Saudi workers in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries generally enjoy the following privileges over their non- 
Saudi counterparts: higher earnings, better working conditions, and permanent 
jobs. These aspects all contribute to the wage differential and wage discrimination 
in these industries. As is discussed earlier, conceptually, a number of categories of 
factors can help to explain the occurrence of the wage differentials. These factors 
include i) human capital factors, such as workers' educational qualifications, on- 
the-job training, and work experience; ii) demographic factors, specifically 
workers' age, marital status and presence of children in the family; iii) workplace 
conditions that comprise occupational status, promotion, pension and work risk 
injuries, health services, and mobility in the labour market. In this chapter, wage 
discrimination mainly indicates a proportion of wage differential that, after 
controlling the explanatory variables, is still unexplained. Such unexplained 
portion of the wage differential between Saudi and non-Saudi workers measures 
how much the non-Saudi group is penalised because they are being paid lower than 
the other group of workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries. 
To set up the analysis and decomposition of the wage structure of Saudi and 
non-Saudi workers in these industries, a number of stages are involved: 
1) Specification of the econometric models of the wage determination 
for both Saudi and non-Saudi workers. This requires identification 
of the key explanatory variables for wage determination, and the 
source of data that are used to measure these variables. 
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2) Preliminary analysis of the data and econometric tests. The focus of 
this stage is on the investigation of a number of econometric issues 
such as multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity that usually arise in 
the context of cross-sectional data sets. 
3) Estimation of the earnings equations for Saudi and non-Saudi 
workers. The third step is related to estimation of the earnings 
equations and verification of the assumptions of the impact of the 
personal and workplace characteristics of the Saudi and non-Saudi 
workers on their monthly earnings. In addition, this stage discusses 
the possible explanation of the wage differentials between Saudi 
and non-Saudi workers. 
4) Application of the decomposition technique. At this stage, the study 
considers the empirical estimates of the wage differentials between 
Saudi and non-Saudi workers in order to apply the decomposition 
technique based on the Oaxaca-Blinder model to identify the extent 
of wage discrimination in the chemical and petrochemical industries 
between the two groups of workers in the Saudi labour market. 
5.2 SPECIFICATION OF THE EARNINGS EQUATION 
This section presents the specification of the empirical wage equation that 
is based on the standard earnings function proposed by Mincer in 1974 (Willis, 
1986). The equation estimates the natural logarithmic monthly earnings for Saudi 
and non-Saudi workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries. 
The earnings equation is specified in Equation (29) as: 
n 
ln(Wi)=äo+ExiBi +ui 
i=1 
(29) 
where the dependent variable, ln(W; ), is the natural logarithmic monthly earnings 
of individual workers; x; (i =1,...., n) represent the explanatory variables, and the 
coefficient vector B; measures the marginal effects of the above factors on the 
workers' earnings. The earnings cover all forms of compensation that are reported 
by the responding workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries. More 
specifically, these compensations include the basic monthly wage, transport 
allowance, housing allowance calculated on a monthly basis, bonuses calculated on 
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a monthly basis, travelling ticket(s) allowance for non-Saudi workers calculated on 
a monthly basis, and monthly pension and job injury risks premiums paid to the 
(GOSI) for Saudi workers. The pension premium is calculated at a premium of 8% 
of the basic salary, while the job injury risk premium paid to both Saudi and non- 
Saudi workers is calculated at a premium of 2% of their base salary. These 
premiums are paid by the employer so they are regarded as part of the monthly 
earnings of these workers. However, the compensation components differ between 
workers and not all workers receive all these privileges. The explanatory variables 
comprise the following: 
" Human capital factors, i. e., educational qualifications, training, and actual 
experience expressed in years. The educational variable is a dummy variable 
indicating a worker's highest qualification, which is classified into: university 
qualification; academic secondary school qualifications referred to as 
secondary education; technical secondary qualification referred to as technical 
education, and intermediate qualification, while the excluded educational 
qualification is the primary educational level. Training is also a dummy 
variable indicating the class training a worker attained for a short period of 
more than one month during the previous three years before the data collection 
point, with a value of 1 if the worker had received training and 0 otherwise. 
Demographic variables, i. e., a worker's nationality, which is a dummy variable 
(= 1 if the worker is Saudi and 0 if non-Saudi), the worker's age, marital status 
(= 1 if the worker is married and 0 otherwise), and children (= I if the worker 
has children and 0 otherwise). 
" Workplace characteristics comprising occupational status include managerial 
jobs, professional jobs, clerical and salesmen occupations, and craftsmen. In 
this study, the occupational status is a dummy variable that classifies the first 
five occupations as high-ranking posts compared with "craftsmen" which is 
regarded as the alternative category. In addition, this category includes some 
non-pecuniary benefits, which mainly comprise health services, job security, 
work-injury risk insurance, promotion, mobility in the labour market, and paid 
leave. These variables are dummy variables, which indicate whether the 
worker is satisfied or not satisfied with these working conditions, with I if the 
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worker is satisfied and 0 if not satisfied. The mobility variable is also a dummy 
variable indicating 1 if the worker can move in the labour market without 
objection of the employer, and 0 otherwise. 
The data for all the variables are obtained from the cross-sectional survey 
of a sample of workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries, as described 
in Chapter Four. The variables used for the regression analysis are discussed in 
detail below. 
5.3 VARIABLES OF THE STUDY 
As is discussed above, the variables are grouped into three broad 
categories: human capital, demographics, and workplace characteristics. Table 
(5-1) presents a complete list of the variables used for the study. 
5.31 Human Capital Factors 
Education and training are the main components of human capital that a 
worker can accumulate to influence his/her payment compensation in the labour 
market. Mincer (1974) argued that spending on any form of human capital, i. e., 
education, on-the-job training, and health, tends to augment an individual's 
earnings capacity. Thus, such spending should be viewed as investments. The 
standard theory of human capital considers earnings as a return value on education 
and training that a worker has accumulated over his/her life cycle. In addition, the 
theory assumes that work experience has an influence on the workers' earnings 
profile. Therefore, the theory postulates that personal differences in human capital 
characteristics among workers largely account for wage differentials among these 
workers (Mincer, 1993). Many studies have confirmed a positive influence of the 
human capital components on the wage differentials among workers with different 
skills (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973; Dixon, 2001; among others). In this study, the 
descriptive analysis in Chapter Four indicates positive effects of education on the 
wage distribution among workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries (see 
Table (4-7). This table shows that educated workers have higher earnings across 
the percentile ranks. Moreover, Table (4-8) shows a substantial influence of work 
experience on the workers' earnings in these industries. Therefore, this provides an 
evidence to estimate the effects of human capital factors on earnings distribution 
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among workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries, and to examine their 
contribution to wage inequality between Saudi and non-Saudi workers in these 
industries. 
5.3.2 Demographic Factors 
The demographic variables usually include age, marital status, and the 
presence of children. The descriptive analysis in Chapter Four indicates a positive 
influence of age on the earnings distribution among workers in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries. But the test of collinearity (presented below) shows that 
this variable causes severe multi-collinearity, and thus it has to be dropped from 
the estimated Equation (29). Therefore, the study will focus on the other two 
variables, i. e., marital status and children. 
i) Marital Status 
Most of the empirical research on wage determination has considered the 
influence of a marriage premium on wage differentials between married and 
unmarried workers in the labour market (Oaxaca, 1973; Korenman and Neumark, 
1991; Mumford and Smith, 2001; among others). In this study, analysis of the 
influence of marital status on earnings distribution will focus on males, who are the 
main breadwinner in the chemical and petrochemical industries. Since employment 
of women in the manufacturing sector in Saudi Arabia is almost non-existent, 
especially in the chemical and petrochemical industries, there is no need to 
examine the marriage premium among female workers. The absence of female 
workers from the manufacturing sectors is largely due to social and cultural 
attitudes. 
The descriptive analysis in Chapter Four reveals a positive influence of 
marital status on wage distribution between married and unmarried workers in 
these industries. It confirms the influences of this variable on both Saudi and non- 
Saudi workers, and between the two groups (see Table 4-5). Therefore, it is 
assumed that estimates of this variable would provide evidence of its influences on 
the earnings of workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries in Saudi 
Arabia, as it is confirmed in other countries. 
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Table 5-1 
Variable of the Study 
Variable 11 Description 
Ws. N The monthly compensation for a Saudi (we) and a non-Saudi (w,, ) worker. It 
includes: basic pay, transportation allowance, housing allowance, travelling 
allowance, pension premium at 8%, injury risks insurance premium at 2% 
of the basic pay and bonus. All these variables are on a monthly basis 
Nationality It is dummy variable with Saudi = 1, and non-Saudi = 0. 
ducation It expresses workers' educational qualification as the following dummy 
variables: intermediate = 1, otherwise = 0; secondary = 1, otherwise = 0; 
technical = 1, otherwise = 0; and university =1, otherwise = 0; with primary 
education as the base variable. 
Training The training courses for a period longer than a month during the last three 
years before the data collection. Trained workers =1 and otherwise = 0. 
Work Indicates the actual number of working years the worker had spent in the 
Experience labour market. They comprise work years inside and outside Saudi Arabia. 
Martial Status A dummy variable: if married=l; otherwise =0 
Occupation It is represented by dummy variables : managers=l, otherwise=O; clerks=l, 
otherwise=O; salesmen=l, otherwise=0; and technician=l, otherwise=0, 
with craftsmen as the base variable. 
Children It is a dummy variable: workers with children =1 and without children=0 
Work This variable comprises different non-pecuniary components, which 
Conditions include: health services: Having access =1, otherwise=O; injury insurance: 
satisfaction =1, dissatisfaction = 0; mobility in the labour market: 
possibility to move=l, otherwise=0; job security: satisfaction =1, 
dissatisfaction= 0; paid leave: satisfaction =1, dissatisfaction=0; 
promotion: worker have a chance for promotion=l, otherwise=O. 
158 
ii) Children (Dependents) 
Existing studies of labour market issues have examined the impact of 
children who are less than 18 years old on the family and the mother's earnings in 
developed countries. In developing countries, children as dependents might include 
all family members who are not working, even those above 18 years of age. In 
most of these countries, as in Saudi Arabia, working family member(s), 
particularly the eldest, are responsible for the non-working members, including 
non-working adults, especially among unmarried females. This indicates a 
significant influence of custom and tradition within the extended family. Chapter 
Four shows the impact of children on the wage structure of the workers in the 
chosen industries in Saudi Arabia (see Table 4-6). It reveals that workers with 
children earn more than their colleagues without children, especially among Saudi 
workers. This provides evidence to estimate the influences of this variable on the 
earnings distribution among workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries. 
5.3.3 Workplace Characteristics 
The literature on wage determination attributes some sources of the wage 
inequality to the differences in workplace characteristics. Empirical studies in this 
area discussed some of these characteristics, which include firm size, hours of 
work, unionism, part-time and full-time contracts, industry, and occupational status 
(Oaxaca, 1973; Preston, 1999; Drolet, 2002). Moreover, Pirece (1999) adds paid 
leave of various types, pensions and savings plans, and health insurance. Mumford 
and Smith (2001) controlled other workplace variables that comprised many 
traditional variables as well as grievance procedures, rewards for seniority, 
workplace teams, workplace circles, difficulty in hiring, and union recognition. 
Many of these variables are potential candidates in this research, but the most 
applicable to the chemical and petrochemicals industries include: 
i) Occupational Status 
This variable is mainly a proxy for human capital, specifically, the 
education and training that a worker has gained. The worker's occupational status 
improves over his/her life cycle in the labour market due to influences of his/her 
human capital characteristics, particularly on-the-job training and experience. It 
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might be expected that there could be collinearity between the occupational status 
variables and the human capital variables. However, association between these 
characteristics reveals low inter-correlation indications. As seen on Table 
(presented below 5-5), the correlation coefficients of these variables range between 
-0.24 and 0.45. 
So, occupational distribution in the workplace has an influence on workers' 
wage determination. From a practical point of view, empirical studies usually 
examine the impact of occupational segregation on wage differentials among 
workers, particularly on the basis of gender. It is argued that the wage differential 
mainly exists due to differences in occupations that are caused by differences in 
skills needed by a specific occupation (Tachibanaki, 1998). However, both human 
capital components and occupational characteristics are considered important 
determinants of earnings in the labour market. Vartianien (2002) confirmed the 
impact of both variables on the gender gap in the Finnish labour market. She found 
that the estimated effect of education on gender wage differentials is different with 
and without controlling the occupational variable. She found that the impact of 
education on the gender earnings gap, without controlling for occupation, is 
calculated at 1.35% for males, and it decreased to 0.97% when controlling for 
occupation, which influences the gender earnings gap by 5.22%. Preston (1999) 
discussed the gender earnings differential in the public and private sectors in 
Australia. He first estimated the impact of human capital on earnings without 
occupation, and found that the effect of the human capital variable is calculated at 
4% of the gender earnings difference in the private sector, while it accounts for 
12% of the difference in the gender wage gap in the public sector. When the 
occupational characteristics are controlled in the model, the impact of the human 
capital in the private sector remain the same, and the occupation variable provides 
women 4.69% more earnings than males in the private sector, and 2.87% for males 
in the public sector, while the impact of human capital decreased to 0.54% for 
males in this sector. 
However, many researchers attempted to examine and estimate the impact 
of the occupational status on the wage differentials in the labour market (Brown et 
al., 1980; Blau and Khan, 2000; Dixon, 2000; among others). It is argued that 
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high-status occupations, especially those in the public sector, are highly valued and 
competed for in Saudi Arabia (Al-Khouli, 1985; Woodward, 1988). Therefore, it is 
expected that occupational status would have an influence on wage determination 
in the chemical and petrochemical industries. Table (4-15) presents simple 
statistical indicators of the impact of occupational distribution on the wage 
structure among workers in these industries. It shows that the higher occupational 
positions provide workers with higher earnings, particularly those in managerial 
and professional jobs. This may be confined to the assumption that job 
characteristics have influences as explanatory variables on the wage differentials in 
the labour market (Dixon, 2000). This research covers six categories of 
occupations, including managerial, professional, clerical, sales, technical, and 
foremen jobs, with the craftsmen as the base occupation for the estimates. 
ii) Mobility in the Labour Market 
Free movement of labour in the marketplace is a fundamental feature of a 
competitive market economy. This movement is usually induced by international 
or inter-regional or inter-sectoral differences in wages and employment 
opportunities and the workers' ability to match their skills and expertise with the 
labour market's needs. But a worker may be restricted in his/her movement within 
the labour market to seek alternative jobs. Under monopsony, which means a 
single buyer of goods or services (the monopolist), the supply curve should be 
elastic. Then the monopsonist firm in the market can buy as much as it needs at the 
current price (Robinson, 1961). In the labour market, the buyer is the employer 
and the worker is the seller of his/her labour services (Boal and Ransom, 2002). 
The literature has examined some typical cases of the monopsony phenomenon, 
such as the reserve clause in the sport of baseball. The clause restricts the player's 
ability to negotiate with another team, while the owner's choices at the end of the 
contract are wide. Accordingly, the employer can renew, sell or terminate the 
contract unilaterally (Scully, 1974). On the contrary, the player's choices are more 
limited. Therefore, the monopsony influences the player's earnings. Scully argues 
that the reserve clause reduces the player's salaries below his/her marginal revenue 
product (MRP). 
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In Saudi Arabia, the personal contract is the basis for recruiting foreign 
workers. This contract ties the worker to the employer, as the worker cannot move 
to another employer unless he or she gets a release from his current employer. This 
restriction is imposed by the residency regulations that govern the foreign workers 
in the labour market. These regulations give the employer the right to deport the 
worker instead of releasing him, and the employer has the right to prevent the 
employee from returning to work in the country over the two consequent years of 
deportation. In contrast, a Saudi worker in this sector can move freely in the labour 
market to match his/her opportunity on cancellation of the existing contract. It is 
obvious that the personal contract has an influence on the earnings of workers, 
particularly those who suffer from the refusal to negotiate with another employer 
and have to stay with the monopsonist employer. So, this is assumed to affect 
earnings of the workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries. Mincer 
(1993) argued that mobility responds to perceived gains in wages, and it promotes 
individual wage growth in the labour market. In keeping with the literature, this 
study also attempts to examine the effects of mobility in the labour market on the 
earnings of these workers. In this research, the mobility variable indicates the 
possibility for the worker to change his employer. 
iii) Health Services 
Several researchers discussed various aspects of the non-wage or fringe 
benefits that influence wage determination in the labour market. Some of these 
researchers paid attention to health insurance and its effects on the worker's 
participation in employment in the labour market (Kalb, 1998; Hamermesh, 1999; 
Edwards, 2002). In addition, the literature assumed that there is some relationship 
between wage distribution and access to health services. Dustmann and Windmijer 
(1999) confirm that individuals with low wages suffer from poorer health 
conditions, while those with higher permanent wages have a better health profile. 
They argued that health services affect longevity and generate benefits from 
improving the workers' productivity; therefore, many governments across the 
world intervene to improve healthcare services. In Saudi Arabia, the health 
services system consists of two forms: the occupational health services and the 
general health services. The former services are restricted to work-related injuries 
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and diseases. Expenses of this form of health service are covered by the employer 
in the form of charges of 2% of the worker's monthly salary paid to the General 
Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI). The general health services are 
provided by either the public or private health care institutions. The public health 
care services are only available to Saudi households, whereas non-Saudi workers 
are denied access to such services except for those working in the public sector or 
being employed as housemaids, family drivers, and house servants. The employers 
in the private sector should provide their employees with health services operated 
by the private health care institutions. Saudi workers in this sector have the right to 
benefit from the employers' health services, as well as that provided by the public 
sector. The health services that are provided by the employer may be extended to 
cover the worker and his/her family or they may be restricted to cover only the 
worker, and for certain types of health care. It is obvious that healthcare as a non- 
wage benefit should have an influence on the workers' earnings, as workers who 
are satisfied with the health services provided by the employer are expected to 
have better wages than those who are dissatisfied with such services. It is expected 
that workers' satisfaction with health services that are provided by the employer 
would explain a portion of the wage differentials between workers in the chemical 
and petrochemical industries. 
iv) Paid Leave 
Paid leave as a non-wage benefit has received a close examination in some 
recent works. These works argued that the low-income groups have little paid 
leave, little flexibility in work, and little support for dependent care in comparison 
to higher income groups (Lettau and Buchmeller, 1999; Naples, 2001; Heymann et 
al., 2002; Watkins, 2004). Limited paid leave may have a negative impact on the 
worker's earnings. Pierce (1999) attributed the increase in compensation inequality 
between workers in the USA in the 1980s to the decline in health insurance 
coverage and the falling costs of paid leave. He contended that this comprised 
various sorts of paid leave that included paid vacation time, holidays, sick leave, 
and other categories. In Saudi Arabia, workers do not enjoy the benefits of paid 
leave on equal terms in either the private or the public sectors. Chapter Three 
shows how regulations differentiate between Saudi and non-Saudi workers 
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regarding paid leave privileges. Firms in the private sector may offer little paid 
vacation to their employees and distinguish between them to access the regulated 
vacations (Barsalu, 1985). The prevalence of the unequal distribution of paid leave 
in the Saudi labour market as manifested in various labour laws and revealed by 
the cross-sectional data (Table 4-18) spurs this research to examine its impact as a 
non-wage benefit on wage determination in the chemical and petrochemical 
industries 
v) Job Security 
Job security is usually associated with employment protection and work 
stability. It encourages workers to advance in their human capital accumulation in 
the labour market through improving their work skills and upgrading their 
productivity (Holzer and Lalonde, 1998; Cazes and Nesporova, 2003). However, it 
is known that changes in job security have negative impacts on the workers' 
welfare, as the job loser may spend a long time unemployed, which, in turn, makes 
a worker suffer earnings losses (Steward, 2002). This research is motivated by job 
satisfaction measures to estimate the effects on earnings of the workers' 
satisfaction with the characteristics of their job security in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries. As the descriptive analysis of the cross-sectional data in 
Chapter Four shows, workers' satisfaction with the characteristics of their jobs 
reveals both positive and negative effects on wage inequality. Therefore, these 
aspects provide evidence to decompose the influences of this variable on the wage 
differentials between Saudi and non-Saudi workers in these industries. 
vi) Other Workplace Characteristics 
In addition to the above workplace characteristics, this research covers 
promotion or advancement in the workplace that indicates the workers' seniority in 
the ladder of the occupational structure. Moreover, job advancement provides the 
worker an opportunity to improve his/her earnings. In this research, the promotion 
characteristic is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the worker has a 
chance for advancement in his/her career. 
Furthermore, pension and injury risk compensations are considered as the 
main sort of social security in the private sector. These compensations are paid by 
the GOSI, as is mentioned elsewhere in this study. It is known that GOSI pays for 
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permanent pensions for Saudi workers and injury risks compensation for both 
Saudi and non-Saudi workers. It is assumed that workers' satisfaction with the 
injury risks and occupational diseases compensations have an influence on the 
earnings of workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries, particularly 
among those who face occupational diseases. 
Having discussed the general specification of the earnings equation and the 
variables that are used in the regression analysis, this chapter now turns to 
examining a number of technical issues that confront the empirical investigation. 
5.4 TESTING MULTI-COLLINEARITY 
As the number of explanatory variables in the current study is large, the 
data of the study is tested for multi-collinearity, which means the existence of a 
perfect or exact linear relationship among some or all explanatory variables of the 
regression equation. Under the presence of multi-collinearity, the regression model 
has difficulty telling which explanatory variable(s) is/are influencing the dependent 
variable (Koop, 2000), as the interpretation of the standard regression equation 
depends on the assumption that the explanatory variables are not strongly linearly 
correlated. Economists contend that there is no decisive method of detecting or 
measuring the degree of multi-collinearity. Rather, there are a number of rules of 
thumb for detecting this phenomenon (Gujarati, 1988; Koutsoyiannis, 1987). The 
main rules of thumb include: 
1- High R2 (greater than 0.8) with small t-ratios and the F test usually rejects the 
hypothesis that the slope coefficients are equal to zero (Gujarati, 1988). 
2- Testing statistical significance of RZ with the observed F* as follows: 
F* - 
(R2x.. x2x3... xk )/(k - 1) 
(30) 
(1 - R2xi. xIx2... x k 
)/(n - k) 
Where R2xi, Xl... A is the multiple correlation coefficient among the explanatory 
variables, n= the size of the sample and k= the number of explanatory variables. 
The hypothesis being tested is: 
2 H0 . . Rxi. x1 x2... xk =0 
(31) 
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and the alternative hypothesis is 
H1: R 2 
xi. x1x2... xk x0 
(32) 
The observed F* value is compared with the tabulated Foos with vi = (k-1) and v2 = 
(n-k) degrees of freedom. If F* > Foos, then we reject the null hypothesis, that is, 
the variable x; is correlated with the other explanatory variables. If F* < Fo. os, then 
we accept that the variable x; is not multi-collinear. 
3- The variance inflation factor (VIF) is another rule for detecting multi- 
collinearity. It should be noted that the variance of the OLS estimator for a typical 
regression coefficient (ß; ) can be shown to be the following (Wooldridge, 2000): 
62 Var(ß) _ 1 Sii(l-RI 
(33) 
n 
where a2 is the variance of the residual term; S, =DX; ý -X; )2 ; and 
RI2i is the 
unadjusted measure of the goodness of fit when X; is regressed against the constant 
term and all the remaining explanatory variables. In the absence of multi- 
collinearity, Ri2 becomes zero and the variance of OLS estimator becomes 
z 
Va,. ( ß ýý = 
LL. On the basis of the two variances, it is straightforward to obtain 
SH 
the variance inflation factor for the ith variable as: 
VIF. =1 1 1-R? 
i 
(34) 
Thus, the larger the VIF becomes, the stronger the indication of multi-collinearity. 
It is suggested that a VIF exceeding 10 is a sign that multi-collinearity may cause a 
problem (Chatterjee and Price, 1977). 
4- Tolerance Factor: it is the amount of variability of the selected independent 
variable not explained by the other independent variables. It is the inverse of the 
VIF and is calculated as: 
Tolerance= 1-R? = VIF (35) 
Small values of tolerance (close to zero) indicate significant problems with multi- 
collinearity. 
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5- Condition Index: It is a simple function of the eigenvalues of the matrix X'X. It 
is calculated as: 
Condition Index (CI) = Maxirom Eigenvalue s (36) 
Minimum Eigenvalue s 
It is suggested that if (CI) is between 10 and 30, there is moderate multi- 
collinearity, but if it exceeds 30, there is severe multi-collinearity (Gujarati, 1988). 
6- Variable Proportion: The variable proportion might be interpreted as the 
proportion of variance of coefficient ßi that is attributed to the collinearity 
associated with the eigenvalue level. A high variance proportion with a small 
eigenvalue indicates serious linear dependency among the explanatory variables. 
However, none of these criteria by itself is considered a satisfactory 
measure of multi-collinearity. Therefore, in assessing the multi-collinearity of the 
variables in this research, a combination of these rules is applied by using SPSS 
(Statistical Package for Social Sciences). Table (5-2) displays the OLS estimation 
of Equation (29) by using the cross-sectional data for the controlled data of the 
responding workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries. Estimates of this 
equation indicate that the observed F* is calculated at 232.8, while the tabulated F 
value at the 5% level of significance with vi = 23 and V2 = 532 is 1.52. This 
indicates that F* > Foos and we accept that some explanatory variables are causing 
multi-collinearity for the estimated variables of Equation (29). 
Further evidence of the existence of multi-collinearity is shown by the high 
value of R2 and the t-ratios for some coefficients that are insignificant. The 
estimates of the cross-sectional data reveal low levels of standards errors, but this 
does not indicate insignificant multi-collinearity of these estimates, because large 
standards errors do not always appear, even in functions in which the regressors 
are strongly multi-collinear (Koutsoyiannis, 1987). 
Table (5-3) presents additional statistical measures of multi-collinearity that 
include the variance inflation factor (VIF), condition index (CI), and variance 
proportion associated with eigenvalues. On this Table, the condition index lies 
between 1 and 67.8, which suggests the presence of severe multi-collinearity. 
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Table 5-2 
Estimates of Earnings Equation for All Workers 
in Chemical and Petrochemical Industries 
Coefficient Std E t 
Collinearity 
Variables (B) . rror Tolerance VIF 
(Constan 6.7900 0.110 63.670 
National 0.9310 0.030 33.580 0.228 4.380 
Marital 0.0219 0.030 0.690 0.181 5.532 
Children -0.0146 0.030 -0.460 0.181 5.538 
Manager 0.0980 0.030 2.910 0.228 4.385 
Salesmen 0.0602 0.030 1.790 0.625 1.600 
Professionals 0.0502 0.030 1.550 0.282 3.540 
Clerks 0.0973 0.030 3.830 0.360 2.778 
Technicians 0.0655 0.030 2.120 0.547 1.828 
Foremen 0.0916 0.030 2.660 0.647 1.547 
Intermediate 0.0091 0.000 3.770 0.181 5.529 
Secondary 0.1180 0.030 4.010 0.532 1.879 
Technical 0.2880 0.030 10.520 0.394 2.537 
University 0.4130 0.030 13.260 0.319 3.130 
Experience 0.4870 0.040 13.500 0.135 7.411 
Training -0.0135 0.020 -0.910 0.778 1.285 
Mobility 0.0215 0.020 1.120 0.468 2.138 
Paid Leave 0.0171 0.020 1.080 0.932 1.073 
Injury Risks 0.0186 0.010 1.540 0.586 1.705 
_ Health Services -0.0138 0.020 -0.910 0.743 1.346 
Job security 0.0148 0.010 1.050 0.869 1.151 
Promotion 0.0194 0.020 1.110 0.898 1.114 
Age 0.0279 0.000 13.680 0.146 6.828 
Work hours -0.0021 0.000 -1.100 0.717 1.395 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F 
Regression 127.613 23 5.548 232.774 
Residual 12.776 536 0.02384 
Total 140.389 559 
R R2 R2 Std. 
0.959 0.919 0.915 0.1462 
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It should be noted that the proposed measures of collinearity do not always give 
consistent indications for each variable. As a summary, Table (5-4) presents all the 
variables that have at least one indicator whose value is higher than the threshold 
levels as suggested by the literature. 
As shown on this table, the age variable satisfies almost four measures of 
the collinearity test. However, it has a high condition index that exceeds the critical 
level, the variance proportion is high and associated with a small eigenvalue close 
to zero, and its tolerance factor is quite small. Thus, there is quite a strong 
indication of the existence of multi-collinearity between age and other explanatory 
variables. It is noted that age has a high correlation coefficient with the experience 
variable (see Table 5-5). Further investigation has also shown quite a significant 
multi-collinearity problem with the following variables: promotion, working hours, 
marital status, and children. The usual remedy for multi-collinearity is to drop the 
severely multi-collinear variable(s). When the age variable is dropped and 
Equation (29) is re-estimated, the new estimates reveal low collinearity values for 
the remaining variables in this table, with the exception of the weekly worked 
hours variable, which still has a high variance proportion, calculated at 0.96 with a 
low eigenvalue of 0.0025, and the CI for the variable is still high, at 63. These 
measures still exceed the suggested minimum level of collinearity. Therefore, the 
monthly earnings equation is re-estimated after dropping age and worked hours. 
Table 5-4 
Variable with High Multi-collinearity Factors 
Variable Tolerance 
Factor 
VIF Eigenvalue Variance 
(Highest) 
C. Index 
Age 0.146 6.83 . 0075 0.89 37.5 
Experience 0.181 5.53 0.593 0.73 0.59 
University 0.135 7.41 0.383 0.55 5.37 
Working Hours 0.717 1.46 0.002 0.88 67.81 
Children 0.181 5.53 1.19 0.80 2.99 
Marital status 0.181 5.53 1.63 0.85 2.55 
Promotion 0.898 1.11 0.035 0.59 17.4 
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Table (5-6) presents the new estimates with low multi-collinearity values in 
comparison to the suggested critical values. From this table, the VIF values fall 
between 5.53 and 1.11 across estimates, and the tolerance factor is between 0.18 
and about 0.94 for these estimates, which suggests moderate collinearity. 
Moreover, the condition index is between 1 and 18.15, which lends further support 
to the suggestion of a moderate level of multi-collinearity. On the other hand, the 
variance proportion shows that the children and martial status variables have 
relatively high values of 0.89 and 0.84, respectively, but with relatively high 
eigenvalues of 1.84 and 1.62, and small condition indices at 2.19 and 2.33 for the 
two variables, respectively. The two variables are not regarded as showing 
significant collinearity problem; therefore, they will be included in the model, as 
they represent major demographic variables in the study and it is expected that 
they will have an influence on earnings of workers in the chosen industries, 
although the observed F* is 182, ( presented below Table 5-8) which is still greater 
than tabulated F (but lower than before). 
Table 5-5 
Correlation between the Collinear Variables* 
Variable Age Experi 
-ence 
Unive- 
rsity 
Work 
Hours 
Children Marital Promo 
-tion 
Age 1.00 0.85 0.43 -0.033 -0.15 -0.176 0.066 
Ex erience 0.85 1.00 0.19 -0.001 -0.112 -0.131 0.063 
University 0.43 0.19 1.00 -0.227 -0.141 -0.144 0.111 
Work Hours -0.033 -0.001 -0.227 1.00 0.19 0.027 -0.119 
Children -0.15 -0.112 -0.141 0.19 1.00 0.902 0.130 
Marital Status -0.176 -0.131 -0.144 0.027 0.902 1.00 0.107 
Promotion 0.066 0.063 0.111 -0.119 0.130 0.107 1.00 
" Based on descriptive data of estimates in Table (5-2) 
5.5 HETEROSCEDASTICITY 
The linear regression model for the observations (Equation 29) assumes 
that the random error terms (u, ) have a constant variance. This represents the 
assumption of homoscedasticity, which is expressed as 
Var(ui) = ßü (37) 
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This means that the variance of the error term (u; ) remains the same regardless of 
the values of the explanatory variables-(X). In contrast, when the variance of (u; ) 
changes as (X) changes, this results in heteroscedasticity. Symbolically, this is 
expressed as: 
Var(u; )= aý (38) 
where the subscript (i) signifies the fact that the individual variances may all be 
different. However, the form of heteroscedasticity depends on the form of the 
relationship between aü and X;. There are three main forms of heteroscedasticity: 
1) monotonically rising form that exists when the variance of the u; increases as X 
increases, 2) decreasing heteroscedasticity when the variance of u; changes in the 
opposite direction as X, and 3) the variance of u; decreases initially as X assumes 
higher values, and then increases with X. However, it is difficult to know the true 
form of heteroscedasticity as the u's are not observable. In this study, because 
there are significant variations in the distribution of earnings and the explanatory 
variables among workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries, it is 
expected that the assumption of constant variance of the error term does not hold. 
Hence, the existence of heteroscedasticity is detected by using the White test as 
proposed by Halbert White (1980). This technique is based on the auxiliary 
regression approach where the residuals from the original regression are used to 
run a second regression that enables the test to be conducted. In this technique, the 
auxiliary equation is specified as: 
kk2k 
e2=-yO+ E yiXI +Y ßiXI +E aIXIX 
i=1 i=1 i*j 
(39) 
where e2 is the residual squared from the original regression. Based on Equation 
(39), the White test is formulated as follows: 
nx2 - xk-1 (40) 
where (n) is the sample size, and the R2 is the unadjusted R2 from the auxiliary 
regression model. The test is distributed as 2 (chi-square) with (k-1) degrees of 
freedom when (k) is the number of regressors included in the auxiliary 
specification. If the test statistic exceeds the critical value, then this indicates the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. Following Pryce (2002), the White test is calculated 
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by using the SPSS software package. From the original OLS equation, the residual 
is calculated (Unstandardised Residual in SPSS) and used as the dependent 
variable; the independent variables age, work hours, and experience were squared 
up regardless of collinearity with the exclusion of the dummy variables (Equation 
41), and all the original independent variables (age, work hours, and work 
experience) expressed as cross products in Equation (41): 
e2=b0 +b1X1 +b2X2 +b3X3 +b4X4*XS +X4 *X6 +b5X5 *X6 +b6X6 (41) 
On Table (5-7), multiplying n= 559 by R2 = 0.099, the product is 55.34. Compared 
with x2 = 505 with degrees of freedom = 559 at the 5% level of significance, the 
White test suggests that heteroscedasticity is not confirmed, as the value of (nR 
2) 
is less than the tabulated x2 
Table 5-7 
White Test for Heteroscedasticity 
B St Error T 
(Constant) 0.0562 0.0110 5.1560 
AGE2 0.0002 0.0000 2.4270 
EXP2 0.0004 0.0000 4.0220 
WHRS2 0.0000 0.0000 2.4900 
AGEEXP -0.0005 0.0000 -2.9270 
AGEWRK -0.0002 0.0000 -2.5760 
EXPWRK 0.0002 0.0000 2.2180 
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
3290 0.1080 0.0990 0.0300 
5.6 TIIE ESTIMATED EARNINGS EQUATIONS 
The study first estimates the aggregate earnings function, Equation (29), for 
the full sample of Saudi and non-Saudi workers to examine the factors that 
influence the monthly earnings of workers in the chosen industries. Following the 
conventional approach to the examination of the impact of nationality on earnings, 
which is introduced as a dummy variable. Then, the earnings equation for Saudi 
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and non-Saudi workers is estimated separately. Comparable explanatory variables 
are used for the determination of the wage rate for both groups of workers. The 
estimated earnings equations for the two groups of workers are used in the final 
stage of the analysis to examine the sources of wage differentials and the extent of 
wage discrimination between the two groups of workers in the chosen industries. 
5.6.1 Earnings Equation for the Aggregate Workforce 
The conventional approach to the investigation of wage differentials is 
usually based on the estimation of an aggregate wage equation that incorporates a 
number of personal characteristic variables, such as nationality or ethnicity. 
Essentially, this approach regards the coefficients on the other explanatory 
variables as equal across different groups of workers (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994). 
In such cases, economists estimate the wage equation using the full sample, 
controlling for the differences in characteristics of Saudi and non-Saudi workers 
with the assumption of wage equality between the two groups of workers 
(Neumark, 1988; Allanson, 1999; Knight and Sabot, 1995). 
The purpose of estimating the aggregate wage equation in the current study 
is to calculate the influence of the controlled variables on the monthly earnings 
determination of workers in the chosen industries. 
In this equation, B; are assumed to be identical for both Saudi and non-Saudi 
workers. Table (5-8) reports the estimates of the earnings equation for the 
aggregate workforce. On this table, the first column shows the values of the 
estimated slope coefficients B; on the workers' characteristics X;. The coefficients 
are measured in percentage terms to interpret their percentage effects on the mean 
monthly earnings. The second column indicates the standard errors of the 
coefficients. The third column presents the t-statistics or t-ratios. The following 
sections discuss the empirical results for each of the determinant factors of the 
aggregate earnings. 
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Table 5-8 
Re-estimates of the Monthly Earnings 
Full Samnle 
Variable Beta Std. Error T-Ratio 
(Constant 7.164 0.040 178.189 
National 0.877 0.031 27.898 
Marital 0.009 0.037 0.235 
Children -0.006 0.037 -0.161 
Manager 0.098 0.039 2.546 
Salesmen 0.040 0.039 1.040 
Professionals 0.030 0.037 0.808 
Clerical Jobs 0.083 0.028 2.938 
Technicians 0.042 0.036 1.174 
Foremen 0.084 0.040 2.114 
Intermediate 0.196 0.034 5.809 
Secondary 0.413 0.030 13.780 
Technical 0.547 0.034 15.987 
University 0.702 0.038 18.619 
Experience 0.038 0.001 27.763 
Training -0.004 0.017 -0.215 
Mobility 0.037 0.022 1.659 
Paid Leave 0.018 0.018 0.973 
Injury Risks 0.013 0.014 0.958 
Health Services -0.011 0.017 -0.654 
Job security 0.008 0.016 0.515 ___ 
Promotion 0.021 0.020 1.025 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F 
Regression 123.09 21 5.862 182.4 
Residual 17.29 538 0.0321 
Total 140.389 559 
R R2 R2 Std. 
0.936 0.877 0.87 0.179 
176 
i) Nationality 
From the Table, it appears that nationality is a major determinant of 
earnings in the labour market in the selected Saudi industries, even after 
controlling for the influences of the other factors. As the estimated equation, 
Equation (29), confirms, being a Saudi provides the worker with a significant 
increase in his/her mean monthly earnings (compensation). This is because the 
coefficient of the ethnicity variable (B; ) is estimated to be 87.7% with a substantial 
t-ratio, which indicates a substantial positive effect of this variable on the earnings 
of Saudi workers over their non-Saudi counterparts. Therefore, nationality has an 
influence on the monthly earnings of the workers in the chosen industries, as those 
with Saudi nationality gain an advantage over their non-Saudi counterparts. This 
indicates the existence of discrimination in the labour market, because the variable 
is a non-income personal characteristic that is induced by labour regulations. As 
explained before, these regulations clearly instructed employers in both the private 
and public sectors to pay Saudi nationals higher wages than their non-Saudi 
counterparts and provide the former with various workplace privileges over the 
non-Saudi workers. Such policies segment the labour market in the country into 
distinct categories: one for Saudi workers with good working conditions and 
various benefits, and the other for non-Saudi workers with poor pay and poor 
working conditions. As shown on this table, significance measures reveal that the 
variable has a standard error of 0.031 and a t-ratio of 27.9; these measures confirm 
that the null hypothesis of no nationality effect is rejected at the 5% level of 
significance. 
ii) Demographic Factors 
The table shows the estimates for the main demographic variables that 
include marital status and the presence of children. It reveals that the estimated 
coefficient of marital status has a minor positive influence on the earnings of 
workers in the chosen industries. The value of coefficient is calculated at 0.9% 
with standard error of 0.037 and a t-ratio of 0.24. As the t-ratio has a marginal 
positive value, the result tends to support the null hypothesis of no marital status 
effect at the 5% level of significance. This may indicate that the married male 
workers, as the main breadwinners in the labour market in Saudi Arabia, should be 
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adequately compensated in order to support their families. But these workers in the 
chemical and petrochemical industries have a minimal marriage premium. This 
confirms conclusions in other empirical studies about the positive influence of 
marital status on the earnings of workers (Cornwell and Rupert, 1995; Mumford 
and Nicalou, 2001; Madalozzo, 2002; Chun and Lee, 2000; Ginther and Zavodny, 
1998). 
Insofar as the children variable is concerned, the table shows a negative 
influence of this variable on the monthly earnings of the respondent workers in the 
chemical and petrochemical industries. This means that workers with children have 
smaller monthly earnings than their colleagues without children. On this table, the 
coefficient of this variable is estimated at -0.06% with a standard error of 0.037 
and a t-ratio of -0.161. The negative t-ratio confirms the null hypothesis to reject 
the effect of the appearance of children at the 5% level of significance. 
iii) Human Capital Factors 
The standard theory of human capital postulates that worker's earnings are 
considered to be a return on the skills that he/she has accumulated over his/her life 
cycle. Mincer (1974 and 1993) argued that positive differences in schooling or in 
occupations that require different levels of schooling are the returns on investment 
in education. Besides, Weiss (1986) contended that firms have the technology to 
convert worker's time and human capital into products. Therefore, a worker should 
be compensated for his/her augmented human capital. 
In this research, educational qualifications are classified into four 
categories, including intermediate, secondary, technical, and university 
qualifications. These qualifications are dummy variables from the base variable, 
primary education. On this table, the coefficients (B; ) denote the estimated average 
rates of return on the workers' investments in different educational qualifications 
in the chemical and petrochemical industries. These estimates confirm that workers 
with more advanced educational qualifications have higher earnings than their 
colleagues with primary qualifications. Moreover, the estimates confirm that the 
higher a worker's education, the higher his/her earnings. As shown on this table, 
the coefficient of university characteristics is estimated at 0.702, which indicates 
that these workers earn 70.2% above the earnings of their colleagues with base 
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educational qualifications. The coefficient has a standard error of 0.038 and a t- 
ratio of 18.62; these measures provide evidence of statistical significance of the 
university coefficient on earnings at the 5% level of significance. Meanwhile, 
those with technical qualifications earn 54.7% more than their colleagues with 
basic qualifications. The coefficient of technical education has a standard error of 
0.034 and a t-ratio of 15.98; this result provides strong evidence of statistical 
significance to reject the null hypothesis of no technical education effect on 
earnings at the 5% level of significance. However, the influence of education on 
earnings of workers in the chosen industries decreases to 41.3% and 19.1% for 
those with secondary and intermediate qualifications, respectively. The standard 
errors of these coefficients are estimated at 0.03 and 0.034 with t-ratios of 13.78 
and 5.81 for the secondary and intermediate coefficients, respectively. These 
results all suggest that the estimated effects from these variables are all significant 
at the 5% level of significance. The positive impact of education on the workers' 
earnings in the chosen industries is consistent with the assumption of the standard 
theory of human capital (Becker, 1971; Mincer, 1974). 
Training is another form of human capital that has its effects on workers' 
earnings. The regression analysis of the cross-sectional data in this table indicates 
that training courses have a rather small influence on the workers' earnings. The 
value of the training coefficient is estimated to be -0.004 with a standard error of 
0.017 and a t-ratio of -0.215. Therefore, this result supports the argument of true 
null hypothesis of no effect for training on earnings at the 5% level of significance. 
This result is not necessarily inconsistent with the theory of human capital, which 
suggests that if training is firm-specific, then the relationship between training and 
earnings is weak. Becker (1975) defines this kind of training as one that only 
increases the productivity of trainees within the firm, whilst it has no effect on the 
productivity of trainees working outside the firm. He assumed that in the case of 
firm-specific training, the wage that an employee could get elsewhere would be 
independent of the amount of training, and thus the wage paid by the firm would 
also be independent of training. Therefore, firms in these industries consider all 
kinds of training as specific training, and so workers who paid for their training 
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would lose the opportunity cost to be compensated for their investments in such 
training. 
The experience variable is another component of human capital. In this 
research, the workers were asked to report the actual years of experience they had 
in the labour market. This table shows that the coefficient on work experience has 
a relatively significant positive influence on the worker's earnings, estimated at 
0.033 with a standard error of 0.001 and a t-ratio of 27.04. These measures provide 
evidence that experience has a strongly positive, statistically significant effect on 
the aggregate monthly earnings in the chosen industries, at the 5% level of 
significance. 
iv) Workplace Characteristics 
Workplace characteristics reveal working conditions that have their 
influences on wage determination in the labour market. The personal contract 
system in the Saudi labour market, particularly in the private sector, allocates 
different working conditions among its workers. So, it is assumed that differences 
in work conditions have their influences on the workers' earnings in the chemical 
and petrochemical industries. The table reports the results for the impact on 
earnings of some work characteristics that include occupational status, possibility 
of movement within the labour market, job security, health services, paid leave, 
work injury insurance, and promotion. The results confirm that workers in 
managerial occupations are compensated more than their colleagues in the base 
occupation (craftsmen). This confirms the assumption of the influence of 
occupational status on the workers' wage determination even after controlling for 
the human capital factors in the chemical and petrochemical industries. For 
example, the "occupational premium" associated with the managerial jobs as 
compared with the base jobs is estimated to be about 10%, as the managerial 
coefficient has a value of 0.098 with a standard error of 0.039 and a t-ratio of 1.04. 
The results also reveal that workers in the technical occupations are rewarded at a 
level that is comparable with other types of professional occupations. Compared 
with the base jobs, the wage premiums for different types of occupations are: 
technical, 4.2% with a standard error of 0.036 and a t-ratio of 1.17; salesmen, 4% 
with a standard error of 0.039 and a t-ratio of 1.040; professionals, 3% with a 
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standard error of 0.036 and a t-ratio of 0.81. However, the statistical significance 
of the coefficients of occupational variables reveal low t-ratios, which might not 
support the argument to reject the null hypothesis suggested to deny the effect of 
the occupational variables at the 5% level of significance. This result may reflect 
the influence of education on occupational status that was shown on Tables (4-12 
to4-14) in Chapter Four, and that was supported by the theoretical argument that 
the occupational status variable reflects the component of schooling attained by the 
workers who invest in education in order to join a certain occupation (Rima, 1981), 
and reflects on-the-job training and experience due to the influences of seniority 
under the administrative structural labour market. 
Concerning other workplace characteristics, the table shows that some of 
these characteristics have positive effects on the monthly earnings of workers in 
the chosen industries. These characteristics include paid leave, job risk insurance, 
job security, promotion, and the possibility of movement within the labour market. 
The slopes (B; ) of these variables produce positive values that fall between 0.008 
and 0.037 with t-ratios ranging between 0.52 and 1.025. The standard errors of 
these coefficients reveal values between 0.014 and 0.022. However, as the t-ratios 
are very low, this suggests that the null hypothesis of no effect of these variables is 
accepted at the 5% level of significance. The table also shows that some other 
workplace characteristics have negative influences on the aggregate earnings. The 
coefficient of the health services that are provided by the employer is estimated to 
be -0.011 with a standard error of 0.017 and a t-ratio of -0.016. Therefore, the 
negative impact of the variable on the aggregate monthly earnings in the chosen 
industries is statistically insignificant at the 5% level of significance. On the other 
hand, the mobility variable reveals a little influence on the monthly earnings of the 
workers in the chosen industries. Labour regulations completely bind non-Saudi 
workers to the employer, while giving the right to Saudi workers to move in the 
labour market rather freely. It is clear that workers who get a release from their 
employer can gain positively, as indicated by the positive value of the coefficient 
on mobility at 3.7% with a standard error of 0.022 and a t-ratio of 1.66. Therefore, 
the result tends to confirm the null hypothesis that the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant at the 5% level of significance. 
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5.6.2 Estimation of the Earnings Equation for Saudi Workers 
This section discusses estimates of the earnings equation for Saudi workers 
based on the cross-sectional data collected in the chemical and petrochemical 
industries. The equation is expressed as: 
ln(ws)=as+ E Psi Xsi (42) 
Table (5-9) presents the OLS regression results of the estimated earnings equation 
for the Saudi workers. The explanatory variables are mostly the same as those for 
the aggregate earnings equation and the estimation results are discussed in detail 
below. 
Table 5-9 
OLS Earnings Estimates for Saudi and non-Saudi Workers 
Saudi Non-Saud i 
Variable Beta 
StD. 
Error T-Ratio Beta 
StD. 
Error T-Ratio 
Beta 
(Difference) 
Constant 7.791 0.183 42.616 7.037 0.047 148.754 0.754 
Marital 0.018 0.041 0.440 -0.049 0.064 -0.760 0.067 
Children 0.008 0.039 0.192 0.036 0.064 0.564 -0.029 
Manager 0.092 0.055 1.683 0.102 0.045 2.261 -0.010 
Salesmen 0.064 0.055 1.169 0.090 0.047 1.900 -0.025 
Professionals -0.018 0.059 -0.310 0.053 0.042 1.257 -0.071 
Clerks 0.093 0.042 2.233 0.047 0.036 1.322 0.046 
Technicians 0.030 0.089 0.332 0.007 0.037 0.193 0.022 
Foremen 0.151 0.068 2.219 0.035 0.043 0.804 0.116 
Experience 0.043 0.002 21.837 0.034 0.002 21.027 0.009 
Intermediate 0.090 0.039 2.320 0.408 0.053 7.704 -0.318 
Second 0.261 0.038 6.933 0.717 0.043 16.764 -0.456 
Technical 0.339 0.050 6.763 0.786 0.044 18.030 -0.447 
Universit 0.619 0.049 12.571 0.889 0.049 18.272 -0.270 
Trainin -0.003 0.029 -0.105 0.009 0.019 0.492 -0.012 
Mobility 0.097 0.169 0.573 0.021 0.020 1.017 0.076 
Paid Leave -0.005 0.025 -0.208 0.009 0.022 0.404 -0.014 
In'u Risks 0.233 0.051 4.582 -0.006 0.013 -0.462 0.239 
Health 
ervices 0.026 0.026 1.019 -0.008 0.020 -0.375 0.034 
Job Securit 0.009 0.023 0.393 
- 
0.005 0.020 0.235 0.004 
Promotion 0.023 0.026 1.281 0.004 1 0.027 0.136 0.019 
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i) Demographic Factors 
Considering the influence of the controlled components of the demographic 
factors on the compensation of Saudi workers in the chemical and petrochemical 
industries, this table confirms that the coefficient of the marital status variable for 
Saudi workers reveals a positive influence on their earnings. The value of this 
coefficient is estimated at 1.8%, with a standard error of the coefficient estimated 
at 0.041, and a t-ratio of 0.44. It indicates that married Saudi workers earn 
relatively more than their unmarried fellow citizens. Therefore, marital status has a 
marginally positive impact on the monthly earnings of the workers in the chemical 
and petrochemical industries. However, as the t-ratio is very low, the result tends 
to support the null hypothesis of no marital status effect at the 5% level of 
significance. 
The children variable is the other demographic component that influences 
household earnings. As seen on the table, results of the estimated coefficient of the 
children variable suggest that this variable has a slightly positive effect on earnings 
of Saudi workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries, estimated at 0.008. 
This means that because of the appearance of children in the family, these workers 
might be compensated for having children by a relatively low proportion, 
calculated at 0.08%, in comparison to their fellow citizens without children. This 
generally confirms the other empirical studies that argued for the positive impact 
of children. Lundberg and Rose (1998) calculated the positive impact of the 
children on the earnings of American fathers, who could increase their hourly 
earnings with each additional child at 4.5%. However, the significance measures of 
this variable indicate that the standard error has a value of 0.039, and a t-ratio of 
0.192. Therefore, as the t-ratio is very low, this provides evidence of true null 
hypothesis that the children coefficient is insignificant at the 5% level of 
significance. 
ii) Human Capital Characteristics 
The table reports significant returns from education for Saudi workers 
across different educational levels. The coefficient of this variable for Saudi 
university graduates is estimated at 61.9% higher than their colleagues with only a 
primary education, with a standard error of 0.049 and a t-ratio of 12.57, while 
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those with technical educational qualifications have earnings returns estimated at 
33.9% relative to their colleagues with the base education; the coefficient has a 
standard error of 0.05 and a t-ratio of 6.76. The table reports that Saudi workers 
with secondary school qualifications have an earning advantage of 26.1% over 
their colleagues with primary education, with a standard error of 0.038 and a t-ratio 
of 6.93, while Saudi workers with intermediate qualifications have an opportunity 
to earn 9% more than their colleagues with primary education, the base 
qualification, with a standard error of 0.039 and a t-ratio of 2.32. Therefore, the 
significance measures of these variables all suggest that their estimated effects are 
all statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. 
In addition, this table presents data on training characteristics. The data 
shows that Saudi workers are not adequately compensated for any period they 
spent in training during the three years prior to the data collection, as the 
coefficient of this variable is estimated to be -0.003. This suggests that Saudi 
workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries have a lost opportunity cost 
that would be considered to compensate them for any additional training period. 
The standard error of this coefficient is estimated at 0.029 with a t-ratio of -0.105. 
Therefore, the impact of training on the monthly earnings of Saudi workers in the 
chosen industries is statistically insignificant at the 5% level of significance. 
Considering the effect of experience on the monthly earnings of the 
respondent Saudi workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries, the table 
shows a positive value for the estimated coefficient of this variable calculated at 
0.043, which indicates that Saudi workers could increase their monthly earnings 
with one additional year of experience by 4.3%, with a standard error of 0.002 and 
a t-ratio of 21.84. The significance measures of the coefficient confirm that the null 
hypothesis of a no experience effect on the monthly earnings of Saudi workers in 
the chosen industries is rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
iii) Workplace Characteristics 
The results from the occupational status variables have revealed some 
unexpected and interesting phenomena. For example, Saudi foremen earn 15.1% 
more than the workers in the base occupations, with a standard error of 0.068 and a 
significant t-ratio of 2.219, while their fellow citizens in the other occupations earn 
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less than the foremen. Saudi workers in clerical jobs have monthly earnings 
estimated at 9.3% more than their colleagues in the base occupations, with a 
standard error of 0.042 and a t-ratio of 2.233. The standard errors and t-ratios all 
confirm that the estimated effects of these variables on the monthly earnings of 
Saudi workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries are statistically 
significant at the 5% level of significance. The table shows that workers in the 
managerial jobs have mean monthly earnings estimated at 9.2% higher than the 
monthly earnings of their colleagues in the base occupations and sales occupations. 
The variable has a standard error of 0.055 and a t-ratio of 1.683. However, the 
relatively low t-ratio tends to support acceptance of the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient is statistically insignificant at the 5% level of significance. However, 
workers in the managerial occupations are not adequately compensated as 
compared to their colleagues in the foremen jobs, as the coefficient of the 
managerial occupations is estimated less than the coefficient of the foremen and 
clerical jobs by 5.2%. This indicates that Saudi workers in high-ranking positions 
are younger and have fewer years of experience than their fellow citizens in the 
foremen jobs. On the other hand, from the table, Saudi workers in the professional 
jobs are not adequately compensated for their occupational skills, as the value of 
the professional occupation coefficient is estimated at -1.8% with a standard error 
of 0.059 and a t-ratio of -0.310. Therefore, the negative t-ratio confirms the null 
hypothesis of no effect for this coefficient at the 5% level of significance. 
Estimation with the ordinary least square (OLS) is extended to cover the 
effects of fringe benefits on the monthly earnings of the Saudi workers in the 
chemical and petrochemical industries. The table shows how satisfaction of Saudi 
workers with these benefits influences their monthly earnings. It indicates that the 
coefficient of mobility in the labour market is estimated at 9.7%. Estimation of the 
coefficient of this variable reveals a positive influence on earnings of Saudi 
workers who are able to move freely in the labour market without severe 
administrative limits on utilising their privilege to match their skills with 
employment opportunities. The standard error of this variable is estimated at 0.169 
with a t-ratio of 0.573. However, as the t-ratio is very low, the result tends to 
confirm the null hypothesis of no mobility effect at the 5% level of significance. 
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On the other hand, Saudi workers are significantly satisfied with their injury risk 
insurance, as the coefficient of the variable is estimated at 23.3% with a standard 
error of 0.051 and a t-ratio of 4.582. Therefore, the effect of this variable on 
monthly earnings of Saudi workers is statistically significant at the 5% level of 
significance. Moreover, the table shows that these workers are only slightly 
satisfied with the health services they get from their employers in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries. The coefficient of the health services is estimated at 
2.6%; it has a standard error of 0.026 and a t-ratio of 1.019. The low value of the t- 
ratio provides evidence of the null hypothesis of a no health services effect on the 
earnings of these workers at the 5% level of significance. Although labour policies 
have tried to secure employment for Saudi workers in order to enhance their 
participation in the labour market, it seems that Saudi workers in the chosen 
industries are not very satisfied with their job security privileges, as the coefficient 
of job security is estimated at 0.09%, which indicates a minor impact for this 
characteristic on the monthly earnings of Saudi workers. The variable has a 
standard error of 0.023 and a t-ratio of 0.393. Again, the low value of the t-ratio 
supports rejection of its effect at the 5% level of significance. The table spells out 
that the satisfaction of Saudi workers with the job advancement privileges in these 
industries has a positive effect on their monthly earnings, as the promotion 
coefficient is estimated at 3.3% with a standard error of 0.026 and a t-ratio of 
1.281. Therefore, the result might confirm the insignificance of the coefficient at 
the 5% level of significance. On the other hand, as shown in the table, some Saudi 
workers are not satisfied with their annual paid leave fringe benefits. The value of 
the annual paid leave coefficient is estimated at the low rate of -0.05% with a 
standard error of 0.025 and a t-ratio of -0.208. Therefore, the negative impact of 
this variable on the monthly earnings in the chosen industries is statistically 
insignificant at the 5% level of significance. 
5.6.3 Estimation of the Earnings Equation for Non-Saudi Workers 
As in the previous section, estimates of the wage determination Equation 
(43) specified for non-Saudi workers are based on the cross-sectional data 
collected in the chemical and petrochemical industries. The same previous 
variables are repeated here; they are expressed as: 
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ln(wn)=an +EBnixni (43) 
The results of the OLS estimates are presented in Table (5-9). 
i) Demographic Factors 
The table confirms that the coefficient of marital status has a negative 
influence on the earnings of the non-Saudi workers. The coefficient is estimated at 
-4.9% with a standard error of 0.064 and a t-ratio of -0.760. Therefore, the 
significance measures suggest accepting the null hypothesis of no impact of a 
marriage premium on the monthly earnings of these workers at the 5% level of 
significance. This reveals that marital status is not an influential determinant of 
earnings for non-Saudi workers; therefore, the married non-Saudi workers bear a 
burden as they are not adequately compensated for their marriage premium, 
particularly in the absence of their spouses from the labour market due to wide 
social and recruitment barriers to their participation in the Saudi labour market. 
Regulations prevent the household members of non-Saudi workers, particularly 
women who accompany their husbands, to search for work in the labour market. In 
addition, most female employment is in the public departments, which mainly 
recruit Saudi women and, then, only in certain jobs. It was mentioned elsewhere 
that these departments are prevented from recruiting non-Saudis in the local labour 
market, but they can recruit among non-Saudi women from outside the country. In 
addition, work opportunities for women in the private sector are very rare. 
Moreover, many of the foreign workers, particularly those with a lower 
educational level than secondary school, are not allowed to bring their families 
with them to Saudi Arabia; therefore, their spouses remain out of the Saudi labour 
market. However, this result is contrary to the results in the last two sections and to 
the many empirical studies that provide evidence concerning the positive impact of 
the marriage premium on the earnings of the married workers (Korenman and 
Neumark, 1991; Krashinsky, 2000; Richardson, 2000). 
The table also reveals that the presence of children has a positive influence 
on the earnings of non-Saudi workers, with a coefficient of 3.6%, a standard error 
of 0.064, and a t-ratio of 0.564. However, the low value of the t-ratio makes it 
difficult to reject the null hypothesis of a no children effect on earnings at the 5% 
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level of significance. On the other hand, the reason behind the positive impact of 
children's presence might stem from the increased working hours of married 
workers in these industries, as indicated by the descriptive analysis in Table (4-6). 
This confirms the assumption of the relationship between child presence and male 
earnings (Pencavel, 1986; Lundberg and Rose, 1998; Waldfogel, 1998), as this 
relationship showed a positive impact on the fathers' earnings resulting from their 
increased hours of work (Waldfogel, 1998). Lundberg and Rose (1998) confirm 
that fathers with high earnings in the U. S. work 201 hours per year more than their 
unmarried colleagues. 
ii) Human Capital Characteristics 
The OLS regressions of the cross-sectional data in Table (5-9) present 
estimated effects of human capital components on the monthly earnings of non- 
Saudi workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries. The estimates provide 
evidence that higher educational levels are associated with higher earnings among 
these workers. The estimated coefficient for the university graduates provide them 
with mean monthly earnings of 88.9% more than their colleagues in the base 
educational qualification, with a standard error of 0.049 and a significant t-ratio of 
18.27. Non-Saudi workers with technical qualifications have a positive effect from 
their educational qualifications over those in the base qualifications. The 
coefficient of the variable is estimated at 78.6% with a standard error of 0.044 and 
a t-ratio of 18.030. Those who have secondary academic qualifications earn 71.7% 
more than their colleagues in the base educational qualifications (primary 
education). The standard error of the variable is estimated at 0.043 with a t-ratio of 
16.764. The table reports that non-Saudi workers with intermediate qualifications 
have an earnings advantage of 40.8% over their colleagues with primary education. 
The standard error of the variable has a value of 0.053 and a t-ratio of 7.704. It is 
clear that education, as a main component of human capital, has a significant 
influence on the monthly earnings of these workers. This confirms the theoretical 
assumptions of the positive impact of education on workers' earnings, because this 
variable has its explicit effects on the workers' skills. The table confirms that more 
highly educated workers earn more than their colleagues with less education, as the 
percentage difference between the university graduates and those who have 
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technical education is about 10.3%, and the difference between the former group of 
workers and those with secondary qualifications is about 17.2%. Moreover, the 
standard errors and t-ratios all suggest that the estimated effects from these 
variables are all statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. 
As regards the effect of training on the earnings of non-Saudi workers, the 
table suggests that the effect is positive, but only marginally. The coefficient of the 
training variable is estimated at 0.09% with a standard error of 0.022 and a t-ratio 
of 0.404. This variable indicates that non-Saudi workers are marginally 
compensated for their training. Therefore, the low value of the t-ratio provides 
evidence to support the null hypothesis that the training coefficient has no 
statistically significant effect on the dependent variable at the 5% level of 
significance. 
From this table, the estimated coefficient of the actual work experience has 
a positive influence on the earnings of non-Saudi workers. The value of this effect 
is estimated at 3.4% with a standard error of 0.002 and a t-ratio of 21.03. Thus, 
work experience is a highly significant variable in determining the earnings for 
non-Saudi workers in these industries. Moreover, it appears that the location of the 
non-Saudi worker's previous work experience, either inside or outside Saudi 
Arabia, does not matter in the determination of the worker's current earnings. 
iii)Workplace Characteristics 
The table also reports the results of estimations for workplace 
characteristics for the non-Saudi workers. It confirms that the occupational status 
of non-Saudi workers reveals some consistency of influence from the 
hierarchically-structured occupational distribution on their monthly earnings in the 
chemical and petrochemical industries. Judging from this table, recruitment of 
these workers in managerial positions provides them with 10.2% more monthly 
earnings than their colleagues in the reference occupation, with a standard error of 
0.047 and a t-ratio of 1.90, while salesmen earn 9% more than their colleagues in 
the base occupation, with a standard error of 0.047 and a t-ratio of 1.9. The 
coefficient of the professional occupations is estimated at 5.3% higher than the 
monthly earnings of their colleagues in the reference occupations, with a standard 
error of 0.042 and a t-ratio of 1.26. The table shows that non-Saudi workers in 
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clerical occupations earn 4.7% more than their colleagues in the base occupation, 
with a standard error of 0.036 and a t-ratio of 1.32. As the t-ratios are relatively 
low, they could not confirm that the coefficients of these variables are statistically 
significant at the 5% level of significance. On the other hand, the table shows that 
the coefficient of foremen occupations has an effect on the monthly earnings of the 
non-Saudi workers estimated at 3.5% higher that their colleagues in the base 
occupations, with a standard error of 0.043 and a t-ratio of 0.193. Non-Saudi 
workers in technical jobs earn marginally more, at 0.07%, than their colleagues in 
the base occupations, with a standard error of 0.037 and a t-ratio of 0.804. 
However, as the t-ratios are very low, this provides evidence to confirm the null 
hypothesis of no effect of the coefficients of these variables at the 5% level of 
significance. The table further reports the effects of other workplace characteristics 
on the monthly earnings of non-Saudi workers in the chosen industries. Most of the 
controlled variables reveal positive influences on monthly earnings of non-Saudi 
workers in these industries with the exception of the health services and injury 
risks insurance variables, which have negative effects. The coefficient of the paid 
leave characteristic has a marginal influence on the monthly earnings of non-Saudi 
workers, estimated at 0.09%, with a standard error of 0.022 and a t-ratio of 0.404, 
while the mobility variable has a relatively larger positive influence, estimated at 
2.1%, with a standard error of 0.020 and a t-ratio of 1.017. The table confirms that 
non-Saudi workers who are satisfied with their job security working conditions 
earn 0.05% more than their dissatisfied colleagues. The standard error of the 
variable is estimated at 0.02 with a t-ratio of 0.235. Moreover, the coefficient of 
promotion benefits indicates that satisfied non-Saudi workers earn only 0.04% 
more than their dissatisfied colleagues, with a standard error of 0.027 and a t-ratio 
of 0.136. However, again the low values of the t-ratios support the null hypothesis 
of no effect of the respective coefficients of these variables at the 5% level of 
significance. On the other hand, satisfaction with the injury risks insurance 
variable among non-Saudi workers reveals a negative impact on their monthly 
earnings. The estimated coefficient of this variable is calculated at -0.06%, which 
means that non-Saudi workers pay more to buy insurance against work risks they 
face, or it means that their employers do not contribute to their subscription to the 
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GOSI according to labour regulations. The standard error of the variable is 
estimated at 0.013 with a t-ratio of -0.462. Moreover, satisfaction of the non- 
Saudis with their health services has a marginally negative effect on their earnings. 
The variable coefficient is estimated at -0.08% with a standard error calculated at 
0.020 and a t-ratio of -0.375. Therefore, the significance measures of the 
coefficients of these variables confirm the statistical insignificance of these 
coefficients at the 5% confidence level. 
5.7 TESTING ESTIMATES 
In the above two sections, the compensation regressions for Saudi 
and non-Saudi workers are specified separately (Equations 42 and 43) in order to 
estimate the effects of different characteristics on the compensation or earnings of 
each group of workers. A test must be conducted to determine whether or not the 
effects of such characteristics on earnings differ significantly across the two groups 
of workers. The Chow test provides a technique that is generally used to examine 
equality between coefficients of two or more different subsamples (Koutsoyianmis, 
1987). This test is based on the F test and is formulated as: 
F. _ 
(E eP- (E e, +Ee,, )) 
Ees +Een (n, +n2 -2k) 
(44) 
where eP is the residual sum of squares (RSS) in the aggregate or pool regression 
of all workers; e, is the RSS in the Saudi workers regression equation; e2 is the 
RSS in the equation of non-Saudi workers; k is the total number of the explanatory 
variables; and n, and n2 are the number of observations in the subgroup samples 
of Saudi and non-Saudi workers, respectively. Then, the observed F* ratio has to 
be compared with the tabulated Foos with vi =K and v2 = (n5 + n -2K) degrees of 
freedom. If F* > Foos, reject the null hypothesis that BS; = B,,;, otherwise the null 
hypothesis is accepted. 
In this research, application of the Chow test is based on estimates of the 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the pooled sample of the two groups of 
workers, and the estimates of each group of workers as presented in Table (5-10). 
Looking at this table, the Chow test is calculated in (45) and (46) as: 
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F_ 
17.293-(5.383+7.793)/21 
(5.383+7.793)/538 (45) 
0.196 
_8 167 0.024 (46) 
The tabulated Foos with vi = 21 and v2 =538 degrees of freedom produces a critical 
value of about 1.81. As the F* >F5, the test provides evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis that estimates of the coefficients of the characteristics of Saudi workers 
BS; and that of non-Saudi workers B,,; are equal. Therefore, there appears to be a 
strong indication that comparable explanatory variables have different effects on 
the monthly earnings of Saudi workers as opposed to non-Saudi workers. 
Therefore, the conventional approach of pooling workers from different groups , 
especially from different nationality backgrounds, seems to be invalid. 
Table (5-10) 
Analysis of Variance for Estimates of Saudi and 
Non-Saudi Workers and their Pooled Sample 
Sample e? n1 K 
Pooled 17.293 538 21 
Saudi 5.383 210 
Non-Saudi 7.793 328 
5.8 COMPARISON OF SAUDI AND NON-SAUDI EARNINGS: 
Based on the results of the estimated earnings functions (Equations 42 
and 43) for the two groups of workers, this section discusses the differences in the 
wage determination mechanism across the two groups of workers. The last column 
in Table (5-9) shows differences in the variables' coefficients of Saudi workers and 
non-Saudi workers. As shown in this table, the estimated coefficients of the 
personal and workplace variables of these workers confirm the existence of an 
earnings differential between them across the three categories of the variables, as 
follows: 
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i) Demographic Variables 
The impact of the marital status on the determination of the monthly 
earnings between the two groups of workers is calculated at 6.7% in favour of 
Saudi workers. This means that a married Saudi worker is compensated 6.7% as a 
marriage premium more than the married non-Saudi worker. On the other hand, the 
presence of children pays a non-Saudi worker 2.9% more than a Saudi worker. 
ii) Human Capital Variables 
Non-Saudi workers are significantly better compensated for their 
educational qualifications when compared to the Saudi workers. The university 
qualification influences the average monthly earnings of non-Saudi workers by 
27% more than their Saudi counterparts, while the difference in the earnings of the 
two groups due to technical educational is calculated at 44.7% in favour of non- 
Saudi workers who have such a qualification. Moreover, the possession of a 
secondary education has a greater influence on the monthly earnings of the non- 
Saudi workers than it does on their Saudi counterparts. Considering this variable, 
ceteris paribus, it influences the monthly earnings of the non-Saudi workers by 
45.6% more than it influences the monthly earnings of their Saudi counterparts. 
Moreover, the difference in the monthly earnings of the two groups due to the 
impact of the intermediate qualification is calculated at 31.8% in favour of non- 
Saudi workers. 
Saudi workers gain marginally more than their non-Saudi counterparts 
from their working experience, which rewards Saudis at 0.9% higher than non- 
Saudis. However, the training variable influences a difference in monthly earnings 
between the two groups at 1.2% in favour of non-Saudi workers. 
ii) Workplace Characteristics 
The influence of occupational status indicates that non-Saudi workers in 
professional jobs earn 7.1% more than their Saudi counterparts in these 
occupations, while recruitment of non-Saudis in the salesmen jobs puts their 
monthly income at 2.5% higher than Saudi workers. The table further shows that 
non-Saudis in the managerial occupations can get an additional 1% of 
compensation more than their Saudi counterparts in such jobs. In contrast, Saudi 
workers in the foremen jobs have estimated monthly earnings of 11.6% more than 
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that of the non-Saudis, and Saudis in the clerical jobs earn 4.6% more than the 
non-Saudis in these occupations. From this table, technical occupations marginally 
influence the difference in the monthly earnings of the two groups by 2.2% in 
favour of Saudis in these jobs. 
However, the other workplace characteristics reveal differences in the 
monthly earnings of the two groups of workers and confirm earnings inequality 
between them across these characteristics. From the table, the difference in the 
estimated coefficients of injury risks is calculated at 23.9% in favour of Saudi 
workers. The difference in the value of the mobility coefficient between the two 
groups of workers shows that Saudi workers earn 7.6% more monthly than non- 
Saudi workers in the chosen industries. The estimated coefficient of health services 
allows Saudi workers to gain 3.4% more than their non-Saudi counterparts, while 
satisfaction with promotion fringe benefits influences the monthly earnings 
inequality between the two groups of workers by 2.9% in favour of Saudi workers. 
On the other hand, the difference in the estimated coefficient of paid leave 
influences monthly earnings of non-Saudi workers at 1.4% more than the Saudi 
workers. Contrariwise, Saudi workers benefit marginally from the positive effect 
of job security, which allows for an inequality difference in the monthly earnings 
between the two groups of workers of 0.4% in favour of Saudi workers. 
However, it is obvious that non-Saudi workers in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries are dissatisfied with their fringe benefits in the workplace 
in comparison with their Saudi counterparts. Hamermesh (1999) argued about the 
importance of the job satisfaction concept as a measure to compare the welfare of 
workers and how they perceive that their work affects their economic outcomes. 
This confirms the conclusion by Grund and Sliwku (2001) and Vanin (2001) 
regarding the relationship between earnings and job satisfaction. Non-wage or 
fringe benefits represent a major part of the working conditions that are provided 
to workers either through regulations or collective agreements. Therefore, workers' 
satisfaction with such benefits, in the chosen industries, is widely influenced by 
their personal contract of employment that governs the work relationship, 
particularly in the case of non-Saudi workers. This contract is largely influenced 
by labour regulations that show little support for workers, particularly foreign 
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workers, as indicated in Chapter Three, in the private sector, and do not provide 
them with job security and employment. Such regulations have ambiguous and 
weak disciplinary actions regarding hiring and firing, and they have no 
comprehensive rules concerning occupational health and safety. Moreover, the 
Saudi labour market is a highly regulated one which suffers various structural 
problems, as there are no autonomous labour courts, nor is there a standard 
employment contract, as the contracts are personal and differ from one worker to 
another even in the same workplace. Therefore, the results of these workplace 
characteristics confirm the existence of the segmentation phenomenon in the Saudi 
labour market, as some workers (Saudi employees) have better working conditions 
that provide them with job security and employment protection. 
5.9 WAGE DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN SAUDI AND NON-SAUDI 
WORKERS 
Since the 1970s, most of the empirical studies on wage differentials 
between two or more groups of workers have attempted to identify the causes of 
the earnings gap between these workers. Generally speaking, these studies have 
applied multiple regression analysis to the decomposition of such earnings gaps. 
The decomposition technique of Oaxaca-Blinder, as discussed in Chapter Two, is 
largely adopted in most empirical studies using natural logarithmic (log) earnings 
as the dependent variable. In this technique, coefficients for the two groups of 
workers (Saudi and non-Saudi in this study) are estimated separately, instead of 
using the subjugated or disadvantaged group as the reference group, as in the 
traditional regression equation that uses a dummy variable that ignores this group. 
In this study, the technique is applied by using the monthly earnings 
estimates of Equations (42 and 43) for Saudi and non-Saudi workers. The standard 
decomposition technique requires that either the slopes of Saudi workers (ßs; ) or 
the slopes of non-Saudi workers (ßni) be used as a reference point to weigh the 
differences in the attributes of the two groups of workers and to estimate such 
differences. The two equations are combined together in Equation (47), as 
expressed by Goldin (1990), using the slopes of Saudi workers (Bi)as the 
reference point: 
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_a)+Zx ni(Bsi - 
Bni)1+EBsi(xsi-xni) (47) 
Based on the estimates of this equation, Table (5-11) presents the 
decomposition of the wage differentials and wage discrimination in the chosen 
industries. On the table, the intercepts of the first term on the right hand side are 
shown in columns (1) and (4); the second term is provided in column (7); and the 
third term is in column (8). In this study, the difference in the attributes of Saudi 
and non-Saudi workers is weighted by slopes of Saudi workers, which is expressed 
by the third term in Equation (47) on the right hand side as EBsi (`xsl -xn; ) . This 
term expresses the part of the earnings gap between the two groups of workers that 
is explainable by the differences in the characteristics of the two groups of 
workers. The first two terms in this equation represent the unexplained portion of 
the wage differentials and is expressed as: 
(W., 
-Wnl)-l(äa-än)+ niAI -Bni)I 
(48) 
Following Gosse (2002), since Saudi workers make up the comparison 
group, positive coefficients of the characteristics indicate higher earning power for 
Saudi workers, thus increasing the wage differentials and wage discrimination 
between the two groups of workers. On the other hand, negative coefficients 
indicate greater earning power for non-Saudi workers and decrease the wage 
differentials and wage discrimination between them. The explained and 
unexplained components of the wage differentials between Saudi and non-Saudi 
workers are analysed as follows: 
5.9.1 The Unexplained Wage Differentials 
As seen in this table, the first part of the unexplained portion is the 
difference in the intercepts of the two groups of workers, while the second part 
expresses the difference in the coefficients of the characteristics of these workers 
weighted by the average value of the characteristics of non-Saudi workers. 
According to the standard decomposition theory, the unexplained components of 
the earnings gap refer to the differences in the pay of the two groups of workers 
that is attributable to the same set of characteristics. Therefore, the differences in 
the earnings of the two groups in the unexplained portion arise from the differences 
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in the coefficients of the two groups (Equation 48). The decomposition of this 
portion analysed across the three main categories comprise these characteristics as 
follows: 
i) Demographic Characteristics 
From this table, the marital status has a positive value indicating that Saudi 
workers earn 3.7% more than non-Saudis due to the difference in the coefficients 
of the two groups, which means that the marital status positively contributes to an 
increase in the monthly wage differentials between the two groups in the 
unexplained portion. The table shows that, the coefficient of children reveals that 
the difference in the two coefficients provides non-Saudis with relatively more 
earnings than their Saudi counterparts and, thus, reduces the monthly wage 
differentials between the two workers with relatively small value of 1.5% in the 
unexplained residual. 
ii) Human Capital 
From the table, the difference in the value of the university coefficients 
remunerates non-Saudi workers more highly than their Saudi counterparts and, 
then, contributes to a reduction in the monthly earnings gap between the two 
groups of 14%. Technical education acts to decrease the monthly earnings gap in 
the unexplained portion by 9.6% due to higher coefficients of non-Saudis for this 
characteristic. This is followed by the secondary qualification coefficient that 
increases the earnings power of non-Saudis to reduce the monthly earnings gap in 
the unexplained residual 6%. The intermediate qualification coefficient contributes 
marginally at 1.4% to the reduction in the monthly earnings gap in the unexplained 
portion. The difference in the experience coefficients between the two groups 
contributes to a rise in the monthly wage differentials in the unexplained portion of 
11.2% in favour of Saudi workers, whilst training increases the earnings power of 
non-Saudis to earn relatively more than their Saudi counterparts at 2.1% and, then, 
decreases the monthly earnings gap in the unexplained residual. 
iii) Workplace Characteristics 
The occupational categories have marginal influences on the monthly 
earnings gap in the unexplained residual portion. The difference in the professional 
coefficient makes non-Saudis earn marginally more than their Saudi counterparts 
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at 1.7%; this reduces the earnings gap in the unexplained portion. Another 
marginal influence arises from the managerial jobs coefficient that contributes to a 
reduction in the earnings gap in the unexplained residual at 0.2%, as non-Saudi 
workers have more earnings than their Saudi counterparts in managerial jobs. 
Salesmen occupations contribute marginally to the reduction in the earnings gap in 
the unexplained portion at 0.1%. In contrast, foremen, clerical, and technician 
occupations act to widen the monthly earnings gap between the two groups of 
workers at 0.8%, 0.6%, and 0.3% for the three occupations, respectively, due to 
marginally higher Saudi coefficients. 
The table also presents the contribution of fringe benefits to the wage 
differentials and wage discrimination between the two groups of workers in the 
chosen industries. The injury risks coefficient increases earnings of Saudi workers 
by a marginal amount of 1.3%, which contributes to a widening of the monthly 
earnings gap between the two groups of workers. The health services coefficient 
again widens the earnings gap, due to the remuneration of Saudis more than their 
non-Saudi counterparts at 1.1%, while the difference in the paid leave benefit 
contributes to a decrease in the earnings gap between the two groups of workers at 
1.1%, due to the higher coefficient for non-Saudi workers. The coefficients of the 
job security and promotion fringe benefits make Saudis earn marginally more than 
non-Saudi workers at 0.1% and 0.3% for the two coefficients, respectively. 
The overall portion of the unexplained earnings differentials is estimated at 
60.6%. The constant terms make a significant contribution to the unexplained 
portion. The difference in the intercepts of the two groups of workers is calculated 
at 0.754 in favour of Saudi workers. This difference indicates that a Saudi worker 
has an opportunity to earn 75.4% more each month than a non-Saudi worker, 
ceteris paribus. This indicates that earnings of Saudi workers might continue to 
increase with improvements in their working conditions in comparison with that of 
their non-Saudi counterparts, whose wages increase more slowly. The other part of 
the unexplained earnings is calculated at -0.147, which indicates that the 
coefficients of non-Saudi workers (B,, ) reduce the earnings gap between the two 
groups of workers to 14.7%. However, the unexplained portion in the monthly 
earnings differentials between the two groups of workers in the chosen industries 
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may be partially due to differences in the characteristics between the two groups of 
workers, which might not be included in the model and may be partially due to 
discrimination in the labour market. Such discrimination might be the result of 
labour regulations that favour Saudi workers rather than their foreign or non-Saudi 
counterparts. 
5.9.2. The Explained Earnings Gap 
The other part on the right-hand side of Equation (47) shows the 
differences in the characteristics of the two groups of workers weighted by the 
coefficients of the characteristics of the Saudi workers, which is expressed as 
EBs' . (x si _X ni) . 
This term represents the explained portion of the earnings 
differential between Saudi and non-Saudi workers. The earnings differential 
between the two groups of workers arises due to the difference in their personal 
and productivity characteristics that compose three categories: demographic, 
human capital, and workplace characteristics. These are further decomposed in the 
table as follows: 
i) Demographic Characteristics 
From the table, the marital status and children characteristics have marginal 
influences to increase the explained monthly earnings gap between Saudi and non- 
Saudi workers at 0.3% and 0.1% for the two characteristics, respectively, because 
married Saudi workers earn more than their non-Saudi counterparts. 
ii) Human Capital Characteristics 
As shown on the table, educational qualifications generally have little 
ability to explain the monthly earnings gap between the two groups in the chosen 
industries. The largest contribution is from the university qualification 
characteristic which decreases the monthly earnings gap in the explained portion 
by 15.6%; this is attributable to the fact that a higher proportion of non-Saudi 
workers are university educated compared to the Saudis, among the interviewed 
workers*. Technical education again contributes to decreasing the earnings gap in 
the explained portion by 4.2%, as non-Saudi workers earn more than their Saudi 
0 The interviewed non-Saudi workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries with a university 
education count 30% in the quota sample, while Saudi workers with such a qualification comprise 
about 11% of the total sample. 
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counterparts who have such qualifications. The secondary qualifications 
characteristic provides Saudi workers with a power to earn 2.8% more than their 
non-Saudi counterparts and, then, increases the monthly earnings gap in the 
explained portion. The intermediate characteristics weighted by the Saudi 
coefficients produce marginally positive earnings for Saudi workers at 1.2% and 
serve to widen the monthly earnings gap in the explained portion. On the other 
hand, training characteristics marginally influence the earnings power of Saudi 
workers to earn 0.1% more than their non-Saudi counterparts for each training 
period and, then, increase the monthly earnings gap between the two groups of 
workers. Experience characteristics make quite a high contribution to the earnings 
of non-Saudi workers at 15.4% more than their Saudi counterparts and decreases 
the monthly earnings gap in the explained portion. 
iii)Workplace Characteristics 
Occupational characteristics of the workers in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries marginally influence the explained wage differentials 
between the two groups of workers. Clerical jobs provide Saudi workers with an 
opportunity to earn more than non-Saudis at 2.3% and, then, increase the monthly 
wage differentials between them. The managerial category contributes marginally 
at 1.1% to increase the monthly earnings gap between the two groups, favouring 
Saudi workers. However, non-Saudi workers in the foremen and technician jobs 
earn marginally more than their Saudi counterparts at 0.5% and 0.4% for the two 
posts, respectively, and reduce the monthly earnings gap between the two groups. 
However, Saudi workers in the professional and salesmen occupations also earn 
marginally more than their non-Saudi counterparts at 0.3% and 0.2% in the two 
jobs, respectively. This increases the monthly earnings gap in the explained 
portion. On the other hand, Saudi workers are benefited by other workplace 
characteristics, which provide them with more earnings than their non-Saudi 
counterparts; this increases the monthly earnings gap between the two groups in 
the explained portion. The injury risk characteristic makes a significant 
contribution to the monthly earnings of Saudis by 20.6% more than the non-Saudis 
and, thus, widens the earnings gap between the two groups. The mobility 
characteristic increases the explained monthly earnings gap by 7.1% in favour of 
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Saudi workers. The health services characteristic again contributes to increase the 
gap between the two groups of workers by 2.1% due to biased compensation 
favouring Saudi workers over their non-Saudi counterparts with the same 
characteristics. Mobility provides Saudi workers more earnings than non-Saudis, 
but only marginally at 0.2% and, then, increases the earnings gap in the explained 
portion. On the other hand, the paid leave fringe benefit weighted by the Saudi 
coefficient has no effect on the explained wage differentials between the two 
groups of workers in the chosen industries. Therefore, both of the two groups 
receive a similar benefit for their paid leave attribute. However, the decrease and 
increase in the estimated influences of the variables of the three categories, i. e, the 
demographic characteristics, human capital characteristics, and workplace 
characteristics, produce an aggregate sum of the explained portion of the wage 
differential, which counts 0.020, (from the last cell in the last column in the table); 
this contributes about 3% to the aggregate wage gap between the two groups of 
workers. 
5.10 CONCLUSIONS 
Using estimates of table 5-11, the aggregate monthly wage differential 
between Saudi and non-Saudi workers in the chosen industries given by Equation 
(47) is calculated at 62.6% in favour of Saudi workers*. The unexplained portion is 
given by the first right hand side of Equation (47); it calculates as 0.606, which is a 
proportion of 97% of the raw wage gap. The large proportion of the unexplained 
portion is attributed to the high value of the constant term of the equation 
Os- in) that calculates 0.745. However, the unexplained portion may be 
attributed partially to differences in other characteristics between the two groups of 
workers, which might not be controlled in the model, and partially to 
discrimination in the labour market. On the other hand, the explained portion, as 
mentioned above (in section 5.9.2), represents the aggregate sum of the differences 
between characteristics of the two workers weighted by the coefficients of Saudi 
*The absolute figures for equation (47) as estimates in Table (5-11) are calculated as: 
Wo -W n =[(7.791-7.037)+(-0.147)] +0.02 
=(0.754)+(-0.147) +0.02 
= 0.606 (unexplained portion) + 0.020 (explained portion) 
= 0.626 
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workers. This portion is calculated at 0.02, which is a proportion of 3% of the 
aggregate wage gap between the two groups of workers. These proportions are 
largely different from those in other countries. Oaxaca (1973) estimated the 
unexplained or wage discrimination portion of raw wage differential in the U. S. at 
74% for white workers and 92% for black workers. The remainder is the explained 
portion estimated at 26% and 8%, respectively, due to personal and productivity 
characteristics such as occupation, health problems, education, experience, on-the- 
job training, and other characteristics shown elsewhere. Blinder (1973) found that 
the unexplained portion of the wage differentials between white males, white 
females, and black workers in the U. S. ranged between 30-40%, while the 
explained portion ranged between 60-70% due to education and other 
characteristics discussed in the previous section. Swaffield (2000) decomposed 
earnings differentials between males and females in the U. K. and estimated the 
unexplained gender gap to be between 12 and 43%, with the remaining portion 
being the explained wage differentials arising from differences in experience, 
education, participation in the labour force, work-oriented women, non-work- 
oriented women (labour market motivation), marital status, and some other 
characteristics. Cohen and House (1993) found that the unexplained earnings 
differentials between males and females in Sudan is 32%, with the explained 
portion at 62% due to education, potential experience and its square, job 
experience, working in a public or a foreign firm, occupation, and industry. Knight 
and Sabot (1995) discussed labour market discrimination in Tanzania; they 
concluded that wage discrimination between Africans and non-Africans is 
estimated at 69% after controlling for differences in education, job tenure, 
employment status, age, training, and occupation. Further, they found that if 
occupation is excluded from the analysis, the discrimination or the unexplained 
wage differential is estimated at 78%. Therefore, compared with the findings in the 
literature, the unexplained portion of the earnings gap between the Saudi and non- 
Saudi workers is significantly higher than it is for any other two groups of workers. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The overall aim of this study is to examine the extent of wage differentials 
and wage discrimination between Saudi and non-Saudi workers and to analyse 
their sources by examining the structure and operation of the labour market in 
Saudi Arabia. In this study, analysis of the wage determination is based on cross- 
sectional data that was collected directly among workers in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries in the three main cities of the country. The information 
extracted from the survey relates to: demographic features of workers, their human 
capital, and workplace characteristics, as well as the workers' monthly earnings. 
The previous chapters discussed various issues related to the structure of 
employees' compensation in the country. They discussed the main characteristics 
of the Saudi labour market. The main characteristic was the persistent skills 
shortage that faced this labour market, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s 
when the country adopted development plans in five-year phases. Foreign workers 
were allowed to enter the country under specific and restricted conditions in order 
to meet the labour demand arising from the new projects that dramatically 
increased the number of labour participants in the labour market and brought new 
occupations that were unknown in Saudi Arabia before the 1970s. Meanwhile, the 
government exerted considerable effort to change the structure of the labour force 
for the benefit of its indigenous workers. It provided various free educational and 
training programmes for Saudis and encouraged them for recruitment in the public 
sector, which provides good work conditions and social prestige for workers, 
although foreign workers are still present across all the occupations, including the 
prestigious ones. In the 1990s, the government started to freeze recruitment for 
various jobs in the public sector and instructed private firms to substitute Saudi 
nationals for their foreign or non-Saudi workers. This policy is known as 
Saudisation, under which some occupations are completely restricted for 
recruitment of Saudi workers. This policy has fundamentally distorted the structure 
and the incentive scheme of the Saudi labour market. On the other hand, the policy 
has substantially raised the reservation wage of the Saudis and cultivated a 
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dependency culture among them. This is reflected by the very low labour market 
participation rates among the Saudis. Although the rate marginally increased from 
31.2% in 1980 to 35.8% in 2000, it is nonetheless substantially lower than the 
participation rates elsewhere in the world. On the other hand, non-Saudi workers 
are severely restricted from employment in certain occupations, especially the 
highly skilled ones. As a result, a mismatch between the demand for and supply of 
skills in the Saudi labour market has emerged, which has given rise to the 
unemployment phenomenon for the first time since the discovery of oil in Saudi 
Arabia, despite an overall labour shortage that is primarily caused by the very low 
labour market participation rate among the indigenous workforce. 
Also, the Saudi labour market is characterised as a highly regulated one: 
there are many labour regulations that govern employment and working conditions 
in both the private and government sectors. These regulations provide Saudi 
workers with various privileges that are not extended to their non-Saudi 
counterparts in these sectors. These regulations comprise: labour law, pension act 
for workers in the public sector, residential regulations for foreign workers, risk 
injury insurance regulations for workers in the private sector, and various civil 
service regulations for workers in government departments. These regulations 
contribute to the segmentation of the labour market into a dual market: one sector 
for Saudi workers who experience secure employment, better pay, and good 
working conditions, including various short and long vacations, pension pay, and 
free public health facilities. The other sector that is crowded with foreign workers 
who have poor working conditions, very limited labour market mobility, low pay, 
and working without pension. Besides differences in the working conditions of the 
two groups of workers, these regulations largely contribute to wage inequality in 
the labour market, as they require the employer to pay more for Saudi workers than 
non-Saudi workers. Although the Saudi labour market has undergone many 
changes over the past few decades, there has been little amendment to the labour 
regulations since their enactment in the 1960s. Moreover, labour regulations 
together with other regulations assigned the relevant authorities the power to 
interpret and implement various policies on different aspects of the labour market 
rather freely. The labour law applies to workers in the private sector, but it does 
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not provide adequate recruitment procedures, as the individual contract is the main 
instrument that governs relations between the employer and employees. Neither 
does the law support collective bargaining because trade unions are not allowed in 
the country. Therefore workers, especially those in the private sector, are largely 
subject to informal and arbitrary remuneration schemes that could easily give rise 
to earnings inequality and discrimination in the private sector. Barsalou (1985) 
stated that labour law articles on wages do not protect Saudi and non-Saudi 
workers equally, as the earnings difference is an obvious phenomenon between the 
two groups of workers in the labour market. In 2002, the wage distribution of 
Saudi and non-Saudi workers revealed a consequent substantial increase in the 
earnings gap between the groups, the aggregate monthly wage ratio of Saudi to 
non-Saudi workers calculated at 3.7 in 2002 in comparison to 3.3 in 1994 in favour 
of Saudi workers over the two periods. 
Economists provide their interpretations of the determinants and causes of 
the wage inequality that usually arises between two or more groups of workers. 
From a conceptual point of view, the inequality can be attributed to both the labour 
supply and demand factors. The labour supply determinants are usually categorised 
into different broad groups, which include personal characteristics or endowments, 
human capital factors, the social welfare system, and workplace characteristics. 
The first group mainly contains the workers' age, marital status, family size, sex, 
race etc. Such factors have been extensively examined in previous studies (see, for 
example, Koreman and Neumark 1991; Lilland and Waite 2000; Dixon 1996, 
Chayny et al. 2001). The second group of factors reflect the workers' effort to 
augment their earnings potential in the labour market. These determinants mainly 
contain educational qualifications, work experience, physical health of the worker, 
and job training. Many economists also argue about the impacts of human capital 
investments on the wage differentials in the labour market (Mincer, 1974 and 
1993; Becker, 1975; and Killingsworth, 1975; among many others). 
Moreover, social benefits and taxes influence labour supply and, in turn, 
have their impacts on the workers' earnings in the labour market. The literature on 
these issues assumes that the labour market is in a state of equilibrium before the 
imposition of labour taxes. But with the tax imposition, wages are decreased, so 
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the workers must increase their labour supply if they wish to make up for the 
earnings cut. The social security system is another factor that has an influence on 
the labour supply and, in turn, on the workers' earnings. Smith (2000) argues that 
reduction of welfare benefits induces substitution effects, which causes individuals 
under the welfare programme to reduce their work hours to zero. 
On the other hand, the labour demand side is influenced by factors include 
technological change, international trade, and consumers' tastes. The technological 
change has its impact on the demand for labour, since technology allows the 
society to achieve greater and more varied consumption possibilities. Meanwhile, 
technology helps to create scale effects, which in turn enlarge and change the mix 
of output. Economists (Johnson, 1997; Card, 2002, Borjas; 2002) argue that a 
relative rise in wages and employment due to technological change suggest that 
demand for labour must have risen at a faster rate than supply. Moreover, they 
contend that the difference in earnings between skilled and unskilled labour is 
determined by changes in relative demand for, and supply of, labour, as well as by 
a parameter reflecting the degree of substitution between the two categories of 
labour (Acemoglu, 2002; Johnson, 1997). It is envisaged that low substitutability 
between different groups of workers contributes to the occurrence and persistence 
of wage differentials. 
Trade is another demand factor that has its positive and negative influences 
on wage determination in the labour market. Borjas and Ramey (1995) explain that 
with the advent of international trade, foreign firms capture returns that would go 
to the domestic industry. They argued that when foreign firms enter markets in 
which domestic firms have market power, their entry increases the wages of 
highly-educated workers in two ways. First, because revenues of domestic firms 
have fallen, the wage ratio of workers remaining in these industries decreases. 
Second, to the extent that foreign competition reduces employment in the 
concentrated industries, many of the workers move to lower-paying competitive 
sectors, while the wages of less-educated workers fall relative to the educated 
workers. The conventional theory of the labour market assumes that while the 
marginal revenue product for labour (MRPL) determines a firm's demand for 
labour in the short run, the demand under the conditions of the aggregate industry 
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level is determined by the prevailing wage rate in the industry. The theory 
postulates that the responsiveness of labour in industry to changes in the wage rate 
is measured by the elasticity of labour demand. 
Labour market segmentation is another issue influencing earnings and 
recruitment of the workers in this market. Under the segmentation phenomenon the 
labour market comprises two segments, the primary and the secondary sectors. 
Doeringer and Piore (1979) argue that the two sectors are interconnected, as the 
workers' movement between these sectors occurs at certain job classifications that 
form ports of entry to, and exit from, the internal or primary labour market. The 
internal labour market provides workers with certain privileges such as better pay, 
work advancement, employment stability, training opportunities, and better 
working conditions. In this segment, workers have specific administrative rules 
that could protect them from the competition of the external labour market, and 
their workplace is more structured in comparison to their counterparts in the 
secondary segment. The theory of labour market segmentation attributes the 
existence of barriers between the two sectors to the characteristics of the secondary 
sector. These characteristics mainly comprise: instability of employment, high 
unemployment rates, low wages and poor chances for advancement, poor training 
opportunities, and absence of administrative rules for work. 
This study covers various issues related to the compensation structure of 
employees in the Saudi labour market. It finds that with the booming oil revenues 
of the 1970s, Saudi Arabia adopted ambitious development plans that aimed to 
raise the standard of living and to build some new economic activities through 
financing of both public and private projects. These plans obliged authorities to 
import skilled and unskilled workers and to contract with multi-national 
companies, which brought their experts and skilled workers to endeavour to 
rebuild the country and change it from its subsistence state into a modern 
economy. 
Foreign workers came from different parts of the world to meet the new 
demand for labour in different occupations. They actually formed the labour force 
in the country, as their participation rate in the labour market hovered around 70% 
in the 1980s. This study found that Saudi workers preferred recruitment in 
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government departments rather than with the private sector, but with restrictions 
and freezing of recruitment for these departments in the 1990s, unemployment 
emerged among these workers for the first time since the discovery of oil in the 
1930s. 
This pushed the authorities to adopt new policies that aimed at decreasing 
the number of non-Saudi workers in the labour market. Therefore, many jobs 
occupied by non-Saudi workers started to be substituted by Saudi workers, in both 
the government departments and the private sector. This is what is known as the 
Saudisation policy. 
The study finds that regulations strictly control the labour market in the 
country either directly, through labour law, civil service regulations, pension, and 
social security insurance acts, or indirectly, through migration regulations. 
Consequently, these regulations have largely contributed to increase labour 
market segmentation in the country, as they allocate many preferential work 
privileges to Saudi workers rather than to their non-Saudi counterparts. The 
residency regulations that are applied only to non-Saudis require a Saudi sponsor 
before workers enter the country and allow them to move in the labour market only 
under certain conditions. More regulations are in place to restrict the mobility of 
non-Saudi workers across firms and occupations once they are admitted to Saudi 
Arabia. These regulations allow the foreign or non-Saudi workers to stay in the 
country only for a temporary renewable period. 
In contrast, labour market regulations provide Saudi workers with better 
working conditions in the areas of recruitment, payment, work hours, vacations, 
training, work advancement, compensation, and pension, while their non-Saudi 
counterparts in both the government departments and the private sector are denied 
these privileges. This largely contributes to the wage differentials between the two 
groups of workers, and increase segmentation of the labour market. 
The study examines a range of variables that affect the wage differentials 
and these are classified into three categories: demographic factors, human capital 
components, and workplace characteristics. These variables provide an instrument 
to interpret the earnings differentials (compensation) between Saudi and non-Saudi 
workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries. 
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Due to the paucity and restrictions in official data, the present study employs 
a survey among the workers in the Saudi Chemical and Petrochemical industries. 
As an initial step to analyse the survey information, simple descriptive statistical 
methods are used to reveal the structure of employee compensation according to 
various classification schemes. The descriptive analysis shows percentile ranking 
of the earnings distribution between Saudi and non-Saudi workers in the chemical 
and petrochemical industries. 
The aggregate earnings ratio of Saudi to non-Saudi workers in the lower 10th 
percentile is 1.8; the ratio in the median percentile is 1.75; and the ratio in the 
upper percentile is 1.92. Ranking of the earnings distribution based on the 
demographic characteristics, human capital components, and workplace 
characteristics provides further evidence of higher earnings by Saudi workers than 
their non-Saudi counterparts. 
Age as a demographic factor shows an influence on workers' earnings, which 
increase as the worker's age increases. Application of the percentile measures to 
the demographic factors reveals that Saudi workers in different age groups have 
higher earnings than their non-Saudi counterparts across the three percentile ranks. 
The relationship between marital status and earnings differentials shows a positive 
influence of the marriage institution on the workers' earnings in the Saudi labour 
market. It reveals that married workers in the chemical and petrochemical 
industries earn more than unmarried workers by 42%. The cross-sectional data has 
recorded the same result among workers in each of the two groups. The Saudi 
married workers earn more than their unmarried fellow workers by 52% to 82% 
across the three percentile ranks, while the earnings differentials between the non- 
Saudi married and unmarried workers ranges between 41% and 83%. 
The presence of children is another demographic factor that influences the 
workers' earnings. The study finds differences in earnings between workers with 
children and workers without children between the two groups of workers. The 
earnings ratios of Saudis without children to non-Saudi workers with and without 
children show higher earnings in favour of Saudi workers without children. 
Considering influences of the human capital components on earnings 
differentials between the two groups of workers, the descriptive analysis shows 
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positive impacts of education, training, and experience on the earnings of these 
workers. The earnings ratio of Saudi workers with various educational levels to 
their non-Saudi counterparts range between 2 to 3 across the educational levels 
from primary to university. The percentile ranking measures reveal the same trend 
with earnings differential ratios ranging between 1.64 and 2.55 in favour of Saudi 
workers with different educational qualifications. 
In addition, the study examines the influence of years of work experience on 
the earnings inequality between the two groups of workers. The descriptive 
analysis shows that Saudi workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries 
have less experience than their non-Saudi counterparts by 16 years on average, but 
Saudi workers receive higher earnings than their non-Saudi counterparts. The 
earnings inequality ratio between the two groups of workers range between 1.85 
and 3.67 for Saudi workers across experience years. 
The occupational status of the workers in the chemical and petrochemical 
industries has influence on the earnings distribution among these workers as well. 
The dissimilarity index or discrimination index shows some differences in 
distribution of the two groups of workers across occupations. The study finds that 
Saudi workers are relatively concentrated in white-collar jobs, particularly in 
managerial and clerical jobs, as they make up about 67% of the Saudi respondents, 
while the non-Saudi workers are relatively concentrated in the professional, 
production, and technical occupations, with a proportion of 58% of the non-Saudi 
respondents. The study finds that about 49% of either, or both, Saudi and non- 
Saudi workers have to shift their jobs for the occupational distribution among them 
to be completely identical. The occupational earnings ratio tells of a continuity of 
earnings inequality in favour of Saudi workers who earn between 49% and 71% 
more than their non-Saudi counterparts, as is indicated by the earnings ratios of 
Saudis to non-Saudis across occupations. 
Considering the relationship between earnings and worked hours in the 
chemical and petrochemical industries, the study finds that Saudi workers earn 
more than their non-Saudi counterparts even when both of them work the same 
number of hours. The earnings ratio of the two groups of workers who work 
between 45-48 hours per week records earnings differentials between them as 1.85 
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for Saudi workers, while the earnings differentials between the two groups who 
work between 50-53 hours is 1.97 in favour of Saudi workers. 
The study tries to examine the workers' job satisfaction in terms of non- 
pecuniary benefits that include: health services, paid leave, mobility in the labour 
market, and job security. It finds that the Saudi workers enjoyed more job 
satisfaction than their non-Saudi counterparts on top of the earnings ratio of 1.94 in 
favour of the Saudi workers. 
To further enhance the understanding of the wage determination 
mechanism in the selected industry, the techniques of regression analysis and the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analysis have been employed. Regression analysis 
of the labour supply side factors is divided into two main parts: estimation using 
the overall sample, and estimation using the sub samples of each of the two groups 
of workers (Saudi versus non-Saudi). 
The results of the regression analyses show that the ethnicity or nationality 
variable has a substantial influence on the workers' earnings in these industries. 
Workers with Saudi nationality receive a premium of 87.7% more in their monthly 
earnings than their non-Saudi counterparts. 
The estimates of the impact of the demographic variables that comprise 
marital status and children reveal that the former variable has a positive effect on 
the workers monthly earnings, while the children appearance has a negative effect 
on workers' monthly earnings in the chemical and petrochemical industries. 
Estimates of the human capital components that comprise education, 
training, and experience reveal significant influences on workers' earnings. The 
coefficient on education is estimated at 70.2% for university qualifications and 
54.7% for technical qualifications, while workers with secondary qualifications 
have a lower earnings return than their colleagues with technical qualifications, but 
higher than those with intermediate qualifications. 
The study finds that training has a negative influence on a worker's 
earnings in the chemical and petrochemical industries as the training courses a 
worker had attended during the previous three years were not considered to be a 
compensation factor. It finds that the actual work experience variable has a 
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marginally positive effect on the earnings of these workers (with a coefficient 
estimated at 3.8%). 
The workplace variables comprise occupational status, possibility of job 
mobility, job security, health services, paid leave, work advancement, and work 
injury insurance. The occupational status variable reveals relatively low influence 
on earnings of the workers in professional and technical jobs in comparison to their 
colleagues in the foremen occupations, as well as for those in clerical and 
managerial jobs. Some workplace variables such as paid leave, health services, job 
security, and job mobility produce marginally positive effects on the workers' 
earnings with rates ranging between 3.7% and 0.8% for all workers, with the 
exception of the health services variable which produces a negative impact on the 
workers' monthly earnings in the chosen industries. 
Insofar as separate regression analyses for Saudi and non-Saudi workers are 
concerned, it is found that the coefficients of the marital status and children reveal 
relatively low positive effects on Saudi workers' monthly earnings in comparison 
to a negative estimate for the marital status coefficient on the monthly earnings of 
the non-Saudi workers who do, however, gain by having children. 
The results of the regression for the two groups of workers indicate that 
education has a positive influence on earnings for both groups of workers. Rather 
interestingly, non-Saudi workers are rewarded more for their education than their 
Saudi counterparts. This suggests that these workers are more educated than their 
Saudi counterparts and confirm that the earnings variation is mainly due to the 
nationality or ethnicity variable. It is found that between the two groups of workers 
high education levels are associated with higher earnings; also, the estimates of the 
impact of the work experience provide positive effects on the earnings of both 
groups. It is found that an increase in the experience of the Saudi workers by one 
year could provide them a 4.3% increase in his/her monthly earnings, while non- 
Saudi workers can gain 3.4% in their monthly earnings. This piece of evidence 
may be an indirect indictment of the discriminatory labour market policy in Saudi 
Arabia: earnings variation is mainly due to nationality or ethnicity variable rather 
than human capital variables. 
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The estimates of the workplace characteristics indicate irrelevant results for 
occupational status on the earnings of Saudi workers, as it is found that foremen 
are rewarded better for their occupation than their fellow workers in other 
occupations. This is in contrast to the non-Saudi workers whose earnings profile is 
generally consistent with their hierarchical occupational status. 
The results of the regression analysis explain advantages and disadvantages 
of working conditions provided for employees in the chemical and petrochemical 
industries. The workplace variables have their positive influence on the monthly 
earnings of Saudi workers, except for the paid leave characteristic, which has a 
negative effect on the monthly earnings of these workers, while these variables 
have marginally positive effects on the monthly earnings of non-Saudi workers for 
such privileges, except for health services and job security, which have negative 
effects on their monthly earnings. 
Based on Goldin's (1990) suggestion of the decomposition technique, the 
study decomposed compensation of Saudi and non-Saudi workers in the chemical 
and petrochemical industries. It found that Saudi workers are compensated higher 
than their non-Saudi counterparts, as the earnings differential between the two 
groups of workers is estimated at 62.6% in favour of Saudi workers, while the 
aggregate value of the explained portion of the compensation structure of the two 
groups of workers is estimated at 3% of the total wage differentials and the 
unexplained portion reveals extreme estimates at 97% of the total wage 
differentials. This unexplained portion is much higher than the estimates in other 
similar studies. There are a number of possible reasons for this unusually high 
estimate in the present study. On the one hand, the level of wage discrimination in 
the Saudi labour market can indeed be much higher than elsewhere, as 
discrimination is actively encouraged or protected by government policies in Saudi 
Arabia but generally discouraged or rectified elsewhere. On the other hand, the 
present estimate may be subject to error because some other relevant variables may 
be missing from the estimated earnings equations. One potential source of error is 
the omission of demand-side factors in the estimated wage equations, which is a 
standard practice in the literature on wage differential and wage discrimination. 
However, this omission cannot significantly change the basic findings of this 
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study. Although the demand-side variables are omitted from the wage equations, 
the chosen supply-side variables explain very well the log-wage variable (the 
dependent variable) as the coefficient of determination (R2) for the estimates of 
the pool sample indicates that these variables can explain 87.7% of variation in 
log-wage of workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries. Therefore, it 
can be claimed with confidence that labour market discrimination is significantly 
higher in the Saudi labour market than elsewhere. 
The current investigation does not attempt to capture directly the 
quantitative effects of the Saudisation policy on the extent of labour market 
segmentation and wage discrimination, it is nonetheless beyond reasonable doubt 
that the Saudisation policy is a major source of the substantial wage discrimination 
in the selected Saudi industries. Although not a focus of the current research, the 
far-reaching effects of the Saudisation policy on the Saudi labour market and the 
Saudi economy need to be carefully examined. It is worth noting that there have 
been some improvements in the performance of the labour market for the Saudi 
nationals, as the overall unemployment rate decreased from 13% in 1992 to 8.1% 
in 2000 and the labour market participation rate increased from 31.1% to 35% over 
the same period. However, the improvement, especially in terms of labour market 
participation, seems to be rather small. Moreover, there are potentially significant 
adverse effects associated with the Saudisation policy, both in the short-run and 
over the long-run. 
First of all, the Saudisation policy has led to a significant problem of miss- 
match between jobs and skills. As many Saudi workers are new entrants to the 
labour market and thus lack the relevant skills and experience for the usually 
demanding skilled jobs, they are not as qualified as the non-Saudi workers whom 
they are replacing. As a result, the overall productivity of the workforce must be 
reduced. Moreover, as the Saudi workers usually have a higher reservation wage 
than the non-Saudi workers across the board, the cost of labour and thus the cost of 
production must have been increased. This has an adverse supply-side effect which 
tends to increase wages and prices in the economy whilst reduce the rate of 
employment in the meantime. 
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Second, the Saudisation policy and the substantial level of wage 
discrimination distort the labour market incentive structure and the relative prices 
system in the economy. As a result, the problem of misallocation of labour and 
other economic resources arises or deteriorates. Moreover, the use of government 
subsidies to the private sector for the purpose of recruiting Saudi nationals will 
strain the public finance, which calls into question the long-run sustainability of 
the policy. 
Finally, this policy over-protects Saudi workers from competition in 
the labour market, which could lead to a dependency culture among the 
Saudi workers. The over-protection could lead to reduced efforts to compete, 
innovate, invest in human capital, and search for alternative job 
opportunities. Moreover, the marginal rise in the labour market participation 
rate among the Saudis is an indication of the limited effect on the work 
attitude of the economically inactive Saudi nationals. This adverse impact on 
the long-run competitiveness of the Saudi workforce and thus the Saudi 
economy is a particular cause for concern, as an increasing number of Saudi 
firms are establishing cross-border production such as SABIC and as the 
country is about to join the WTO. Therefore, the Saudisation policy has to 
be seriously re-evaluated and reformed in order to improve the competitive 
standing of the Saudi economy in the context of increasing globalisation. 
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Appendix I 
Source of Official Document on the 
Saudisation Policy 
Saudisation or nationalisation refers to the labour policy adapted in 
Saudi Arabia in the 1980s and applied to different economic sectors such as 
foreign banks in the country, oil companies, and to the labour market when 
the expatriates in the top ranks were substituted by Saudi nations. Although 
the implementation of the saudisation policy started in the 1980s, there are 
no a high rank official decree on the policy. So the practice of Saudisation 
was largely informal and on a limited scale. In the 1990s, this policy is 
widely applied in the labour market and covers all occupations. The policy 
aims to replace foreign workers by Saudi nationals. It mainly based on the 
Ministerial Decree No. 50 of 1994, which states that firms employing over20 
workers to have reduce the number of foreign worker by 5% a year. 
235 
APPENDIX II : 
Questionnaire to 
Workers in Chemical and Petrochemical Industries 
Purpose of this Questionnaire: 
This questionnaire aims to collect data on some aspects of labour 
economics among workers in the Chemical and Petrochemical industries in Riyadh 
, Jeddah and Dammam the main three cities of 
Saudi Arabia. This to fulfill 
requirements of Ph. D. degree. 
Information and answers to this questionnaire will be consolidated and 
generalized in the study, in addition your answer will not be used as example in 
any part of the study and will not be used in any other purpose except the academic 
It is not require to mention name or address . Please, sure your answer to all 
question is valuable and will contribute to the results and conclusions of the study. 
In most cases you are required to tick in the appropriate box to the answer that is 
the most appropriate to you please, in such cases, use (X) % 
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Part I 
Area ......................................... Age 
Marital Status: 
(please tick the appropriate answer) 
Married 
Number of Children F] 
Daily Work Hours 
Nationality ........................................ 
Cl 
Unmarried 
Part II : Experience and Training 
1-Total Experience (in home &Saudi) Q years 
2-Work Experience in Saudi 
Q 
years 
3-What is your current occupation? 
Managerial job Q Professional Q Sales Clerical E] 
Technician Q Craft Job Q 
4-Did you change your job in the local labour market before? 
Yes Q No Q 
If (yes) What reason(s) ? 
(Please tick the appropriate answer) 
work itself not suitable to my experiences Q 
looking for higher wage Q 
looking for a secured job Q 
others (States) 
5-Please, what reason (s) make you to stay at the current work? 
work satisfaction 
Q 
employer objection 
Q 
exhaustion of the allowed period 
Q 
6- Do you think it is easy to change your employer in the local market ? 
Yes Q No 
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7-Did you ever be unemployed during last three years? 
Yes F-I No E 
8-Education: 
primary inten-nediateF-l secondary fl 
technical education EJ university & Higher 
9-Did you receive any type of training during the last three years? 
Yes F-I No LI 
Part III -Wage and Benefits. 
10-What factor(s) determine your wage in the current job? 
( Tick the appropriate answer(s)) 
For Saudis For non-Saudis 
qualifications Q qualifications Q 
experience F7 experience F7 
personal negotiation personal negotiation F7 
kinship relation to the employer standard of living in country home 
family size standard of living in the local market E1 
hours of work family size 
type of work itself Q hours of work 
wage levels in the same occupatiori-= type of work itself 
0 
wage level of other colleagues in the wage levels in the same occupation 
same work wage level of other colleagues in the 
nationality 
Q same work 
language skills 
0 
wage level of the same nationality 
El 
rate my national currency to SR 
El 
language skills Q 
driving experience 
El 
other (states) ............................................................................... 
11-Do you face any problem to receive your wage on the date? 
Yes No 
Q 
If yes, state t is problem s ......................... 
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12-Please, what are main components of your usual wage ? 
A- Pecuniary Benefits: 
-basic monthly wage (in figures) SR ............................................... 
-transportation allowance (in figures) SR 
............................................... 
-housing allowance (in figures) SR 
............................................... 
-traveling expenses (in figures) SR ............................................... 
- annual allowance (in figures) SR ............................................... 
- bonus ............................................. 
(in salary month equivalent ) 
B-Non- pecuniary Benefits 
(Please, check the appropriate box for the suitable answer) 
Satisfied dissatisfied 
- promotion 
Ö ý 
-earnings iI 
- job security 
ö 
- working free 
e 
-hours of work a O 
- post status 
-work relations 
E 0 
-health services El El 
- paid leave 0 
0 
-injury risks insurance 0 
0 
13-What period does this wage cover? 
(Tick the most appropriate answer) 
Weekly 71 Bi-monthly] Monthly 
Others (states) ........................................................................ 14-Are you subscribe to the Social Insurance Organization? 
Yes = No skip to Q 16 
What risks do you insured against? 
(Tick the appropriate answer): 
-pension (include accident) 
D 
-accident only F1 
15-When you get close to retirement age(or 65 old years) ; what are you planning 
to do? 
(Tick the appropriate answer) 
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A- For Saudis Q 
run own business Q look for another job 
stop work and stay at home Q 
B-For non-Saudis 
look for another job 
back home and run own business 
back home and stay at home 
16- Are you satisfy with your current pay ? 
Yes No 0 
17-Do you think there is other colleague(s) who in a similar occupation of yours 
and 
receive more pay than you? 
Yes 0 No 
If yes , what 
do you think is the reason(s)? 
education 
training 
experience 
nationality 
martial status 
family size 
work hours 
other(s) 
states ......................................................................................... . 
18-Do you have a chance to change your current wage level? 
Yes No F-I 
If (yes), how can that be ? 
Through: a 
promotion 
applying a request 
arguing to labour office R 
if (No) what is the reason(s)? 
lack of promotion system a in the firm 
restrictions of the contract 71 
rigidity of job evaluation s F7 
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